EDITORIAL

Emerging Research Fields, Networks, and Mertonian Norms
by Christopher Kullenberg & Jakob Lehne 3-4

ARTICLES

Claims to Globalization: Thailand’s Assembly of the Poor and the Multilevel Resistance to Capitalist Development
by Pei Palmgren, New York University 5-22

Becoming Power Through Dance
by Duygun Erim, The Open University 23-37

Changing the system from the outside – an evaluative analysis of social movements opposing the 2007 G8 summit
by Patrick T. Hiller, Nova Southeastern University 38-53

Multinational Corporations and Human Rights Abuses: A case study of the Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People and Ijaw Youth Council of Nigeria
by Victor Ojakorotu and Ayo Whetho 54-80

School’s Out: strategies of resistance in colonial Sierra Leone
by Christine H. Whyte, London School of Economics 81-91

REVIEWS

“Conceptualizing Resistance”, by Jocelyn A. Hollander and Rachel L. Einwohner
by Johan Johansson, University of Gothenburg, Museion 92-96
Emerging Research
Fields, Networks, and Mertonian Norms

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In 1942 Robert K. Merton writes the essay “The Normative Structure of Science”, where he argues that there are functional imperatives which must be put to work in order to arrive at purely scientific results. These institutional imperatives were summarised in the later to be famous CUDOS model, consisting of “Communism/communalism”, “Universalism”, “Disinterestedness”, and “Organised Scepticism”. They were directed explicitly to the expulsion of Jewish scientists in Nazi Germany, and could also be said to be in defence of the enlightenment tradition and a liberal social order at the time it was written. However, in the late 1960s Merton was heavily criticised from various directions. For example, the notion of disinterestedness was said to be unrealistic since social and individual interests were actually what made scientific facts to appear at all. Also the neutrality of organised scepticism, which is similar to Karl Popper’s falsification model, has been challenged by authors claiming that scientific data are always theory-laden, and that we make choices as social collectives in deciding in what direction to proceed in research.

How would then the Mertonian ethos of science relate to Resistance Studies? Well, Merton was, in a way, somebody who resisted a dominant
power structure within academia himself. The Nazi ideology excluded Jewish scientists, and by arguing in favour of a certain ethos he tried to challenge this destructive conception of race and society.

But there is also a practical dimension to why it is relevant to talk about Merton today. The peer review model that we also use for this journal is very much a product of the proposed combination of universalism and communalism imperatives. Universalism, the pre-established impersonal criteria, is to be found in the practice of always treating articles that are submitted in an anonymous fashion. Neither the reviewer, nor the author, know exactly who is at work in the process, and this is applied to prevent bias in gender, nationality or official academic degree. Moreover, the communalism principle, where scientific knowledge is treated as a common good accessible to (almost) anyone, echoes in the open access model of publication, which the Resistance Studies Magazine has chosen. Any findings or reflections should be possible for anybody to seek inspiration in or criticise, and should not be kept restricted to those who can afford subscription through large publishing houses.

It is always important to reflect upon the ideals of academic work and its relations to the public(s). However, it is even more exciting to deal with the practicalities of editorial work. Since the readership of electronically distributed magazine does not have any upper limit, nor is it possible to know who is going to read it, there is a large amount of randomness. Since the first issue came out in January, the response has been very positive, both in terms of comments from inside and outside of academia, also in having twice as many submissions for this second issue. This time we are publishing five articles and one article review, thus connecting to a potentially wide audience. This second issue of the Resistance Studies Magazine will contain a variety of approaches, which ought to be relevant for anyone interested in the complex phenomenon of resistance practices.

The editorial work has been a challenge this time as well, partly because the submissions doubled. Producing this magazine with a zero-budget requires the ambition of dedicated people, and those are to be found in the editorial board, amongst the authors and within the Resistance Studies Network. As editors we would like to give special thanks to Wei Liu, who did some amazing emergency review work with the shortest notice possible, and Ingrid Ekenberg, who volunteered to help us out the days before publication.
Claims to Globalization: Thailand’s Assembly of the Poor and the Multilevel Resistance to Capitalist Development
by Pei Palmgren, New York University

For centuries, groups and individuals have continually resisted unjust social processes and structures by asserting their political agency through sustained collective actions. While these actions have varied depending on particular circumstances and locations, they have always been greatly determined by the historical context in which they have occurred. Thus, as the world was organized through the construction of modern nation states in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, localized actions against immediate authorities diminished and modern forms of social movements emerged within a national context (Tilly 1984). In turn, transformations that have occurred on a global scale in the latter half of the twentieth century have begun to alter the ways in which collective action is carried out. In the context of an integrated and increasingly pervasive global economy, many social movements have recognized the extent to which overarching global economic processes can exert influence over social, political, economic, and ecological circumstances in local and national realms. In contrast to past movements that operated solely within the nation state and international state system, several movements have responded strategically to the transnational practices of global capitalism by fostering connections with an expanding web of transnational networks that allow for interactions with
globally dispersed allies and opponents. As such, their political activities have expanded beyond the state to include actions at transnational and global scales.

In this paper I seek to examine forms of multilevel resistance to capitalist development in Thailand that have been carried out by the social movement network, the Assembly of the Poor (AOP). Following a brief discussion of Thailand’s development agenda as occurring within the context of neoliberal globalization, I will focus on the ways in which the AOP has advanced its efforts to oppose the adverse social and ecological ramifications of capitalist development through actions at local, national, and global scales. In analyzing such actions I hope to argue that the AOP’s transnational extension has allowed its members to confront multiple areas of power and authority that exist within the global economy while including them in broader arenas and networks of resistance that are spreading throughout the world. Lastly, I hope to raise questions about the potential that emergent forms of grassroots globalization and global politics may have in challenging the hitherto dominant system of neoliberal globalization.

Globalization and Capitalist Development in Thailand

Understood in its most general sense, globalization refers to “the widening, deepening, and speeding up of global interconnectedness” (Held et al. 67). While this interconnectedness manifests itself in various social, cultural, political, and ecological forms, in practice, the economic processes of neoliberal globalization have significantly defined the concept. In this form, globalization is “arguably the politics of instituting a corporate market on a global scale” (McMichael 596). Demonstrating such politics, the global capitalist economy was constituted throughout the late twentieth century by national policies of deregulation, privatization, and liberalization of trade and investment that were implemented worldwide with varying pressure from supranational institutions such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF). Defined as “…an economy whose core components have the institutional, organizational, and technological capacity to work as a unit in real time, or in chosen time, on a planetary scale,” the global economy serves to connect capital, savings, and investment from national economies throughout the world (Castells 311). Accompanying the development of this economy has been the emergence of new global actors – particularly transnational corporations and global economic institutions – who have gained considerable influence over policies and overall development agendas of individual nations. The emergence of such actors
has resulted in the transfer of vast amounts of decision-making authority from individual states to the governors of the global economy and helped to transform capitalism from its previously international system into a globalizing one in which “there are hardly any places now left outside of market influences” (Harvey 67).

A key component of such a transformation has been “the restructuring of states to facilitate global circuits of money and commodities” (McMichael 596). Thailand’s development agenda, beginning in the 1950s and accelerating in the late 20th century, is one example of many across Asia, Africa, and Latin America that reflects such restructuring. Largely backed by a World Bank plan of rapid industrialization, this agenda was initially characterized by substantial economic investment in urban infrastructure, a strong market orientation, and a leading role for the private sector and foreign investment (Bello et al. 6). The military dictatorship of Sarit Thanarat (1958-1963) set the course by promoting capitalist development as “both an economic goal to be pursued and an ideology on which the legitimacy of the government was based” (Keyes 76). Showing a comprehensive departure from Thailand’s pre-1960 agricultural-based economy and society, succeeding governments maintained this goal and ideology by seeking urban-based industrial growth through a liberal, market-oriented approach (Falkus 15). Subsequently, the National Economic and Social Development Board in the Prime Minister’s Office began to focus on export-oriented manufacturing policies that were accompanied throughout the 1980s by “the tremendous infusion of foreign capital” (Bello et al. 6). By the 1990s foreign capital had contributed so much to Thailand’s growth that the World Bank, IMF and many mainstream economists regarded it and other countries of Southeast Asia as “exemplars for the rest of the developing world” (Rigg 3). However, perpetually overshadowed by the immensity of this economic development was its unevenness across the country. Largely left out of the success stories of Thailand’s development during this time was the subordinated position of the country’s rural regions to the capital city of Bangkok. Put simply, the government strategy of the late twentieth century was “consistently a lopsided, shortsighted one of milking and permanently subordinating agriculture to urban commercial-industrial interests” (Bello et al. 137). Exploitation and transfer of wealth from the country to the city persisted throughout the 1960s and 1970s as agricultural exports provided the manufacturing sector with capital to acquire imported machinery (Suphachalasai 67). By the 1990s the agricultural sector had declined heavily in relation to manufacturing,
bringing the most poverty and despair to small-scale farmers and peasants (Bello et al. 135). In the context of economic growth predicated by participation in external markets, such populations have been rendered insignificant and thus vulnerable to exploitation by and exclusion from the rapid changes occurring within Thailand.

Associated with such subordination has been the environmental degradation, and associated human consequences, caused by several aspects of Thailand’s development agenda. For example, the country’s earlier integration into the world economy as a resource and agricultural exporter entailed heavy deforestation that has continued throughout the decades, resulting in Thailand’s northeast region to lose nearly 30% of its forests between 1961 and 1997 (Bello et al 183). Such deforestation has caused multiple and lasting problems for those living in the countryside, foremost of which include droughts and destructive floods induced by watersheds that are destabilized by industry logging (Bello et al. 176). Contributing greatly to hastened deforestation, while presenting a set of ecological problems of its own, has been the construction of dams that have been “developed fundamentally to provide electricity for the country’s rapid industrial growth, centered disproportionately around Bangkok” (Glassman 519). In addition to contributing to the disappearance of an estimated 2,000 square kilometers of forest, hydroelectric dams have displaced thousands of rural families (McCully 83-85) and significantly reduced water and fish availability for those living in various river basins (McCully 53). Furthermore, the proliferation of shrimp farms in southern Thailand, implemented to increase supplies for global food markets, is having damaging effects on the coastal environment as well as the communities whose livelihoods have been dependent on the area’s deteriorating mangroves (Barbier and Sathirathai 2004).

Considering these damaging consequences, ecological degradation and its concomitant human suffering have proven to be inherent features of Thailand’s economic development agenda. Moreover, as this agenda continues to be greatly influenced, if not determined, by an increasingly powerful and invasive global economy, those who traditionally subsist outside of it face serious threats to their fundamental means of survival and ways of living. Thus, it is easy to see why rural resistance movements have developed alongside these projects. During periods of parliamentary democracy in the 1970s, groups such as the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) and the Peasant’s Federation of Thailand (PFT) built strong memberships for their respective resistance movements, only to be
systematically repressed in the lead up to and after the 1976 military coup (Missingham 22-24). With such repression, rural protest was temporarily contained until the parliament replacement of the military dictatorship provided the context for a reemergence of protest activity beginning in the mid-1980s (Baker 13). While protests were initially localized during this time, in the late 1980s political organization of villagers began to redevelop in ways that would lead to the creation of a new political space within which rural agency could be asserted into the national discourse on development and progress. As will be discussed, this discourse has been greatly influenced by members of the AOP who have proclaimed crucial concerns of Thailand’s marginalized rural populations in national and, more recently, global political arenas.

**Contested Development in the Global Economy: The Case of the Assembly of the Poor**

Amid the vast social and environmental transformations that were occurring within the context of Thailand’s economic development, community leaders and NGO activists saw an increasingly urgent need for a broad umbrella organization able to fight for community rights at the national level (Missingham 38). Thus, on December 10th, 1995 a conference entitled, “Assembly of the Poor: The Consequences of Large-scale Development Projects” was held at Thammasat University in Bangkok and attended by representatives of such village organizations as the Northern Farmers’ Network, the Network of People Affected by Dams, and a network of urban slum dwellers (Missingham 38). During the conference, villagers, NGO activists, academics, and university students participated in panels and gave speeches about the negative social and ecological impacts of industrial development. After days of discussion, participants drafted the “Mun River Declaration,” which served as a manifesto announcing the formation of the AOP and attacking “state policies that promote industrial development at the expense of the environment, the small-scale agricultural sector, and urban laborers” (Missingham 39). Most importantly, the Mun River Declaration signified the refusal of the most excluded and ignored sectors of Thai society to remain passive subjects of the rapid changes taking place within the country. Days after it was prepared, hundreds of AOP members introduced themselves to the state and public by marching through Bangkok and submitting the declaration and list of demands to the Thai government.

In the years following the Mun River Declaration, the AOP greatly expanded its membership through the development of an extensive and
diverse network of the country’s poor populations. By 1997 six villagers’ networks representing over 36,000 families from all regions were incorporated into the AOP and broken down into “problem groups” that included Forest and Land, Dams, State Development Projects, Slum Community, Work-Related and Environmental Illness, Alternative Agriculture, and Small Fishers (Missingham 45-46). The inclusion of urban slum dwellers and laborers into the network is significant because these groups consist largely of farmers and other rural inhabitants who moved to Bangkok to address worsening conditions at home through the demand for service and manufacturing labor in the city. Thus, the diffuse nature of poor populations throughout both rural and urban sectors has provided an extensive grassroots base for the AOP’s emergence and progression as a broad-based national movement of the “poor” who are “victims of development” (Missingham 44). In addition, the AOP’s network consists of multiple alliances with the urban middle class, academics, media, and NGOs who have added much logistical support to this grassroots base (Banpasirichote 237).

Through its networked organizational structure, the AOP has been able to develop a movement that is continually progressed by democratic cooperation among community groups and their allies. In contrast to a hierarchical structure that concentrates authority at the top and dictates an agenda to a rank and file, the decentralized AOP network allows representatives from several villagers’ organizations, NGOs, and academics to share information and agree upon the best courses of action for the movement (Missingham 53). As such, the movement is motivated by a diverse collection of immediate grievances that are specific to particular communities, and taken together, these grievances comprise a united opposition to common processes and practices of development. In addition, they assert a historically marginalized discourse about rethinking and resisting the capitalist development paradigm that the Thai government has adhered to. How this growing discourse has translated into political practice within and between local, national, and increasingly global scales is a topic of further examination.

**Political Actions in the National Arena**

Though problems stemming from Thailand’s capitalist development program inevitably emerge as local manifestations, most of the AOP’s political actions have occurred in the national arena in which several of the
movement’s local groups have converged to collectively assert their respective claims. As one NGO adviser explains, “After many years of protest by different villagers’ groups at local sites of conflict…villagers have repeatedly encountered the plea that the officials in those [local authority] positions do not have the authority to act on their demands” (Missingham 139). Thus, in March of 1996, after dissatisfaction with government inaction towards their original petition, the AOP staged their first mass protest in front of the Government House – the center of state power and authority. The rally of 12,000 people lasted for five weeks and gained public recognition as well as a promise by Prime Minister Banharn to take action on all grievances listed in the petition (Missingham 129). Though, after months of government negligence, the late-1996 collapse of Banharn’s Chart Thai Party, and the reluctance of the new Prime Minister, Chavalit Yongchaiydh, to implement his predecessor’s promises, the AOP began planning their next action. It was their following protest that would fully assert them into the national political arena as a diverse yet unified social movement seeking immediate changes in the ways in which the state carried out its development projects.

On January 25th, 1997 thousands of villagers from all regions traveled to Bangkok by bus, train, and shared vehicles to converge on the capital in a show of force outside of the Government House. The villagers, along with hundreds of urban slum dwellers who joined the rally, amounted to over 25,000 protesters who refused to move until the government responded to their petition (Missingham 121). Immediately upon entering the city, a “Village of the Poor” was constructed directly outside of the Government House within which villagers shared their experiences with each other and the urban public through speeches and performances. River community representatives spoke of the damage that dams have caused to their fishing practices, forest communities expressed concerns over harmful forest management projects, and other villagers from several areas throughout rural Thailand similarly asserted grievances and claims specific to their local circumstances. In addition, talks about the government’s neglect of these populations were given by NGO activists and academics at various venues across the city, including parks and college campuses, serving important purposes of public education on the lives and experiences of perpetually ignored segments of Thai society. As a whole, the globalized capitalist development paradigm was admonished while public support for community-based sustainable development was sought.
Central to the demonstration’s contestation of the Thai government and its policies were efforts to generate necessary support from the urban public. As such, protesters framed their demands within the popular discourse of “Nation, Religion, and King.” Reference to such ideologies helped to “undermine the ideology of difference and otherness that is attached to poor protesters” while “underscoring shared identity and suggesting common citizenship rights with other sections of Thai society” (Missingham 158). Such framing indicates a concerted effort by villagers to introduce themselves as a constitutive yet neglected part of Thai society. Furthermore, because the protest included several urban laborers and slum dwellers, the ever-present rural/urban divide was challenged with pleas for recognition of the diffuse poverty that had been increasing as a result of development projects in all regions of the country. The protest was presented as a series of claims towards the Thai government to be included within the unfolding of the development process rather than as a threatening resistance to mainstream Thai society.

Throughout the 99 days of the demonstration, increased support from the Thai public helped to put pressure on the government to consider the demands of the AOP. Negotiation meetings were held between AOP members and government representatives, including Prime Minister Chavalat (Missingham 131). With the help of a mostly sympathetic media, these negotiations were presented to a national audience in such a way that garnered further support from most of the country’s middle-class and NGO sector. This backing was decisive in prompting the government to accelerate its efforts to address the villagers’ demands. Eventually, the government agreed to all 122 grievances put forth by the AOP, which included the establishment of a 1.2 billion baht fund to compensate communities harmed by dams and other development projects (Missingham 131). In addition, one dam project was cancelled while five others were put under review, and resolutions that allowed for long-settled groups to remain in forest zones were passed (Baker 23). Though the protest was an immediate success, the ensuing economic crisis that hit Thailand and Southeast Asia later that year would have a devastating impact on these concessions as they collapsed along with the Chavalit government.

Nonetheless, the demonstration did make a valuable impression on Thai society that would not have been achieved if their actions had remained local and dispersed. Most importantly, the construction and maintenance of a makeshift village within Bangkok proved effective in presenting to the public the continued hardships of those populations largely
neglected in the popular discourses on economic growth and development. Throughout the three-month-long protest, the site functioned like an actual village with daily routines of domesticity, sustenance, and survival. As anthropologist Bruce Missingham observed first-hand, “…domestic activities became symbolic, signifying the protesters’ persistence and resistance to the destructive effects of development and their intention to endure here in the rally site until the state responded” (M MISSINGHAM 142). Such a display of the lives of villagers from across the country served as a distinct contrast to the signs of wealth and prosperity that had been growing rapidly in the country’s urban center and proved effective in dispelling inaccurate depictions of the Thai hinterland as “a place where nothing significant happens” (Askew 102-103). In contrast, the protest represented a nationally dispersed “community in crisis” that was “threatened by the very development and economic growth the city both symbolized and depended upon economically” (MISINGHAM 141). Thus, it served to educate the urban public and Thai government about the lesser-known impacts that capitalist development projects were having on rural populations. As the immediate results indicate, public response to the demonstration was favorable enough to force the government to recognize these communities.

Significantly, such a protest at the national level was necessary for perpetually neglected issues of development and environmental justice to be heard by national political leaders. Though environmental concerns have been growing in Thailand since the later decades of the twentieth century, issues linking environmental changes to social justice concerns have been marginalized by the mainstream “consensus-dominated civil society discourse” that has tended to stay clear of controversial issues related to poverty (Banpasirichote 234). In addition, as Thailand’s historically precarious democracy has been characterized by varying levels of corruption, mainstream environmental campaigns have been susceptible to interference by vested business and bureaucratic interests (Banpasirichote 237). Thus, issues of great importance to AOP members, including those related to dams, community forest management, depleted fisheries, the suppression of local knowledge systems, and so on, are most often trumped by powerful interests. Such political marginalization is a main reason why street protest — long designated as the “political resource of the powerless” (Della Porta and Diani 170) — was utilized in the 1997 Bangkok protest as well as others that followed. As is the case in several countries, a severe lack of democratic participation in Thailand’s policy process has led grassroots environmental movements such as those of the AOP to become
increasingly contentious (Banpasirichote 237). Thus, the use of protest at the state level proved to be a necessary political act of resistance for those suffering from local manifestations of national policies.

By seizing the urban space surrounding the Government House and asserting their claims to the Thai government and society, the AOP established itself as a national social movement in direct contention with the Thai state rather than a loose collection of dispersed local struggles. Importantly, such action at the national level transformed the political consciousness of many villagers into one characterized by “lack of fear, confidence, determination, and collective solidarity” (Missingham 158). As villagers were able to meet and share stories with other members of the network, the collective solidarity of the movement was fostered. In addition, these interactions as well as the unprecedented interactions with government officials created a learning experience for villagers who were educated on different aspects of national politics (Missingham 160). Most importantly, the immediate results of the protest added to the confidence of rural communities and individuals as they came to realize that they were not completely vulnerable to seemingly uncontrollable systemic changes. However, because the contested development projects were carried out to bolster Bangkok’s, and thus the entire country’s position within the global economy, the protest can be seen as a reaction to development in a globalizing context. As such, the site of protest existed not only on the national level, but also within the global economic space of Bangkok. Though the bulk of the AOP’s political activity has continued to exist at the national level, the transnational and global dimensions of their actions have proven to be increasingly important, especially after the Asian economic crisis that began in Thailand in mid-1997.

**Transnational Activities of The Assembly of the Poor**

When the collapse of the Southeast Asian economy began in Thailand on July 2nd, 1997, causing the Thai baht to lose a fifth of its value, almost everyone was surprised (Rigg 25). Two key features of the Thai development model – heavy dependence on a fragile export sector and even more dependence on foreign capital – proved also to be the main causes of the collapse (Bello et al. 36). Immediately, Bangkok suffered as the many construction projects throughout the city came to a halt and thousands of workers lost their jobs. In addition to increased unemployment and poverty within the city, “much of the pain of the crisis was displaced to rural areas, in spite of the origins of the crisis in the urban-industrial economy,” further
intensifying the “sense of the injustice of the system which had not served rural areas that well during the boom yet made them pay heavily during the bust” (Glassman 522). Moreover, the collapse made frighteningly clear the degree to which the lives of many Thai citizens were vulnerable to unpredictable changes of the global economy. The economic crisis also gave way to political crisis as the Chavalit government collapsed along with several others in the region.

Though the 1997 collapse generated much anger and resentment towards the IMF and the World Bank for their hand in orchestrating the failed development model (Tadem 379), the crisis actually caused the Thai state to become much more dependent upon the institutions of the global economy. Within weeks IMF rescue packages amounting to $17 billion were granted to the state (Rigg 25), though much of this fund was used to pay off foreign creditors rather than saving the local economy (Bello 2006). In addition, as the new Chuan Leekpai government began implementing crisis-management policies they quickly reversed all of the major concessions the AOP gained in their 99-day protest as part of an “aggressive determination to suppress the rising demands of organized rural groups” (Missingham 201). In the context of the economic crisis and a hostile Chuan government, during 1998 and 1999 the AOP resorted to a “scattered-star” approach consisting of setting up protest villages in various locations, such as near the continually contested Pak Mun dam, to resist development projects at the local level (Chalermsripinyorat 546). Yet, as these projects were increasingly recognized as occurring within a global economic and political context, the AOP began to adapt their national struggle to the global context in which Thailand was undeniably entrenched, opting to expand its network across national borders and shift the scale of its politics to include activities at transnational and global levels.

The concept of “scale shift” has been defined in social movement literature as “the spread of contention beyond its typically localized origins” (Tarrow and McAdam 125). In many cases this shift has occurred back and forth from the local and national levels to transnational and global realms. One significant way in which the AOP has carried out such a shift has been their involvement in transnational protests. The first example of such activity was their participation in a demonstration in Bangkok during the tenth meeting of the United Nations Commission on Trade and Development (UNCTAD X) in February 2000. Though this protest was held in Thailand’s capital, the AOP’s actions may be seen as constituting a scale shift in that, for the first time, the main targets of contention were
global institutions and not the Thai government. During this conference, leaders representing the World Trade Organization, the World Bank, and the IMF were planning to make up for the meetings that failed to occur as a result of mass protests that took place against the WTO in Seattle two months earlier (Glassman 517). Arguably influenced by Seattle’s unprecedented display of heterogeneous disapproval towards neoliberal globalization, AOP members joined the group of national and transnational protesters at the UNCTAD meeting and delivered a statement that “excoriated the type of development pursued in Thailand and its effects on people such as these villagers” (Glassman 518). Since this event, AOP members have been key participants in protests during meetings of other regional and global economic institutions that include the Asian Development Bank in Chiang Mai in 2000, and the 2005 Hong Kong meeting of the WTO. Though a lack of resources has limited the AOP’s mobility to the Asia Pacific region, in the past decade they have demonstrated a clear effort to expand the targets and reach of their protest activities to include opponents beyond the Thai state. Importantly, involvement in protests against supranational targets can be looked at as signifying the assertion of the AOP’s social movement discourse within global political arenas while simultaneously adding to an expanding worldwide critique of neoliberal globalization.

Participation in such arenas has been greatly aided by the AOP’s involvement with transnational networks and organizations that operate on a global scale. For example, the AOP now serves as the Southeast Asia convener for People’s Global Action (PGA) Asia, a network that facilitates communication and political coordination between a variety of social movements in various locations. In addition, the AOP is a member of La Via Campesina, a movement that has brought together millions of landless peasants, small farmers, agricultural workers, rural women, and indigenous communities in their global campaigns for biodiversity and food sovereignty (McMichael 604). Moreover, the AOP’s continual fight against large dams has been greatly aided by its relationship with the International Rivers Network (IRN), an organization that collaborates with a global network of local communities, social movements, and NGOs to “protect rivers and defend the rights of communities that depend on them” by opposing “destructive dams and the development model they advance” (IRN 2008). Such transnational coordination has greatly enhanced the AOP’s ability to shift the scale of its movement activities beyond local and national levels while demonstrating clear manifestations of this shift.
The AOP’s connection to groups who operate at transnational and global levels has allowed for the use of tools and resources that are provided for the purposes of protesting global targets and building mutual solidarity with other movements affected by similar processes of globalization and development. For instance, PGA has fostered an extensive network “to offer an instrument for coordination and mutual support at the global level for those resisting corporate rule and the neoliberal capitalist development paradigm...” (Routledge et al. 2578). In particular, the AOP has benefited much from PGA’s ability to mobilize resources and people for transnational protests. In addition, PGA and other groups such as La Via Campesina have acted as valuable support systems during these protests. For example, when 79 representatives from the Assembly were detained during the 6th WTO Ministerial Meeting in Hong Kong in 2005, La Via Campesina publicized the incident and widely circulated a solidarity statement urging the release of all detainees (La Via Campesina 2005). Moreover, through participation in transnational protests as well as conferences facilitated by such groups, members of the AOP have taken part in “solidarity-building efforts” that are based on notions of shared fate with communities in other countries (Smith 2002). For example, in recent years there has been continued exchange of information between Thailand’s dam-affected communities and India’s anti-dam activists who have been involved in their own struggle over the Narmada Valley dams for decades (Glassman 526). Thus, by forging connections with transnational movements and networks, the AOP has been able to confront more political targets while greatly expanding its diverse social movement network through solidarity with communities who are also making claims to their respective national governments and common global powers.

Importantly, increased coordinated action and mutual solidarity has translated to strengthened issue-based transnational campaigns in which the AOP has increasingly taken part. For example, AOP members have recently linked with La Via Campesina’s campaigns for food sovereignty and shared their experiences of poverty resulting from WTO, IMF, and World Bank promoted programs of export-oriented rice production and monopoly control by transnational corporations (La Via Campesina 2006). Such participation has added to a growing discourse that exposes the devastating effects of the corporate-driven global food system and offers suggestions for the implementation of food sovereignty worldwide. In addition, through ties with the IRN, communities who have long fought against the Nam Choan, Pak Mun, and other dams in Thailand have been able to contribute to
global campaigns against World Bank-funded dams. Such campaigns have been influential in forcing the World Bank to adopt new policies on resettlement, environmental assessment, indigenous people, and information disclosure (McCully 308). Thus, by drawing from strengthened connections with transnational allies, the AOP has simultaneously transposed its own movement agenda to global arenas while contributing to broader social movement campaigns in resistance to particular aspects of neoliberal globalization.

In addition, members of the AOP have been able to utilize groups who enjoy greater access to, and recognition by, national and global institutions to further their immediately local goals. For instance, the World Commission on Dams (WCD), an independent body of scientists, academics, politicians, anti-dam activists and dam-industry professionals commissioned by the World Bank to assess the environmental and social impacts of large dams (McCully xix), has proven to be a valuable resource. In particular, the 2000 WCD report, Dams and Development: A New Framework for Decision-Making “vindicates many of their [dam opponents] arguments and proposes a progressive decision-making framework for future water and energy planning which echoes many of the demands of anti-dam campaigns” (McCully xxv). As such, the communities struggling against the Pak Mun dam used the report to assert the validity of their local knowledge of ecology that had long been ignored by the Thai state and global economic institutions. Bolstered by the report, in June of 2001 these communities and their allies were able to put enough pressure on the Thai government to open the dam’s floodgates for a year to study its social and ecological impacts (Drinkwater 2004). Within the year over a hundred local fish and numerous plant species returned to the Mun River and local communities were able to “return to fishing, farming and other longstanding practices central to their culture” (Drinkwater 2004). Eventually a compromise to leave the dam gates open for four months of the year was agreed upon. This example demonstrates both the unfortunate lack of credence given to the knowledge claims of local communities and the potential of these communities to validate their knowledge and strengthen their negotiating power by utilizing information from more institutionally respected sources.

Sociologists Doug McAdam and Sidney Tarrow state, “What we normally see in transnational contention is the transposition of frames, networks, and forms of collective action to the international level without a corresponding liquidation of the conflicts and claims that gave rise to them
in their arenas of origin” (McAdam and Tarrow 123). Thus, it is important to recognize that the various ways in which the AOP has shifted the scale of its political activities has been for the purpose of enhancing its members’ original struggles. They have not replaced local and national protest with actions on a global level, but have utilized a variety of strategies involving numerous alliances in maintaining a multilevel approach to political action. Such an approach seems necessary considering the diffuse character of political and economic power in a globalized world. As David Schlosberg argues in his study of environmental justice movements, “Citizen action is necessary on the regional and local level, because it is where much of the control remains lodged; it is necessary on the global level because the institutions of global governance there are so limited (and undemocratic). And it is necessary to network across each of these levels, as political power flows through them simultaneously” (Schlosberg 136). As the above analysis has shown, the AOP recognizes the necessity of such multilevel strategies and has exhibited them through several acts of resistance at local, national, and global scales. Moreover, such resistance has allowed for the inclusion of the AOP in a constantly growing and connected collection of diverse oppositions to the dominant processes of neoliberal globalization.

**Conclusion**

The development paradigm that has been adhered to by the Thai state “… offers the world a single vision that flattens its diversity and sponsors an increasingly unsustainable monocultural industrial system” (McMichael 589). Since the mid-nineties the members of the Assembly of the Poor have challenged this vision by building a network of Thai communities and allies in resistance to local injustices, constituting a national social movement to resist ecologically and socially damaging development projects at the state level. However, such projects have never been insular national events. Initial industrialization agendas were formulated and encouraged by the World Bank, and liberalization of the national economy was continually predicated upon the country’s emergent position within the global economy. Furthermore, the financial crisis of 1997 made it clear that the various global forces impinging on the state called for a multilevel approach to political action. In response, the AOP has taken actions similar to other grassroots movements who are, as Arjun Appadurai writes, “finding new ways to combine local activism with horizontal, global networking” (Appadurai 25).
Though the transnational expansion of its originally national network has been helpful in challenging state policies, the extent to which such developments will further the goals of Thailand's poor amid powerful state and global forces is yet to be determined. Nevertheless, the AOP’s cross-border connections reveal emergent possibilities for political action and resistance in the contemporary era of globalization. By involving themselves in transnational campaigns and presenting their concerns within such frameworks as environmentalism, food sovereignty, and biodiversity, the AOP has been able to connect to broader frames of reference and larger spheres of action. This suggests that movements that may otherwise be dismissed as insular groups of stubborn peasants unable to adjust to globalization and development can present themselves as being involved with broad issues of global concern. Moreover, their participation in a growing array of transnational social movement networks demonstrates the ways in which grassroots movements might gain access into global political arenas and potentially influence global politics. In addition to making claims to the state, these movements are increasingly asserting claims to global institutions and other powers that attempt to dictate and define the ways in which globalization transpires. Thus, by presenting their local problems on a global stage and offering alternatives to harmful capitalist development projects, movements such as the AOP are contributing to an expanding global resistance to dominant practices and processes of neoliberal globalization.

Lastly, the proliferation, increased interconnection, and collaboration between a diversity of movements throughout the world points to new possibilities for the realization of alternative forms of globalization that are developing through bottom-up processes of collaboration and understanding. When activists from different areas of the globe share information, develop common goals, cooperate in political action, and offer alternatives, our understanding of globalization as consisting of much more than integrated markets is enhanced. Thus, transnational social movement processes are adding to a constantly growing vision of globalization from below—a vision that counters the homogenizing logic of neoliberalism with its diversity and global pervasiveness. How alternatives to neoliberal globalization manifest themselves is continually unfolding, and the extent to which such processes may challenge dominant capitalist ideologies is yet to be seen.
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Becoming Power Through Dance
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Social scientific research is a world-making process (Mol 1999, Law 2004). We have options in choosing between which reality to enact from a variety of versions (Mol 1999: 74). So what we need to ask for, are the whereabouts of these options in terms of their situatedness and what are the forces that bring us to decide between the other alternatives (ibid). This notion of choice brings in an actively choosing actor who potentially may not be disentangled to how s/he is enacted (ibid). The ancient magical incantation abracadabra is derived from the Aramaic word meaning ‘I create as I speak’ therefore in choosing what we are going to talk about, we are also creating which version of realities to enact:

*Working on the ways in which we are situated in various culturally and materially specific ways of thinking, feeling and doing opens up possibilities of transformation, of insight and political action: not in order that we in any absolute way can escape being acted upon by external forces, but in order that we may find more freedom of choice in just what external forces we would like to be expressed in our embodied perceptive actions (Marcussen 2006: 294).*

Feeling is a way of apprehending the world (see Ahmed 2004 and Marcussen 2006). During my ethnographic research on dance I
experimented with dancing in the middle as a way of knowing. I was constantly ‘experiencing, experimenting, not interpreting but experimenting’ with actuality, therefore the matters of process, affect and sensation, what is new, coming into being, taking shape in movement and transition, rhythm, creativity, imagination, vitality became practical and therefore theoretical centers in my research (Deleuze 1995: 106). As a result while translating and representing the ‘reality’ of dance in writing, I tried hard to resist to fixing and reducing dance to ‘culture’, ‘economy’, ‘gender’, ‘class’, ‘race’, ‘power’, because it is ‘apart’ of and ‘a part’ of all these aspects and it is between and beyond them too (Cooper 1998: 120). It is beyond them because in its play it has a potential to create another ‘reality’ in itself and this is precisely why it is so interesting. I tried to avoid imposing a conceptual framework that will frame dance within power relations (race, class, gender and so on) or as spatiality across (transgressive, resisting, counter-movements and so). Rather, I tried to dive into the spatiality of this middleness (of rhythm, of dance, of time, of space, of body and of reality).

Reality is multiple, and it is ‘culturally, historically and materially located’ (Mol 1999: 75). The metaphors that Mol uses to define the character of multiplicity of realities are ‘intervention and performance’ and through them it is implied that “reality is done and enacted rather than observed” (Mol 1999: 77). I am overfilled with joy in dance and that is why I choose to bring in dance in relation to joy, rather than race or gender. I choose to enact this reality of dance, rather than the others and it is a political choice. I choose to speak about the things in the ways in which I

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1 “To translate is to betray. To translate is to connect, to displace, to move, to shift from one place, one modality, one form, to another while retaining something. Only something. Not everything. While therefore losing something. Betraying whatever is carried over” (Law 2002: 99).

2 This is about ‘ontological politics’ that John Law (2004) and Annemarie Mol (1999) suggest in making a choice about which version of reality to enact in social scientific research.
was affected and which may indeed be ‘absent’ rather than ‘present’\(^3\). Because speaking about them, is a way of creating them and making them real.

In movement, the closed and rigid modes of thinking and ideas as well as feelings that derive from past experiences are dissolving and changing shape, they become liquefied. In that sense ‘dance’ is a force of transformation and when enacted as a way of looking at the world (a method of realizing), it may have a similar effects on our ways of understanding what is in and around us. “Working on our affective stance (including both the feeling state of our bodies and the ideas or thoughts we have of that stance) is thus a process that enables us to transcend that stance, so that we may better perceive the complexity of realities we are researching.” (Marcussen 2006: 299). From this perspective, I aim to think on power and resistance in context of playful dance in everyday life in this article. I suggest going back to Baruch Spinoza in considering the power question in relation to dance. Deleuze’s reading of Spinoza’s ethics involves a ‘philosophical nomadism’ (Braidotti 2006: 146) and draws it as politics of resistance (Deleuze 1978, 1988). This theoretical framework will give me insights to rethinking the particular role that dance may enact in terms of politics of everyday life. Overall, I will offer to situate dance as a power that may create a joyful energy, therefore an ethically empowering option in Spinozian terms. The joy of dance may generate in us a power that operates as a force of life, and therefore that dance could enact as the power of acting.

**Dance and Power**

Conventionally we conceptualize and imagine ‘power’ through a framework that builds itself under the weight of negativity as an obstructive force or kind of hindering process. More clearly, we imagine a process in which we

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3 Absence works at multiple levels, first it has a direct meaning, the figural absence of dance in the dance events in general. And I argue that may be the reason why I dance all the time. The absence of dance is indeed the challenge to bring it into presence. If everybody danced deeply with passion around me, I would probably not be dancing with such a powerful passion. This actually brings to think about the second level of absence that is about how presence derives from and is constituted in absence. This figural absence of dance and my passion to enact it applies to something other than itself; it shows me something more, at a deeper level, that our understandings of things and our enactments actually occur through things that are absent. In this sense absence can be a triggering and creative force in our enactments of practical living and also theoretical thinking (Derrida 1976, 1994, Serres 1991, Beer 1992, Gordon 1997, Law 2004).
are being subjected to ‘power’ and precisely this is the moment in which we build the negative sense of power and this imagination derives from our habits of thinking through binary oppositions which in this case appears as the self is opposed to socio-political mechanisms (see Braidotti 2006). However, power is multiple and heterogeneous and poststructuralists bring this into question through generating power in its positive sense of ‘enabling’ as well as its negative sense of ‘hindering’ (Braidotti 2006: 85-86).

The analyzes on dance in relation to politics come from different perspectives, such as: a form of transgression or resistance (Jackson 1989, Hall and Jefferson 1993, McRobbie 1994, Redhead 1993, Reynolds 1998, Rietveld 1998, Gilbert and Pearson 2002, Wilson 2002); an infusive negotiator of power relations (Saldanha 2002, 2005, 2007); as a play that ‘eludes’ power (Thrift 1997) or; a possible generating force of a resistance to ‘micro power’ that operates within us (Malbon 1999). Overall, there is more emphasis on power as a hindering force that is external and imposed upon us or infused in us, in all these representations of dance in the literature. In that context power is seen as a force that needs to be escaped from or be opposed to or to resist against. Dance is best analyzed as the bringer of ‘escape’, however the potentials in it for generating power (of enabling kind) widely escapes from all of these imaginations.

For example, in an analysis of the party scene in Goa, dance and music are seen as forces that create a feeling of belonging to an “escapist, psychotropic nowhere” (Saldanha 2002: 59, 60). Dance is elaborated as a temporary illusion that has no use and, “it is precisely the potential for escape that can turn [...] into [...] a narcissistic revolution changing nothing to overall systems of domination” (Saldanha 2002: 59, 60). Since we are all a part of the world and continuously enact and therefore make it through our existence and becomings, we have an effect in making the world as process. Playing with the world through dance can not be reduced to a ‘narcissistic’ aspect only. Although narcissism may be involved in it, it is not the sum of it. Dance or party scene in Goa for example could be infused and located within the networks of power and exploitation (of cheap local labour) and re-establishing the relations of domination and racism in overall (Saldanha 2002, 2005, 2007). However, the more we (researchers and social scientists) choose to see and emphasize ‘systems of domination’ only as the main determining character; indeed we are re-establishing and re-making them (even more strongly) through our writings. This is of course not to suggest that we should keep our eyes closed to them or simply ignore them, but to suggest a more detailed look to the event of dance from the middle of
it and maybe to see the spatio-temporal potentials of disruption or possibility of momentous freedom and the feature of change within the larger mess. The enjoyment of the dancing space maybe constructed ‘on top of’ other people’s suffering’, as the cheap labor of cleaners (Saldanha 2002: 17), that is undeniable; however it does not reduce the significance of the emancipatory possibilities that may occur in there. Otherwise, we may be freezing and fixing things in the field of ‘existing systems of domination’ on and on and may end up in making ‘moralistic judgments’ in interpreting the world. There may be a moment in which the cleaner may join dance for example, or a dancer and a ‘chai mama’ (ibid) can share a moment in which they become united in a productive way through playful dance. Such a moment is indeed significant in terms of our relations to networks of power and how we enact the reality, the world making process and this possibility is what I am particularly interested in.

The world and its relations are complex and we are all a part of this complexity. Because we are all indeed parts and actors, we make this world and affect one another. In arguing this, I am situating my arguments in a ‘baroque’ way of understanding complexity (Kwa 2002). We are in need of enacting a ‘baroque’ complexity in social science by looking at minuscule mundane swarming instants, state of affairs and affects. More clearly, when someone steps on my feet on purpose in the dance floor or when another one wants to share her gum with me and takes it out of her mouth, these all matter, because: the ways in which these “epiphenomena of corporeal causal interactions” affect “the responses and actions of agents” (Patton 1997: 2). The change in a body’s relations or its status during its encounter to other bodies and the body’s subjection to a new account through this encounter, more clearly the ‘incorporeal transformations’ (Deleuze and Guattari 2004) that bodies continuously enact, matters. In that context

4 In terms of situatedness: I dance in the middle and enact a knowledge that derives from the affections of the experience of dance. I do not pretend that I “see everything from nowhere”, rather I ‘feel, see and hear some things when I dance in the middle’, the former is actually not possible according to Donna Haraway and in doing so scientist are either irresponsible or in delusion (Haraway 1991a: 189 in Law 2004: 68). The irresponsibility derives from attempting to play the ‘god-trick’, whereas there is always somewhere where you see the world from and you need to accept and demonstrate it (ibid).

5 This is about enacting a more uncertain, uncategorized, under-determined approach to the world by reflecting on dance in our daily lives and also in the theories of social science, it is not about universalizing dance as a single, strategy, if you do not enjoy the actual dancing you can still read it as a metaphor for playful flexibility.
enactment of social scientific research is one of the ways in which we enact realities and therefore how we describe and elaborate events matters in determining what kind of worlds that we are going to live in (Mol 1999, Law 2004). Baroque complexity draws on Leibniz and looks down to “mundane, crawling and swarming of matter” (Kwa 2002: 26):

*Every bit of matter can be conceived as a garden full of plants or pond full of fish. But each branch of the plant, each drop of its bodily fluids, is also such a garden or such a pond (Leibniz 1986 in Kwa 2002: 26).*

The unity of his (Leibniz’s) “body is political in form”; it is a body of a “free republic of monads”. Thus it is “the direction of looking” that matters (ibid):

*First, historic baroque has a strong phenomenological realness, a sensuous materiality. Second this materiality is not locked within a simple individual, but flows in many directions, blurs the distinction between individual and environment (ibid).*

Which means that whatever I do in here and you do over there affects and touches each other in many ways and from many directions. A smile we give to a stranger in the street, or a bad look matters for the making of the world in every moment passing. What we write, what we eat, how we interact, they all matter. There are possibilities of inventiveness in baroque, “the ability to produce lots of novel combinations out of a limited set of elements (ibid). However:

*Individual monads are not linked at all, they don’t even communicate. But they are connected in the sense that, in the material aspect, they affect each other. If one individual had not existed the whole universe would have been different (Kwa 2002: 26).*

Therefore, we (things, wind, people, landscape, fashion and everything) are a part and apart of all that is around and affect each other in complex ways. Someone dancing here, another one joking there, you now are reading this article all these matter in affecting and making life and reality. It is all (life, word and reality) in a process and it may move in several ways and directions in each passing minute, through ‘inventive abilities’ internal to us and life within this kind of complexity. Therefore matters of everyday life and our ontological politics in living is the spatiality that we need to consider
in looking at issues of power and resistance or thinking on how to change the world.

Joy and sadness

All that is frightening in ordinary life is turned into amusing or ludicrous monstrosities. Fear is the extreme expressing of narrow-minded and stupid seriousness, which is defeated by laughter. Complete liberty is possible only in the completely fearless world.

Mikhail Bakhtin (1984: 51)

Joy is an inextricable element in play which moves between frivolity and ecstasy (Huizinga 1980: 21). Spinoza thinks that we are ‘spiritual automata’ that are left to the chance of encounters (Deleuze 1978: 5). As spiritual automata we have a continuous state of good or bad encounters that increase or diminish our power of acting and most of us live all our lives like this; left to the consequences of random encounters with ideas (Deleuze 1978: 4):

As such spiritual automata, within us there is the whole time of ideas which succeed one another, and in according with this succession of ideas, our power of acting or force of existing is increased or diminished in a continuous manner, on a continuous line, and this is what we call affectus, it’s what we call existing. Affectus is thus the continuous variation of someone’s force of existing, insofar as this variation is determined by the ideas that s/he has… it increases my power of acting or on the contrary diminishes it in relation to the idea that I had at the time, and it’s not a question of comparison, it’s a question of a kind of slide, a fall or rise in the power of acting (ibid: 5).

In here, ‘affectus’ refers to affect in English as determined by Deleuze and it is different to ‘affectio’, which he translates as ‘affection’. The difference between them is that affect refers to ‘continuous variation’ as he determines above, whereas affection is the condition of a body when it is acted upon by another body (the condition of our body when it is subject to cigarette or a lover etc.). More clearly:

…it’s a state of a body insofar as it is subject to the action of another body. What does this mean? “I feel the sun on me,” or else “A ray of sunlight falls upon you”; it’s an affection of your body. What is an affection of your body? Not the sun, but the action of the sun or the effect of the sun on you. In other words an effect, or the action that one body produces on another, once it’s noted that Spinoza, on the basis of reasons from his Physics,
does not believe in action at a distance, action always implies a contact, and is even a mixture of bodies. Affectio is a mixture of two bodies, one body which is said to act on another, and the other receives the trace of the first. Every mixture of bodies will be termed affection (ibid).

Spinoza formulates idea as a mode of thought that represents something, a representational mode of thought whereas an affect (affectus) is any mode of thought that does not represent anything, a pain, a love, a sorrow are non-representational (Deleuze 1978: 1). Every mode of thought that is non-representational is termed as affect in Spinoza and thus he concludes that the idea is primary to affect; “in order to love it’s necessary to have an idea, however confused it may be, however indeterminate it may be, of what is loved” (ibid: 1-2). Ideas constantly chase and replace each other and we are a sort of ‘spiritual automata’ in which these ideas are affirmed. Deleuze calls this ‘a regime of variation’ which means that during the succession of two ideas, a perpetual variation operates in us, which determines our ‘force of existing’ or ‘the power of acting’ and this non-stop operating variation is “what it means to exist” (ibid: 3). In other words “there is a continuous variation in the form of an increase-diminution-increase-diminution of the power of acting or the force of existing of someone according to the ideas which s/he has” (ibid: 4). This passage in-between affects is determined by ideas (that constitutes them) (ibid). And there are two basic passions according to Spinoza which are ‘joy’ and ‘sadness’. All other affects that operate in us derive from these two passions of joy and sadness as a source (ibid). When we encounter things we get affected by joy or sadness and we do not usually recognize what happens, we just have an increase or decrease in our power of acting, more clearly we live the results of our encounters (as becoming weak or becoming powerful in acting) and we mostly do not realize or consider the reasons behind. Deleuze gives the following example for our existence in daily life and explains it as follows:

In the street I run into Pierre, for whom I feel hostility, I pass by and say hello to Pierre, or perhaps I am afraid of him, and then I suddenly see Paul who is very charming, and I say hello to Paul reassuredly and contentedly… When I pass from the idea of Pierre to the idea of Paul, I say that my power of acting is increased; when I pass from the idea of Paul to the idea of Pierre, I say that my power of acting is diminished. Which comes down to saying that when I see Pierre, I am affected with sadness; when I see Paul, I am affected with joy. And on this melodic line of continuous variation constituted by the affect, Spinoza will assign two poles: joy-sadness, which for him will be the fundamental
passions. Sadness will be any passion whatsoever which involves a diminution of my power of acting, and joy will be any passion involving an increase in my power of acting...What is important is that you see how, according to Spinoza, we are fabricated as such spiritual automata. As such spiritual automata, within us there is the whole time of ideas which succeed one another, and in accordance with this succession of ideas, our power of acting or force of existing is increased or diminished in a continuous manner, on a continuous line, and this is what we call affectus, it’s what we call existing (ibid: 4-5).

The dance floor is obviously a space in which these two main passions are in a continuous coexistence and are being transferred from person to person in a contingent manner. Let’s assume, I find a little place to dance and I see two people there who start dancing and this affects me with joy, then someone comes and offers me her/his beer and right after that takes my space in return of this favour. I loose my space, I am affected by sadness and my dance diminishes, I change my space and so on. When I change my place, I indeed, enter into having an ‘adequate idea’ in Spinozian terms (ibid 14). We are affected with the consequences of our encounters, rather than their reasons and these are just ‘inadequate ideas’ (ibid). Spinoza argues that we need to develop levels of awareness and the first level of awareness is passing from ‘inadequate ideas’ to ‘adequate ideas’ by realising what gives us joy, and by organizing good encounters for ourselves we enter into the spatiality of ethics. Thinking through the example above, when my body is affected with this unpleasant encounter, I perceive the affect of it on me rather than the reason or the content of this idea as a decrease in my power of acting. But if I realize that dance and music gives me joy and I stick with it, and look for some good encounters with the sounds that will combine with my elements in a good way and eventually increase my joy and power of acting. By doing this, I enter in the sphere of having an ‘adequate idea’ according to Spinoza:

*You undergo a joy, you feel that this joy concerns you, that it concerns something important regarding your principal relations, your characteristic relations. Here then it must serve you as a springboard, you from the notion-idea: In what do the body which affects me and my own body agree? In what do the soul which affects me and my own soul agree, from the

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6 It is unpleasant for me because I indeed accepted the beer offer in order to be receptive, despite the fact that I don’t enjoy beer in general (maybe I was expecting that later on this person will share dance with me). However it becomes apparent that indeed s/he was looking for a place to stand and this affects me with sadness.
point of view of the composition of their relations, and no longer from the point of view of
eyour chance encounters...You leave joyful passions, the increase in the power of acting; you
make use of them to form common notions of a first type, the notion of what there was in
common between the body which affected me with joy and my own body, you open up to a
maximum your living common notions and you descend once again toward sadness, this
time with common notions that you form in order to comprehend in what way such a body
disagrees with your own, such a soul disagrees with your own. At this moment you can
already say that you are within the adequate idea since, in effect, you have passed into the
knowledge of causes. You can say that you are within philosophy (ibid: 14).

In this context, the ‘adequate idea’ for me would be (since I am affected with
joy when I dance), is to run towards, dancing and combining my elements
with the elements of music. In this ‘partially located’ and ‘situated’ case,
dance might become a power of a different kind or of another order (Law

To dance could be to live and not submitting yourself to sadness.
Dance could enact in us the power of acting, the joy, and make us able to
laugh at ourselves and the world. However, dance enacts in heterogeneous
forms too, only the joyful, playful, vital dance could be a force, a power of
life. Space enacts as a sum of all our relations and connections and it is
continuously being made, all the encounters create affects and contribute to
making of the event and the space (Lefebvre 1991, Thrift 1996, Massey
2005). Those encounters could be friendly or antagonistic. However, some
people may derive their joys from the sadness of others, but these are
‘compensatory’, ‘indirect’ joys, in Spinozian terms, they are the poisoned
joys of hate (Deleuze 1978: 9). Instead of doing that we need to take a local
point of joy for a departure and try to increase it by opening it up and
putting our labour in it by organizing pleasant encounters for ourselves.

Dance space is not homogenous, there are contestations of affects
in there and sadness and joy are encountered through the bodies of people,
music and other effects. In those encounters via dance there may be a
possibility of submission to sadness rather then joy by summing up the
effects that make us feel weak and make us afraid. Passions of a different
kind of joy and sadness, of love and hate enact a simultaneous coexistence
and they are affirmed in us in multiplicity or plurality of ways in this space
of encounter. This is where we come into play with others, and the ‘Other’.
This process is ultimately under construction; it is never closed or fixed for
there are always further permutations of relations amongst the multiple
players. So a space and the happenings in there is more about what we make
of it, bodies are in a continuous world making process and they are open to all options within the limits of their own possibilities of conditions. Space and politics are inter-dependent shared imaginaries founded on relations (see Lefebvre 1991, Thrift 1996, Massey 2005). Submission to sadness in that sense will decrease dance in us through decreasing our power of acting. There may always be killjoys in a dance space and they may affect us with sadness which in a way will contribute to their exercise of power (that hinders) on us, whereas the more we enact ethics and organize good encounters (with people, objects, music etc.) and enact a labour of movement in dance the more we are likely to be filled with joy and therefore become more powerful.

**Conclusion: Dance is a power**

Dance could enact as a form of play, as an undetermined creative force, it could enact by itself and for itself as a transformative force and a form of power that is of a differing kind, as the power of acting. In that context identifying dance as ‘elusive’ (Thrift 1997) and the characterization of it as a resistance to ‘micro power’ (Malbon 1999) will avoid seeing the possibilities that may occur in dance as a transformative force. Indeed these identifications derive from a hierarchical understanding in which the ‘real’ world is more seriously ‘real’ than the ‘reality’ of playful dance and as long as we think in those terms, we enact this as the ‘reality’ in social science and life at general. Then, this is not about dance as externally engaged with transgression or escape. Rather, I suggest placing it elsewhere as a force of departure that has an effect of a different kind as well as another power that enacts elsewhere and that is equally important. This is about imagining another universe as a possibility and enacting the play of the world, in there we indeed can play with the killjoy effects.

Imagining is a way of enacting the world; therefore I argue that we need to enact a more positive imagination. We need to sum our joys rather than sadness and therefore increase them and this will be a way of enacting a better world within and out of us. Only then we may realize that stupid serious sadness is about fears and it may indeed disappear through enactment of joy in ourselves. In arguing this, Spinozian vocabulary gives a base, to see how power (or authority) needs sadness of people in order to enact, because when people are sad they are indeed weak (diminished in their power of acting) and therefore it is easier to control them (Deleuze 1978). Thus power needs the sadness of people in order to operate. If we increase our joy inside, we increase the joy of the world, and we do this
through our writings, chats, arguments, dances, music, friendships and all our enactments in general, which all matter in creating affections, thus the mundane matters (Kwa 2002).

How we live (the reality that we enact) is about, how we imagine, dream and enact our stories. Cemtan, for example (a music and dance lover) is someone who has extended those imaginations and moments (of dance and joy) as his ontological politics in overall to his everyday life. He is Peter Pan from ‘Neverland’. He was looking for ways in which to build a tree-house in central Istanbul to live in. He always has some interesting projects through which he performs and transforms the world and our lives in general. He started ‘şuur 6 (subconscious) LimiSeD company’ that takes action in the parks by inviting the young men of the neighbourhood (who usually play cards in coffee houses all day, attend football events or join nationalist movement party’s youth clubs) to play drum and percussion circles. He was once on an acid trip and he encountered big trouble in the street, with five angry men. I don’t know how it started, but he really looks like ‘Peter Pan’, even his appearance can be a target to reflect upon the accumulated sadness of a group of men from a certain social economic political and cultural backgrounds (imagine some neo-Nazi’s attacking a gay or a dark coloured person in a narrow street somewhere in England for example). In this event they beat him and then threw him in a big garbage container. He was lying in garbage with one arm and leg out, after sometime he hears a rhythm. He raises one arm and joins the rhythm and slowly pulls himself out of the container by holding to and following the rhythm. He starts dancing and marching towards the club or bar, enters inside and dances the pain. This is a good example how rhythm may pull us towards life. The way Cemtan perceives dance is as such:

CEMTAN: ...dance err it raptures from within you really, I mean something born from inside you...like joy...yeah you give birth to it and spread it to the universe...like err... the things that we do here...our movements, the words that we say, the music that you do, somehow err... well when you move your arm like this, it goes, it expands around the world and when it expands it widens and spreads and gets even bigger in waves, for example you do like this in here, when it goes 100 km it becomes... buooaahh... a movement, a bigger one...so to say when you dance the energy that expands from your movement travels around the world...err...think of it in this way, you are sending a wonderful thing to the world...a beautiful energy and a power yes... err... how should I say, there are bad energies...yes you send your joyous power aside to the black hole energies, which again derive from people. I don’t know why, but usually black hole energies derive from people, and you... yes you send
a very big energy of joy against them, not against in fact, aside to them... It is all spontaneous...and it is pure...yeah you send a primarily spontaneous and a good and really beautiful energy...well to dance is, yes...it is to war...in that sense...to dance is to war... Because in all of these things, for example you dance in here and someone else dances in Africa, and another one dances in America, and all these dance séances that these people do...it has a network...you know what I mean...these energies they know, recognize each other and of course they like and sympathize each other...well man... the dance wave in there and the dance wave in here recognize and love each other in wave length/dimension ....that energy has its own network and they recognize each other...yeah it is Love...you got it?

Cemtan relates dance first to joy and then to power. Related to that he situates this ‘beautiful energy’ and ‘power’ not ‘against’, but ‘aside’ in relation to the dark forces of sadness. This is a critical distinction and a crucial moment. The way in which Cemtan visualizes and maps those affects of life and death as networks of joy and sadness in a simultaneous coexistence, gives me a key and it indeed illustrates my argument in establishing dance as a power to act. In that context, dance is not about eluding power it is about creating and becoming another power. And the first kind of power indeed feels threatened by the kind of power that dance generates, because it increases our power of acting and therefore the first kind can not operate in us.

When and if we are overfilled with joy we see how ridiculous is the conventional modes of ordering and how stupid seriousness can be. We may become elsewhere in another form that is no longer controllable and weak. This is possible by or is a matter of passing from ‘inadequate ideas’ to ‘adequate ideas’ (Deleuze 1978). Spinoza assigns a fundamental political and ethical problem to power. He asks “how does it happen that people, who have power (pouvoir), in whatever domain, need to affect us in a sad way?” (Deleuze 1978: 4). When we feel weak, our power of acting diminishes and therefore we are potentially controllable. Sad passions are necessary for the exercise of power (ibid: 4-12). Thus, we need to increase our joy by all means. However, there is no golden standard we need to search and find what or which bodies combines well with our principal relations. This means that dance gives me joy, something else will give joy to you, what matters is to realize what it is that body that combines well with your elements and increases your power of acting. In doing that we need to be careful about the character of joy, it should not be a poisoned or mistaken one that derives from sadness, however that kind is ‘compensatory’
and ‘indirect’ (ibid: 9). When we are sure that it is not such a joy and it truly concerns us, we need to take this local point for departure and try to open it up by putting labour in it and increase it locally. It will no longer be a ‘regime of variation’, but rather a ‘bell curve’ and we need to apply it to sadness too by eliminating our common notions with ‘bodies that disagrees with our own’ (ibid: 14). This simply is about the labour of life, enacting vitality from within and therefore in world in general. Dance, here is a way in which I and possibly some others may enact as a source of joy, it can not be generalized to all, however it will be some other form of play for others. The last words I bring in-here will be from Cemtan again:

_This is not about ‘dancing’ or ‘not-dancing’, as an actual situation and as two different conditions. Let me put it in this way, you also dance in your mother’s grave, when you are burying her. There is indeed no difference between your dance in a party and in your mother’s grave, but there is a bond. There are differences between ‘here’ and ‘there’, but what matters is the states of affairs. Being aware of the phenomena itself is an affair of ‘being there’. Then every single breath that you take becomes a dance in that dimension that you do not perceive the phenomena of death as pain._

References:


Changing the system from the outside – an evaluative analysis of social movements opposing the 2007 G8 summit

by Patrick T. Hiller, Nova Southeastern University

"Even a purely moral act that has no hope of any immediate and visible political effect can gradually and indirectly, over time, gain in political significance". 

Vaclav Havel

This essay examines the large-scale social protests surrounding the 2007 G8 summit in Heiligendamm, Germany. Based on a discussion of social protests surrounding the 2007 G8 summit with respect to their goals and objectives and the exploration if and how they are related to public policy changes, it is argued that contextual factors surrounding social movements’ intents to change public policy outweigh content-related issues on the activists’. A document analysis of the summit and its environment leads to the following conclusions: (1) The government will evaluate how to deal with social protest depending on factors not directly related to social protest. (2) The logistics of the G8 summits are highly influenced by the anticipated protests. (3) Selective media coverage and the self-representation of assorted movements minimize the movements’ struggles. (4) Organized social movements intend to increase the salience on issues that differ from the objectives of the G8 summit participants. (5) Violence by splinter groups justifies violent
countermoves by authorities against larger groups of social protesters. (6) By using the “instantaneity of the internet” as a platform, social movements can act as educators and address their issues and objectives in an in-depth manner and reach a virtually unlimited audience. (7) Contextual factors determine the extent to which social movements act.

Introduction

The 2007 G8\(^8\) summit in Heiligendamm, Germany has once again brought social protest into the international spotlight. In fact, the social actions surrounding the meetings seemed to have received at least the same amount of attention as the actual meetings among the heads of state of the eight most powerful economic nations in the world. During a time which, most generally, is depicted as the ‘age of globalization’ the study of social movements needs to be revisited. Globalization as such has lead to a myriad of campaigns opposing this phenomenon\(^9\). Many of these movements are made up of grassroots social activists engaged in a struggle against the political and economic elites. With this in mind the question arises as to which extent social movements can draw on social protest to achieve sustainable changes of public policy on the national and international level.

The impact of social movements is a widely studied issue. In very general terms the main arguments regarding the impact can be divided into two groups – the ones claiming that “social movements strongly influence public policy, and that they do not” (Burstein, 1999, p. 4). Within this debate I argue that contextual factors surrounding the intents of the social movements to change public policy outweigh content-related issues on the activists’ agendas. In other words, policy-makers and government authorities place emphasis on how to deal with the manifestation of social protest, i.e. the context/environment, as opposed to addressing the topics, i.e. the content/demands set forth by social movements aim to address. To support

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7 I refer to this notion as it previously has been discussed by Linstroth (2002).

8 G8 stands for “Group of Eight”, which is made up by the countries of France, United States, United Kingdom, Russia, Germany, Japan, Italy, and Canada.

9 I am using the term ‘globalization’ in a very loose way that often is used by the so-called anti-globalization movements targeting transnational organizations such as the World Trade Organization, the International Monetary Fund or the World Bank.
my argument, I discuss the social protests surrounding the 2007 G8 summit with respect to their goals and objectives and explore if and how they are related to public policy changes.

This article hopefully will stimulate further research and understanding regarding the dialogic interaction of social movements and public policy (makers). First I will review literature discussing the forms, tactics and impacts of social protest in relation to public policy. Then I will show how social protest specifically was applied at the 2007 G8 summit followed by a discussion of the results.

Social movements have been defined in numerous ways. Frequently, and for the purpose of this article, these movements are considered as grassroots movements. According to Tilly (1999, p. 257, italics in original) social movements consist of “a sustained challenge to power holders in the name of population (groups or individuals) living under the jurisdiction of those power holders by means of repeated public displays of that population’s worthiness, unity, numbers, and commitment”. For the purpose of this article I will use a slightly revised definition of social movements that has been developed by Goodwin and Jasper (2003). A social movement is a collective, organized, sustained, and non-institutional challenge to authorities/powerholders aiming at a change of public policy through the means of social protest. Social protest will be defined as an act or acts of “challenging, resisting, or making demands upon authorities, powerholders, and/or cultural beliefs and practices by some individual or group” (Goodwin & Jasper, 2003, p. 3). Public policy is defined as “political agreement on a course of action (or inaction) designed to resolve or mitigate problems on the political agenda – economic, social, environmental, and so on” (Fischer, 1995).

Social movements, social protest and public policy

A major reason for the emergence of social movements in democratic societies is the perceived failure of the implementation of public policies or the policies per se. I consider this as relative deprivation on the political realm. The theoretical notion of relative deprivation is defined as “actors’ perception of discrepancy between their value expectations and their value capabilities” (Gurr, 1970, p. 24). Value expectations have to be understood as goods and necessities for living that people believe they are justifiably entitled to. In this case, these goods and necessities are public policies and/or services. Value capabilities are the values members believe they are
capable of maintaining, both in the present and in the future. Value capabilities can be further subdivided into value positions, which have been attained or provided for by the government (present), and value potentials, which are the skills that society or governments will allow them to attain (future). Within this notion there are personal, societal, and political opportunities for achieving and/or maintaining desired value positions. Inherited and value-enhancing actions are considered as personal opportunities (e.g. admission to an Ivy League school through family connections). Societal opportunities are said to be found in the normal course of action (e.g. a strong economy providing employment security). Political opportunities are considered as political actions as a means to providing satisfaction (e.g. social protest against perceived injustices) (Gurr, 1970).

Social movements, as discussed in this article, act outside the political realm. In other words, they form no part of official political and administrative bodies in the executive, legislative or judiciary branches of states. There are virtually no limits to the types of actions they undertake in order to achieve their goals. Social movements are an important feature of the contemporary national and international political landscape. Scholars argue that there is a firm link between institutionalized politics and social movements (e.g. McAdam, McCarthy, & Zald, 1996). The major activities of social movements with respect to public policy are: “(1) agenda-setting - identifying a problem of international concern and producing information; (2) developing solutions – creating norms or recommending policy change; (3) building networks and coalitions of allies; and (4) implementing solutions – employing tactics of persuasion and pressure to change practices and/or encourage compliance with norms” (Price, 2003, p. 584). According to Offe (1985) this notion implies the actors in the movements do not negotiate or compromise as it is done in the political arena. Instead, Offe (1985) argues that they apply tactics with sharp antinomies yes/no, them/us, now/never or victory/defeat. This is an oversimplified, merely theoretical argument. I maintain that a form of negotiation and compromising generally takes place when social movements emerge and act. While the open rhetoric and manifestation often contain the antinomies stated by Offe (1985), there is a constant negotiation taking place within the movements and between them and the political structures they address. These negotiations do not necessarily have to be direct if the mere interaction, often carried out through mass media, is considered as negotiation. It is my contention that the media coverage, regardless if the emphasis is placed on the movements’
contents or actions, creates an environment of negotiation between the social movements and public policy makers as well as the broader public in general.

A myriad of transnational anti-globalization movements challenge neoliberal policies and institutions. The framing and understanding of the contemporary economic globalization process and with it associated policy making has lead to collective action that needs to be given as much attention as the socio-economic process per se. It is argued that “the mobilization of beliefs and interpretations critical of neoliberal globalization had been central to the eruption of a protest movement that achieved global proportions by 2003” (Ayres, 2004, p. 27). Ayres (2004) provides an overview of contested interpretations of the globalization process. The actors in the anti-neoliberal protest movements are identified as civil society activists, national/transnational social movement organizations, independent media centers, and internet websites. The neoliberalism proponents are identified as states, multi-national corporations, currency speculators, financial media outlets and supra-national financial and trade bodies such as the IMF, World Bank and WTO. The protest movements’ policy proposals include de-ratification and reform of existing treaties, debt relief, strengthening of state sovereignty, deglobalization, and return to a more local orientation. The proponents of neoliberalism propose policies of liberalized trade and investment, deregulation, tax cuts, privatization, and the reduction of public expenditures. Ayres’ (2004) succeeds in creating a general picture. Its strength lies in the fact that the presentation and self-presentation of numerous anti-globalization movements is based on these or similar content-related categories. However, I argue that this approach needs to be elaborated by examining the variable ‘social environment’ within which both sides are embedded.

Regardless of the form or impact of social movements, one has to view the national, political, and social context of the respective protest actions to assess their implications. Rucht (1996) conceptualizes the impact of a social movement’s structural context. Briefly stated, the conjunction of the political, social, and cultural context has structural implications with regard to the movement’s themes. Within this context, the movements’ structures, their strategies, and other internal factors lead to the protest activities. The outcome of these activities then can bring the process back to the conjunctural context with newly created opportunities or constraints. I
maintain that Rucht’s (1996) conceptualization is a useful analytical tool for the study of social movements within different contexts.

Social protest can be displayed in forms such as public meetings, demonstrations, marches, creation of special associations and commissions, mass media statements, pamphlets, petitions, posting or wearing of identifying symbols, the adoption of distinctive slogans, sit-ins, and/or the celebration of difference (Bernstein, 2003; Morris, 2003; Sharp, 1973; Tilly, 1999). According to Offe (1985) positive aspects of protest demands are framed in grammatically negative forms by using key words such as never, stop, freeze, ban, and end. Consequently, one might consider the mobilization of public attention is one of the main objectives of social protest in general.

It is argued that governmental concern about the mobilization potential of opposing groups (social movements) has grown during the last years (Cleaver Jr., 1998; Linstroth, 2002). Modern communication technologies, especially the internet, have created an atmosphere surrounding social movements called the “Zapatista Effect”, referring to the internet's ability in having brought the struggle of the Mexican Zapatista movement from the geographical and ideological margins to the center (Cleaver Jr., 1998, p. 622). Contemporary social movements are faced with the concept of “instantaneity with the advent of the Internet” (Linstroth, 2002, p. 212). The internet has linked struggles “challenging dominant policy and ideology in ways that often bypass the nation state” (Cleaver Jr., 1998, p. 637), thereby allowing the capacity for action sought by social movements to become more concrete (Cleaver Jr., 1998). Furthermore, I argue that coordination of actions, exchange of ideas, and calls for solidarity, are additional factors which social movements draw from on a pragmatic level of social protest. The creative use of modern communication technologies, especially the internet, has broadened the spectrum for protesters.

The impacts of social movements on public policy can extend over a period of time, from winning a specific state policy decision to providing continuing leverage over a political process. In general it is argued that most social movements aim at benefits to flow to a constituency (Amenta & Young, 1999) in the forms of changed laws, policies, regulatory practices and administrative (Goodwin & Jasper, 2003). Social movements can create social change by changing the salience of the issue. Burstein (1999, p. 16) hypothesizes that “the greater the impact of interest organizations on an
issue’s salience to the public, the greater their (indirect) impact on legislative action, provided that there is a discrepancy between the public’s preferences and public policy”. Briefly stated, Burstein (1999) maintains that social movements potentially can change public policy if they are able to change public preference and issue salience, as legislators acting outside of their own self-interests in an electoral agenda will most likely act according to the wishes of the majority of their constituency.

Institutional change as a consequence of social protest has been examined by numerous scholars. According to Kriesi and Wisler (1999) frames of political institutions have been purposely designed to make it difficult to challenge and change them from the outside. However, the authors further assert that social movements can transform political institutions under certain conditions. First, there has to be a societal crisis, typically of economic character. Second, a master frame must exist that provides citizens with credible alternatives. Third, a movement’s success depends on institutional vulnerability. Fourth, a movement can create a momentum for change only if the established elites cannot maintain control over the masses (Kriesi & Wisler, 1999).

Burstein (1999) argues that social movements can influence public policy under the constraints of electoral competition and the limited ability of citizens and legislators to simultaneously deal with many issues. Burstein’s (1999, p. 14) public preference hypothesis states that “the greater the impact of interest organizations [i.e. social movements] on the public’s preferences on an issue currently framed or as reframed, the greater their (indirect) impact on legislative action”. While this hypothesis seems appealing, Burstein (1999) admits that there is a lack of data to support this hypothesis. The author follows the assumption that public opinion often influences policy; however, the empirical link between social movements and their ability to frame public opinion still is rather weak.

Contemporary anti-globalization movements collectively act within international norms to restructure world politics, where they are “emerging as a powerful new force in international politics and are transforming global norms and practices” (Khagram, Riker, & Sikkink, 2002, p. 4). It can be further argued that these non-state actors have actively become parts of “de-facto global governance” (Khagram et al., 2002, p. 4). Edelman (2001, p. 311), for example, posits that “the new anticorporate activism … employs an action repertoire that combines decidedly postmodern elements
(informational politics, cyber-attacks, and ‘swarming’) with others that hark back to early nineteenth-century forms of direct action, albeit with global rather than local audiences”. In this line, Meyer’s (2003) dialogic model on the mutual influence of social protest and policy shows that policy processes are not only the sources of social protest mobilization but also the outcomes.

Social movements act as educators for populations through their protest actions. Public policy makers do not necessarily share information on certain topics with the public for a variety of reasons. For example, they can intentionally suppress information to maintain their self-interests or the interests of powerful groups. On the other hand, given the fact that policy makers often have to deal with a myriad of issues they will hardly ever have all the necessary information to make informed choices on certain issues (see also Burstein, 1999). The dissemination of information by a social movement thus potentially brings topics to the public agenda - topics that would have otherwise remained unknown (Grant, 2004). Consequently social movements potentially can inform and educate not only the public but also the policy makers.

The above review has shown that social movements act outside official political channels to challenge and/or change public policies and entire political, administrative and economic institutions. To convey their messages and achieve their goals the movements rely on a myriad of tactics. In order to explore if and how social protest is successful regarding the goals and contents and what the impact of the protest environments have in relation to the goals and content, I will now turn to an analysis of the social protests surrounding the 2007 G8 summit.

**Clashing agendas at the 2007 G8 summit**

The 2007 G8 summit in the German city of Heiligendamm followed an agenda set forth by the organizing government of Germany. The summit and the preceding time period were accompanied by numerous organized and unorganized violent and nonviolent protests following an alternative summit agenda. According to the German government\(^{10}\), the key foci of the 2007 summit were shaping globalization and aiding development Africa. The summit’s agenda included the two main topics of growth and responsibility in the global economy and growth and responsibility in Africa.

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\(^{10}\) Information retrieved from http://www.g-8.de/Content/EN/Artikel/2007/03/Anlagen/2007-03-01-g8-schlaglichter-en,property=publicationFile.pdf, July 7, 2007
Within this framework the focal areas with respect to the global economy were: (1) global imbalances and the agenda for global growth, (2) promotion and protection of innovation, (3) investment, (4) transparency of the international capital markets (Hedge Funds), (5) social shaping of globalization, (6) climate protection, (7) energy efficiency, and (8) raw materials. With respect to the focus on Africa the focal areas were: (1) good governance, (2) sustainable development, (3) peace and security, and (4) strengthening the health care system, fighting HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria (German Federal Government). Within these categories a myriad of issues were to be discussed by the summit participants. The focal areas do not bare any surprises. The global leading economic powers have discussed similar topics throughout the preceding G8 summits. For example, the focal areas of the 2006 G8 summit in St. Petersburg, Russia were global energy security, infectious diseases, and education. The main issues on the agenda at the 2005 G8 summit in Gleneagles, Scotland were climate change, Africa and development, global economy, oil and trade, regional issues and proliferation\footnote{Information retrieved from http://www.g8.gov.uk/ and http://en.g8russia.ru/ , July 7, 2007.}

Protest organizers used existing alliances and the internet as an information platform for summit related protests. The following actions took place within the provided “choreography of resistance”\footnote{Information retrieved from http://de.indymedia.org/2007/05/175755.shtml, http://www.g8-2007.de, http://antig8.tk/, http://www.heiligendamm2007.de, and http://www.g8-alternative-summit.org/en/, July 7, 2007.}. The organizers called for a march against precarization, caravans for refugee rights, bicycle caravans, regional actions against G8, occupation of “Bombodrom” (an area used by the German military which is supposed to be established as a air-ground bombing range for German, EU, and NATO forces), a demonstration in the city of Rostock, an anti-Nazi demonstration in the city of Schwerin, a concert “Move against the G8”, a day of action on global agriculture (a rally with stops at supermarkets, laboratories for genetically modified animals and crops), a day of action on migration (with panel discussions on activities at refugee camps, deportation authorities, etc.), an action day for education, actions against militarism, war and torture, mass blockades of the access roads to the summit in Heiligendamm, marches to Heiligendamm, and an alternative summit.
Outcome of social protest at the G8

There is no doubt that the protest accompanying the 2007 G8 summit in Heiligendamm received extensive media coverage. However, coverage emphasized the violent nature of the protests and the clashes between police forces and protesters rather than the agenda set forth by the protest organizers. With this in mind one has to question whether the objectives of these organizers aimed at affecting the policy decision-making of the summit leaders were undermined or strengthened. The following part will provide the findings and practical and theoretical interpretations of my analysis of the 2007 G8 summit and the protests surrounding it.

The government will evaluate how to deal with social protest depending on factors not directly related to social protest. One must not assume that the government agents act in the best interest of the people. The state actors’ self-interest outweighs the interest of protest, even if the concerns brought up are legitimate. The examined material reveals that policy-makers are more concerned with the manifestations of social protest than with the content of what the social movements addressed. For example the German chancellor Angela Merkel German repeatedly emphasized that she was open for any type of nonviolent protest but would take a strong stand against violence. Even though these statements can be understood as obvious political rhetoric, this position was taken by government authorities. The social protests that have been analyzed for this study often have very clear but at the same time limited objectives in regard to potential satisfactory resolution through policy makers. As mentioned above, the addressed issues were for example agriculture, migration, education, militarism, war and torture. Regardless of the relevance of their claims, the protesters were not speaking the language of the policy-makers. Policy-makers are aware that the mere fact that they are meeting and discussing the issues on their agenda is strongly opposed by the anti-globalization movement. I argue that these movements are of no concern to policy-makers as long as the general public-opinion, i.e. the policy-makers constituency, does not shift. Thus the “danger” for policy-makers stemming from the anti-globalization movement is the conscientization of the larger, silent public. In other words, the conditions for social change (see discussion of Kriesi and Wisler, 1999) were not in place.

The logistics of the G8 summits are highly influenced by the anticipated protests. After extremely violent clashes at the summit in Genoa 2001 leading to the death of a protester, the meetings have been held in rather
isolated rural areas. The demonstrations have drawn attention away from issues on the agenda. Weeks before the summit, mass media was more focused on the preparation by police authorities and the construction of a security fence isolating the entire city of Heiligendamm rather than on the issues to be discussed by the G8 members. The summit itself took place out of public view only allowing the media to cover the summit in a controlled environment.

Selective media coverage and the self-representation of assorted movements minimize the movements’ struggles. A German government official was quoted: "I don't think they [the protesters] had any influence at all on the summit. They only influenced the media coverage” (Kirschbaum, 2007). A content analysis of media coverage during the G8 summit shows that the focus indeed was partly taken away from the summit’s objectives. However, the focal areas of the organized social movements were lost as well. Headlines such as Protesters fight police, block roads to G8 summit, Protesters attack police after Rostock anti-G8 demo, or Germany warns of left-wing terrorism at G8 summit outweighed the content-related issues of the G8 participants and their protesting counter-parts. The analysis of the organizers’ websites revealed that numerous activities indeed had strong content-related messages of social concern. Panel-discussions and informative events of social/public concern were held but not given the necessary public attention. The examination suggests that the forms and objectives of social protest at the G8 summit did not strongly reflect the underlying issues that the protesters wished to address.

Organized social movements intend to increase the salience on issues that differ from the objectives of the G8 summit participants. The issues set forth by the organizers touched upon contents of the G8 summit. However, the call for mobilization was framed rather negatively by keywords such against, stop, anti, fight, or no (see earlier discussion of Offe, 1985). I maintain that such negative media coverage contributes toward depicting these social movements in a negative light, thus associating them with anarchistic, destructive movements with no interests in the advancement of constructive dialogue with policy makers. The negative frame distracted from the issues

13 The media analysis took place by examining the reports by the international news agency Reuters which were re-printed in national and international news media. The archives can be found at http://www.reuters.com.
that also differed from the ones discussed by the summit participants. Thus again I argue that the demonstrators did not speak the language of the summit participants.

Violence by splinter groups justifies violent countermoves by authorities against larger groups of social protesters. As the discussion has revealed, numerous social movements created platforms to create nonviolent social actions throughout the G8 summit. Self-declared anarchistic groups disrupted protest events and engaged in violent clashes with the police. As it has already been discussed, these clashes detracted from the true objectives of the organized nonviolent demonstrations. Furthermore, police authorities used the violent encounters to gain control over the violent groups and the entire protest surroundings. Protest organizers strongly condemned the violent clashes between “police and a hardcore group of militants” (Armitage, 2007). I maintain that the differentiation between nonviolent protesters and the violent groups shrunk in the public perception, and along with it, the moral legitimacy of the organized nonviolent social movements. The violence surrounding demonstrations against the G8 will de-legitimize any attempts to raise awareness on issues of global concern that social movements intend to bring to the public through their protests.

By using the ‘instantaneity of the internet’ as a platform, social movements can act as educators and address their issues and objectives in an in-depth manner and reach a virtually unlimited audiences. The anti-globalization movements are linked through websites, web-blogs, and email communication. Large unrelated groups can be mobilized for joint protest actions. The process of conscientization of the public can be taken to more profound levels by providing in-depth information on the movements’ objectives with regard to public policy. Through the internet, social movements can create an alternative ‘news’ outlet not covered by the dominant media. According to Sharp (cited in Ameglio, 2006, n.p.), “a basic principle that the logic of nonviolent action entails is that of political judo and jujitsu”. This principle implies that “the adversary’s apparent force and errors are used against him, which demands a public construction and in the

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14 It must be noted that not all social movements have the financial and technical resources to draw from this newly existing information outlets. I am not implying that social movements who cannot make use of the internet cannot spread their information, create networks or act as educators for the public.
medias of some epistemic ruptures in people (and if possible in authority)” (Ameglio, 2006, n.p.). The news media depicted the demonstrations and social movements surrounding the G8 summit in a rather negative light. While the movements' organizers do not have equal access to the mass media platform, they can use the internet as an alternative news outlet to construct a discourse using the force of the media against their adversaries, the G8 leaders. The ‘instantaneity of the internet’ allows social movements to contest moves by the media or government authorities that would have remained undiscovered during earlier times.

Contextual factors determine the extent to which social movements act. In general, the environment surrounding social movements has to be taken into consideration, i.e. no social protest takes place in a political vacuum. The discussed displays of social protest in Germany took place within a protest-friendly environment, as has been shown by the official acceptance of nonviolent protest constantly reiterated by German Chancellor Merkel. Protesters following a creative nonviolent agenda did not have to fear persecution from state authorities. In contrast, social protest challenging the recent election results of the 2008 Presidential elections in Kenya and Zimbabwe took place in threat-laden, violent environments, where manifestation of discontent was dealt with through oppressive manners. I follow Goodwin and Jasper’s (2003) contention that the uses of tactics in social protest are structurally determined by the resources, threats, opportunities and daily lives of the social activists. Factors such as timing, location, participants, and resonance have to be taken into consideration when trying to examine the outcome (Moore, 1999). I am arguing from a social contextualist perspective set forth by Goodwin and Jasper (2003, p. 222) that “protestors in different societies face different political structures within which they must operate …”. Nevertheless, I maintain that the repertoire of action of social movements has many similarities even though the struggles might be completely disconnected.

**Conclusion**

The paper has shown that governments will evaluate how to deal with social protest depending on factors not directly related to social protest. The G8 summit’s logistics were largely determined by the anticipated social protest. Throughout the meetings the media coverage minimized the movements’ struggles on a content-basis. The violent splinter groups had a negative impact on the organized nonviolent movements, since the focus was taken
away from the content related issues. Nevertheless, social movements use the internet is used as an instrument for practicing “political judo” by allowing them on a pragmatic level to organize their actions and on a content-level to create an alternative news outlet. In general, the German social context was supportive of social action. Any study of social movements needs to carefully examine contextual factors.

The findings of this study certainly do not mark the end of the road. The empirical data is based on ongoing processes, thus the long-term outcomes are unknown. However, I maintain that every finding as such deserves follow-up research and a more profound analysis with which the assertions can be tested for accuracy. The protest surrounding the 2007 G8 summit can be seen as an opening for elaborative studies on the dialectical relationship between social movements and public policy. One might seek the connection between the literature review that extensively deals with nonviolent social protest and the discussion of the protest surrounding the 2007 G8 summit. Briefly stated, I argue that it is crucial for social movements to create salience of issues through strictly nonviolent action. It is essential for movements to act reflectively and organize themselves guided by the philosophy of nonviolent action. Moral authority and legitimacy can be reached within the larger public audience which then can lead policy makers to consider the claims the social movements share in their protest actions.

If one follows the position that “the rise of the protest movement against neoliberal globalization represents one of the most significant illustrations of social conflict and contentious political behavior of the past several decades” (Ayres, 2004, p. 11), then it becomes clear that social movements need to be studied in the same way as their political counterparts have been studied – as actors in shaping the social and political landscape of any given society.

References


Multinational Corporations and Human Rights Abuses: A case study of the Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People and Ijaw Youth Council of Nigeria
by Dr Victor Ojakorotu and Ayo Whetho

The paper examines the increasing connections between oil extraction and human rights violation in the Niger Delta of Nigeria especially with the transition to democracy which began in 1999. The transition to democracy in 1999 inadvertently unleashed centrifugal pressures on the Nigerian state as exemplified, for example, in the exacerbation of the struggle over the sharing of oil revenues between the oil-producing states and the central government. The Niger Delta has witnessed violent confrontations between the oil-bearing communities and the Nigerian state and between these communities and multinational corporations (MNCs) with attendant gross violation of human rights in the region. Suffice it to say that the attention of the international community has been drawn to the human rights situation

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16 Ayo Whetho is a doctoral candidate at the Department of Political Studies, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg, South Africa.
in the region (partly) through the activities of social movements. In fact, the formation of the Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP) and the Ijaw Youth Council (IYC) in the 1990s marked a watershed in the internationalization of the Niger Delta crisis as well as addressing human rights violations in the region. Within this milieu, the fundamental question is the extent to which democracy (civilian regime) has changed anything for the people of the Niger Delta.

**Introduction**

The Niger Delta, one of the world’s largest wetlands, is one of the most richly endowed on the continent with abundance biodiversity with large proportions of Nigeria’s oil reserves. The area is the main oil-producing region in the country thus generating more than 80% of national revenue. At the same time, the Niger Delta has been an enclave of youth militancy and unmitigated violence on a large scale. It has been more conflict-prone than any other region in Nigeria. The region has been the epicentre of conflicts between oil bearing/host communities and oil companies (mainly over land rights or compensation for ecological damage); between oil producing communities and the government (over increased access to oil wealth); and between and among ethnic groups (over claims to land ownership and sharing of amenities).

The long-standing Niger-Delta crisis has led to serious consequences, including the loss of lives, wanton destruction of property, and disruption of oil activities. The Nigerian state is seemingly overwhelmed by the complexity of this quagmire in spite of successive governments’ efforts to address the structural dynamics that underpin the region’s problematique. And the democratic opening (since 1999) seems to have provided an outlet for increased militancy by the youth of the region thus posing an immense challenge to national stability.

This paper highlights the causes of the perennial violence in the Niger Delta, as it is one of the main reasons that informed the upsurge of social movements in the region in the 1990s. The paper also assesses the activities of MOSOP and IYC in challenging the state and oil multinationals (especially Shell) on the issue of human rights violations in the region. In this regard, the paper highlights how the activities of these social movements have internationalised the human rights situation in the Niger Delta.
Theoretical framework

Scholars have proposed several theories to explain the occurrence of conflict, especially resource-based conflict. Some of these theories explain the bases of conflict, the motivations of belligerences and the dynamics of conflict. To properly understand the Niger Delta conflict and the gross violation of human rights, this paper situates itself within the framework of the Frustration-Aggression theory. This theory posits that frustration increases the likelihood of aggression, akin to what the people of the Niger Delta have exhibited over four decades against the state and the major oil multinationals operating in the region. According to the Frustration-Aggression theory, all aggression has its origin/root causes in the frustration of one or more actors as a result of another actor’s achievement of a goal. Therefore conflict is as a result of the lack of fulfilment of an individual’s or group’s objectives and the frustration that this breeds. Generally, human needs have always been insatiable and the failure to meet all these demands informs series of conflicts between political actors.\(^\text{17}\)

Over the years, oil-bearing communities in the Niger Delta have had to endure neglect by the government and the negative effects of environmental practices by multinationals. The attempts by these communities to ensure greater control of their resources have yielded little results, resulting in the quest for the restructuring of Nigeria’s federal system, especially the fiscal aspects of the system. Furthermore, local communities have deemed the performance of multinationals in the area of corporate social responsibility as less than satisfactory, leading to environmental activism which often assumes violent dimensions. The failure of both the state and the multinationals to meet the expectations of the people of the Niger Delta has bred frustration and aggression in the region as illustrated by the forms of violence ranging from hostage taking and attack on oil facilities to conflict between ethnic militants and government forces.

Hence, the Frustration-Aggression theory vividly illustrates why the ethnic militias in the Niger Delta have resorted to violence as a form of response to the state of affairs in the region. It is not uncommon for activists, leaders and ethnic militias in the region to predicate the violent behaviour associated with the politics of the Niger Delta on (pent-up) frustration.

induced by the policies of the state and those of oil multinationals. The people of the region have been disgruntled by what they perceive as the deliberate policies of marginalization, alienation, environmental degradation on the part of the state and the oil multinationals. Indeed, it is plausible to locate the Niger Delta crisis, especially the recent upsurge in violent behaviour by militants, within the context of the frustration arising from unfulfilled expectations.

**Oil Multinationals in the Niger Delta**

As Robert Gilpin has commented, no aspect of international political economy has generated more controversy than the global expansion of multinational corporations since the end of the Second World War.\(^\text{18}\) This is so because the impact of their activities on host states is interpreted differently and in most cases their operations in developing countries are linked to the perennial crisis of underdevelopment. While some view MNCs as “boon to mankind… diffusing technology and economic growth to developing countries, and interlocking national economies into an expanding and beneficial interdependence”\(^\text{19}\) others view them negatively for they do not always engage in best practices in their areas of operations as the case of the Niger Delta shows. Notwithstanding these divergent views of MNCs in less developed countries (LDCs), it is quite clear that LDCs have actually welcomed the idea of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) partly as an extension of the commitment to liberalisation and partly because they see in such investment by foreign MNCs the hope of achieving the modernization and economic growth of their countries. In short, in the initial post-independence years, the enthusiasm of the leaders of most LDCs was basically oriented towards the interest of the western world. Many LDCs at independence endorsed the idea of FDI as integral to the actualisation of their development aspirations.

Nigeria was not an exception in this regard, as the head of government in Nigeria at independence extended an open invitation for economic relations to firms of the colonial overlords. He said: “I sometimes doubt whether your


\(^\text{19}\) R. Gilpin, *op. cit*, p. 231.
business men here in England are fully alive to the extent of possibilities available to them in Nigeria and whether they would take full advantage of the potential enormous market waiting to be overtaken by other more enterprising of the western world.” Without much hesitation foreign investors responded in order to gain, extend or protect their access to Nigeria’s market.

However, the involvement of oil multinationals in the Nigerian economy predates the country’s independence. The granting of mineral oil concession to the Shell-d’Arcy Petroleum Development Company by the colonial government in 1938 marked the origin of MNCs’ operations in the country. The discovery of oil in commercial quantities by this company kindled the interests of other oil companies in the late 1950s including Mobil Exploration Nigeria Limited, an affiliate of the American Socony-Mobil Oil Company. Other MNCs were to join with the independence of the country in 1960. These included Tennessee Nigeria Inc. (1960), an affiliate of the American Tennessee Gas Transmission; Nigerian Gulf Oil Company (1962), an affiliate of American Gulf Oil Company; and Nigerian AGIP Oil Company (1962), an affiliate of the Italian government-owned ENI.

The Nigerian oil industry is dominated by the major oil multinationals operating a joint venture with the state through the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC). These multinational companies are Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC), Chevron Nigeria Limited (CNL), Mobil Producing Nigeria Unlimited (MPNU), Nigerian Agip Oil Company Limited (NAOC), Elf Petroleum Nigeria Limited (EPNL), and Texaco Overseas Petroleum Company of Nigeria Unlimited (TOPCON). Apart from these oil companies that operate joint ventures with the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) there are others that also operate in Nigeria’s oil industry. These include Pan Ocean Oil, British Gas, Tenneco, Deminex, Sun Oil, Total and Statoil, all of which operate alongside numerous other local firms.

20 This position was expressed by the first Prime Minister of Nigeria, Sir Tafawa Balewa on his state visit to the United Kingdom. Apart from him other subsequent governments have adopted series of policies that sought to encourage foreign investors to do business in the country.


22 This information was gathered during field work in the Niger Delta in 2002. Also see Human Rights Watch, www/hrw.org, for further details.
venture between the six oil multinationals and the Federal Government operates under a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) which stipulates that “the operating company in a joint venture receives a fixed sum per barrel provided the price of oil per barrel remains within certain margins.”

This arrangement illustrates the partnership between the state and oil multinationals in Nigeria.

Having said that, it is instructive to clarify the generally inaccurate perception about the oil industry in Nigeria. It is assumed that the oil industry is a single industry with exclusive focus on the extraction of oil. However, this notion is wrong, as the industry is made up of many sub-sectors. According to Popoola, “the more important of the industries are exploration and production, transportation, processing, marketing and distribution” but for the purpose of this research emphasis will be placed on exploration and production because of its impact on the host communities of the Niger Delta and secondly, it impacts so much on the subject matter of this paper. Given this background, the operations of the oil companies have generated harmful consequences in the form of environmental degradation and pollution which in turn, have resulted in militant resistance from the host communities. But it is noteworthy that such grievance has been induced not only by the activities of multinationals but also by the perceived deficits in Nigeria’s federal arrangement and government policy. For example, legislation has stripped the local people of the necessary benefits they would have derived from these oil companies in the event of environmental damage emanating from oil production. A case in point is the Land Use Act of 1978 which vests ownership and control of all land in the government. Hence, local communities cannot claim to have any vested interest in the use and the consequences of the use of their land. As a result of this legislation, oil companies usually deflect the responsibility for the environment to the government. The government in turn, more often than not, passes this responsibility to the multinationals, as it argues that this duty constitutes part of the social responsibility profile of MNCs. In any case, this buck-passing does not address the concerns of the oil-bearing communities regarding environmental governance, leading to activism and militancy on the part of the people of the region.

23 Human Rights Watch, op. cit.

24 A. O. Popoola, op. cit.
According to Frynas, there are indications to suggest that there was a sort of cooperative relationship between the oil companies and the local people before the upsurge of violent struggles in the area. Frynas further asserts that this new twist in the relationship between the local communities and MNCs might not be unconnected with the issue of “compulsory land acquisition and subsequent low compensation payments”\(^\text{25}\) as clearly demonstrated in the court case between *Nzekwu v. Attorney-General East-Central State*:

*The Ogbo family sued the government over the compulsory acquisition of 397 Acres of their land near Onitsha in the then Eastern Region of Nigeria. From the beginning the family had cooperated with the oil companies. In 1957, they leased 3.2 acres of land to Total Oil for ninety-nine years at a rent of 945 pounds per annum. In the same year, they let out land to Shell-BP for a ferry ramp at a rent of 200 pounds.*\(^\text{26}\)

Given this agreement between the family and the oil companies, the Nigerian government in 1960 indicated its intention to acquire about 800 acres of land in that area including the 397 acres at 10 pounds per annum for twenty years. The government’s offer was considerably lower than what the oil companies initially offered the family. This was the basis of the court case and the Supreme Court awarded the family the sum of 252,600 pounds for the land and houses thereon.\(^\text{27}\) Therefore this case pointed out how government intervention was partly responsible for the breakdown of peaceful relationship between the oil companies and the local people of the area. Government intervention in oil production through the NNPC and the disempowerment of the local communities through environmental legislation meant that the oil companies have had to deal directly with the government. More importantly, the oil multinationals are guided by primarily by the logic of profit maximisation; the needs of the communities are not exactly on the priority list. These companies are also accountable to their headquarters in Europe and America and not the Nigerian state. This scenario undermines the ability of the people to make demands on MNCs.


\(^{26}\) *Ibid.*

\(^{27}\) *Ibid.*
operating in the region, especially in effecting policy and attitudinal changes that are deemed harmful to the environment.

That said, MNCs’ involvement in the Niger Delta portrays a somewhat ambivalent character. With the eruption of persistent violence that translates to the disruption of oil production, these companies have had to support state repression. On the other hand, MNCs have been involved in community development programmes and projects in the realm of corporate social responsibility (CSR) to launder their image. In either case, MNCs’ motivations have been to maintain their production levels in the region. Nevertheless, the companies’ involvement in CSR is not simple and clear-cut as it seems. As Davies notes, “[g]iven the Federal Government’s position on oil and other minerals, the oil companies have in most cases agreed that it is the responsibility of the state to meet the demands of the local people in view of their agreements in regard to oil production.”28 Although MNCs undertake initiatives that ostensibly seek to facilitate the development of their areas of operations, Davies contends that “all the oil companies are deeply and structurally connected to the repressive apparatus of the state.”29 All oil companies are required to pay the salaries and expenses of a special armed and uniformed national police force tasked with guarding oil industry facilities. These are not company security guards but national security forces answerable to the Nigerian government. In addition, after years of public denials, Shell was finally forced to admit that it had purchased thousands of guns and millions of rounds of ammunition for its police contingent, known among the people as the "Shell Police". The company’s “Mobile Police Force (MPF)” is equally well known in the region.30 The apparent culpability of the MNCs in the operation of these forces shows the oil companies’ ‘structural connection to the repressive apparatus of the state’.


29 Ibid.

30 Ibid.
A sore point in MNCs’ operations in the Niger Delta has been (debate over) the responsibility for the development of the region. Some analysts believe that the responsibility to develop the Niger Delta rests with the Federal Government. For example, the former British High Commissioner to Nigeria, Sir Graham Burton once argued that the Federal Government, rather than multinational oil companies, was responsible for the marginalization of Niger Delta and its people. In this regard, he implored the Nigerian government to live up to its responsibilities towards the people of the region the government receives the bulk of its earnings from oil business, even as the government earns more than the oil companies with which it has joint venture agreements.\textsuperscript{31} He further substantiated this position by pointing out that “Shell Petroleum Development Company – the ubiquitous whipping outfit for Niger Delta crisis – for instance, earned only 75 cents per barrel of oil when the price was $20, against $15.37 being credited to Government through the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC).”\textsuperscript{32} On the basis of such arguments, some advocate greater commitment on the part of the government towards resolving the crisis in the Niger Delta.

On the other hand, not a few people in the Niger Delta believe that it is the responsibility of the oil companies to protect the environment where they operate and that they should demonstrate their commitment to the people of the region as much as the government is expected to do. Those who subscribe to the view predicate their argument on the negative effects of oil exploration on the communities. For instance, one of the impacts of oil production on the people of the region is the devastating effect of oil spillage, and in most cases, these companies do not live up to their responsibilities to the environment and to the people. It is on record that the communities affected by oil spillage have witnessed much of violent resistance in recent times. This is the case in the Ijaw and Ogoni communities:

\textsuperscript{31} \textit{The Guardian}, 17 November 1999. Some oil-bearing communities and staff of non-governmental organisations expressed similar sentiments during field work in the Ijaw and Ogoni communities in the Niger Delta.

\textsuperscript{32} \textit{Ibid}. 

62
Rivers state of Nigeria which is most affected by incidences of oil spillages has in recent times recorded the highest number of agitation for the equitable distribution of oil wealth and demands for self determination, as witnessed with the activities of the Ogoni movement.\textsuperscript{33}

It goes without saying that the spectre of violent resistance does not bode well for the oil companies as it disrupts their operations. On the basis of this, it is argued that the oil companies have to implement measures in reducing the negative impact of oil spillage on the people. And:

\begin{quote}
[g]iven the overwhelming role of oil in the Nigerian national economy, the policies and practices of the oil companies are important factors in the decision making of the Nigerian government. Because the oil companies are operating joint ventures with the government they have constant opportunities to influence government policy…\textsuperscript{34}
\end{quote}

In view of the above, multinational oil companies are expected to contribute to the socio-economic development of their host communities. The former British High Commissioner to Nigeria, quoted earlier, opined that “multinational companies certainly have a developmental role within the community.” He was however quick to add that “other partners too must face up to their responsibilities.”\textsuperscript{35} Certainly, the debate about the level of the culpability of government and MNCs in the Niger Delta crisis, as well as their contributions to solving the region’s problems, will remain a subject of intense debate in Nigeria’s oil industry.

A recurring issue in the debate about the operations of the oil multinationals in the Nigerian state and the Niger Delta in particular is the question of the degree of collusion between these companies and the domestic power brokers. Such collusion is not restricted to the local elite who might perceive and/or receive some benefits in colluding with foreign oil companies but it lies more especially with the successive governments that have been accused of encouraging the penetration of Nigeria by foreign capital and failing to compel MNCs to comply with environmental laws.


\textsuperscript{34} Human Rights Watch on Nigeria Niger Delta

\textsuperscript{35} \textit{The Guardian} (Lagos) 17 November 1999.
The double standard on the part of oil companies (in terms of non-adherence to ethics of business in Nigeria but compliance elsewhere) is cited to buttress the argument that there is some form of collusion between the government and MNCs. For example, it is argued that the operations of Shell elsewhere ensure that it does not degrade the environment but it does not take such precautions in Nigeria. The following observation is therefore apposite here:

[With regard to] Shell’s pipeline from Stanlow in Cheshire to Mossmoran in Scotland, 17 different environmental surveys were commissioned before a single turf was cut … A detailed Environmental Assessment impact covered every measure of the (pipeline) route … Elaborate measures were taken to avoid lasting disfiguring and the route was diverted in several places to accommodate environmental concerns… [but] the Ogoni have never seen, let alone been consulted over, an environmental impact assessment.36

Notwithstanding the agreement between the oil multinationals and the Nigerian state over the provision of necessary infrastructural facilities it is the duty of the oil companies to exhibit corporate responsibility towards their host communities. This will enhance their operations and promote a peaceful relationship in the course of their operations in these areas. It is to this concept that is so integral to resolving the Niger Delta crisis that this paper now turns attention.

**Corporate Social Responsibility: Evidence from the Niger Delta**

Although there is no universally or generally acceptable definition of the concept of corporate social responsibility, it enjoys wide acceptability in international economic relations. Simply defined, CSR implies the demonstration of certain responsible behaviour on the part of governments and the business sector towards society and the environment. The importance of this concept has made international institutions to support the idea. As Natufe notes

*Three important international institutions have underlined the need for governments and companies to adhere to the principles of corporate social responsibility. These are the World*
The concept has been promoted through the initiatives of two international organizations as a measure of drawing global attention to the necessity by governments and business to demonstrate a degree of responsibility toward society. (The Business Council for Sustainable Development (BCSD) and the World Industry Council for the Environment (WBCE) later formed WBCSD (which comprises about 140 international companies) in 1995, as a driving force behind CSR globally). The WBCSD defines CSR “as the continuing commitment by business to behave ethically and contribute to economic development while improving the quality of life of the workforce and their families as well as of the local community and society at large.”\textsuperscript{38} WBCSD’s definition of CSR focuses essentially on major issues such as human rights, employee rights, environmental protection, community development, supplier relations, and monitoring.\textsuperscript{39} It is possible to determine the extent to which companies exhibit CSR in their areas of operations by evaluating their performance vis-à-vis these major issues.

This paper uses Shell as a case study to assess the extent to which its activities reflect CSR. It is worthy of note that of all the oil companies operating in Nigeria, Shell is the only oil company with WBCSD membership. Furthermore, the company’s former Chief Executive in Nigeria (1991-1994) and Managing Director of Royal Dutch/Shell Group, Mr. Phil Watts, is an executive member of the WBCSD and co-chair of the Working Group that produced the Corporate Social Responsibility Report for the WBCSD.\textsuperscript{40} Therefore, these factors should put the company in good stead to implement CSR in its host communities in the Niger Delta.

\textsuperscript{37} O. I. Natufe, op. cit.

\textsuperscript{38} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{39} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{40} O. I Natufe, op. cit.
Despite the fact that Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC) is a prominent member of WBCSD and given the environmental guidelines established by the Nigerian State through Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR) and the Federal Environmental Protection Agency (FEPA), the company has witnessed more protests than other oil companies that operate in the region. This might not be unconnected with the inability of the Nigerian government to implement the environmental laws as they are established. It is also interesting to note that the Nigerian environmental regulations and standards through DPR and FEPA compare favourably with those of advanced western countries such as Canada and the United States but the issues of implementation as mentioned above remains a challenge. Given this limitation, the oil companies have not always addressed in a satisfactory manner the impact of oil production on the environment and the local people. And in some cases these companies find it convenient to claim sabotage as the cause of oil spills even if available evidence suggests something contrary to the companies’ claims:

Shell admitted that there were 815 oil spills between 1997 and 1999, out of which 170, an alarming 20.85%, were caused by its corrosive pipelines. It should be stressed that, Shell did not include the volume spilled at Ekakpomre, Delta State, in its calculation of the 1999 volume. It blamed that oil spill on "sabotage", just as it has always done in cases of massive oil spills caused by its corrosive pipelines.41

The charge of sabotage comes in handy for oil companies as it potentially exonerates them from blame and frees them from the responsibility to lean up the environment. It is instructive to note that MNCs and local communities are almost always embroiled heated debate over the cause(s) of oil spills and the responsibility for the clean up process.

The table below shows Shell’s oil spills between 1997 and 1999 and their causes thereof:

41 Ibid.
### Table: Shell’s oil spills

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of Spills</th>
<th>Volume (in barrels)</th>
<th>Caused by Corrosion</th>
<th>Volume</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>254</td>
<td>76,000 barrels</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>11,533</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>242</td>
<td>50,200</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>21,548</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>319</td>
<td>23,377</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The many cases of oil spills resulting from corroded pipelines illustrate negligence on the part of both the Nigerian state and the oil companies. Such negligence is to the detriment of the local people of the region. Therefore, the policies of oil multinationals in the Niger Delta have been a major source of prevailing violence in the region.

Generally, transnational oil companies have shown rhetorical commitment to the Niger Delta, as they have at different times restated/defended their “commitment” to the Niger Delta and the principle of “corporate/social responsibility.” The former Managing Director of Chevron Texaco Nigeria Limited, Mr. Jay Pryor, once said that the company was committed to corporate responsibility in the country, noting that the multinational had a set of values guiding its operations. He explained that “the events of the past 25 years including political democratization in many countries, economic liberalization and information technology revolution, have changed people’s perception about the roles of business.”

He listed the expected roles of business as:
- sustenance of the business enterprise; and
- sustenance of people and the society and sustenance of the environment.

Pryor also stressed that “the six pillars of corporate responsibility are:
- business ethics
- employee welfare
- local business development
- community engagement
- human rights and safety and environmental stewardship.”

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43 Ibid.
What is clear from the above is that issues of human rights, protection of the environment come last in the operational calculus of ChevronTexaco, and by extension, all oil multinationals operating in the Niger Delta. Given this scenario, the resolution of the conflicts between the oil multinationals and the host communities is one yet for the future, at least not until there is a convergence of interests between the actors in the Niger Delta.

**Human rights violations**

The centrality of oil to Nigeria’s economy cannot be overemphasized; oil is the mainstay of the economy. The government depends heavily on the revenue generated from the sale of oil. Any activity that disrupt oil supplies, say activism by oil-bearing communities, is viewed by the government as a threat to the survival of the state and this elicits responses (sometimes military repression) that infringe on the rights of the people of the region. Therefore, it can be said that the politics associated with oil is responsible for gross violation of human rights by both the Nigerian government and the oil multinationals in the region. As noted earlier, the enactment of certain laws meant the disempowerment of the people as far as having a say in the use of the environment was concerned. To this must be added the cases of physical assault on the people of the region by state security forces (sometimes in collaboration with MNCs and their agents). For instance, the most serious case was that of Umuechem in 1990, where a Shell manager made a written request for a detachment of MPF to protect the company’s facilities during a protest by the people of the oil-bearing community. The request of the manager and the subsequent deployment of mobile policemen led to the loss of about eighty lives and the destruction of about one hundred homes. There is another well-known case: between January and December 1993, Ken Saro-Wiwa and other prominent Ogoni leaders were arrested and detained several times, with criminal charges brought against them for leading the cause of the Niger Delta against the state and MNCs operating in the Niger Delta.

The other dimension to this crisis needs to be given attention here. This is government’s method of ‘divide and rule’ which was intended to break the Ogoni struggle in a number of ways. In fact, available evidence suggests that

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the government actively sought the implosion of MOSOP. A case in point was the Giokoo Accord of March 1994, which called for the Gokana people to pull out of MOSOP. Government had allegedly induced some conservative Gokana chiefs to sign this accord. However, Gokana people demonstrated spontaneously against this accord on May 19, 1994 in many Gokana villages.\textsuperscript{45} The government also encouraged violent conflicts between the Ogoni and their neighbours, which resulted in ethnic and communal clashes. The attempt was to dub the clashes as purely ethnic, indicting the MOSOP leadership in the process. The use of sophisticated weapons and standard military tactics in all these ethnic clashes is evidently enough to prove the involvement of the military.\textsuperscript{46} For instance, Human Rights Africa (HRA) reported that soldiers were recruited from Liberia to fight and kill Ogoni people under the pretext that they were going to fight in Cameroon.\textsuperscript{47}

Following the shooting and killing of about eleven Ogoni people by security agents at Bara, old Rivers State in April 1993, the Ibrahim Babangida-led military government promulgated a decree which stipulated death penalty for all acts of treason. The Ogoni responded with increased mobilization and media campaign, with a possible option of violent demonstration. However, this strategy later became a divisive factor in the rank and file of MOSOP and its leadership. After the controversial MOSOP boycott of the June 12, 1993 presidential election, it became clear that there had been a division of its leadership into two – the moderates led by Dr Leton, and the militants led by Ken Saro-Wiwa. Apart from accusing Saro-Wiwa of being too confrontational, militant and authoritarian, the moderates also alleged that he was planning to kill thirteen Ogoni leaders, among whom four were eventually killed in May 1994.

As part of his environmental advocacy, Ken Saro-Wiwa had campaigned from village to village on the need for the government to address the problems of the Niger Delta, especially the marginalisation of the Ogoni

\textsuperscript{45} Gokana is one of the several villages that comprise the Ogoni kingdom.


\textsuperscript{47} The Punch (Lagos), 9 November 1997.
nation in the national scheme of affairs. This campaign took him to Giokoo village on May 21, 1994, where some conservative chiefs (allegedly being sponsored by government) were meeting. The attempt by soldiers to turn him back culminated in violent confrontation in which the youths in the village killed four chiefs. This incident led to the immediate arrest and detention of Ken Saro-Wiwa and many other Ogoni activists. They were later arraigned before a special military tribunal, which sentenced Saro-Wiwa and eight others to death by hanging. The execution was carried out in November 1995 against all entreaties both from within and outside the country. This development (coupled with leadership bickering and state repression) sounded the death knell for the Ogoni struggle. However, this is not to say that the struggle completely fizzled out, but it lost the vibrancy and militancy associated with it in its early stages.

The Ijaw, through the IYC, took the centre stage of activism in the Niger Delta following the implosion of MOSOP. Since 1997, when Ijaw youths called for an end to Shell activities in the Niger Delta, Ijaw people have resolved to lead the struggle against the state and oil companies with a view to liberating the region from perceived exploitation, neglect, and marginalization. Bayelsa State, which is wholly inhabited by the Ijaw people, became a hotbed of Ijaw militancy between 1998 and 1999. The militant and self-acclaimed invincible Egbesu Boys came into limelight in 1998 when they were able to set free their detained leader from government House in Yenagoa, having disarmed the guards. The emergence of the Egbesu warriors since then has demonstrated the militarisation of local conflict in which sophisticated arms have been freely employed by militant youths.

After the death of General Abacha in 1998, the new political climate made it possible for Ijaw youths to be more vigorous in their demands. To drive home their grievances, the youths started hijacking oil installations. In December 11, 1998, the youths convened at Kaiama town, where they made a landmark declaration, now made popular and known as the Kaiama Declaration. In the document, they requested for more local control of oil revenues and better environmental policies. More importantly, the statement gave a December 30th ultimatum to both the government and the oil companies to respond positively to their demands. It added that if the

deadline was not met, all multinational oil corporations operating in Ijaw lands and territorial waters, and indeed in the larger Niger Delta, should leave the region.\textsuperscript{49}

To actualize their threat, Ijaw youths and other people who joined them marched in peaceful demonstration towards government House in Yenagoa, the capital city of Bayelsa state. Their main purpose was to convey their grievances through the state governor, Lt Colonel Paul Obi to the Federal Government. The protest turned out to be one of the bloodiest in the Niger Delta as soldiers shot at the protesters, leaving some of them dead and many others injured. This marked the beginning of hostilities between Ijaw youths and the security forces.

The Ijaw communities of Warri North Local government area (Apia and Kenyan) also experienced state repression on the 4 January 1999 when about hundred armed soldiers from the military base next to Chevron’s escravos terminal attacked them. At the end of this operation virtually all the houses in the two communities were destroyed, canoes were sunk and dozens of people lost their lives.\textsuperscript{50} There are other numerous examples of state repression against the local people. In most cases oil companies collaborated with the Nigerian state in perpetrating human rights abuses. For instance, Shell has been accused of maintaining its own police. The company is also allegedly responsible for the importation of arms:

\textit{Shell admits to purchasing 107 handguns for the supernumerary police more than 15 years ago. Shell argues that it does not own these guns, which remain the property of the Nigerian police force, the body that regulates the conditions for their use and storage.}\textsuperscript{51}

Apart from this, it was alleged that in 1995 the company negotiated to purchase upgraded weapons worth almost a million dollars for its own police. At another level, Shell has given assistance to the Nigerian Police in brutalizing the local people of the Niger Delta. Shell helicopters and boats

\textsuperscript{49} Ima Niboro, “Bloodbath”, \textit{Tell} (Lagos), No. 3.

\textsuperscript{50} B. Manby, \textit{op. cit.}

have transported members of the Nigerian security forces during these operations against the local people. In 1987, for example, the company transported members of the MPF to a demonstration at Icon in Akwa Ibom State.”52 The MPF killed two people and destroyed about forty houses in this operation. In most cases the company accepted the use of its equipment by MPF while at the same time refuting the allegation that the company used the MPF to suppress dissent. It is not uncommon for news reports to highlight instances MNC collaboration with the Nigerian government and its security forces to suppress the local communities in the Niger Delta.

In another incident, Friends of the Environment (FoE) accused NAOC of culpability in the killing of 16 youths from Olugbobiri and Ikebiri communities in the southern Ijaw Local Government Area of Bayelsa state by security operatives manning Agip’s facilities for merely agitating for a sense of belonging. FoE argues that such a measure is genocidal and constitutes a systematic cleansing of the human resources of the region needed for development.53 Friends of the Environment (FoE) also condemned the insensitivity of the oil companies to the plight of their host communities. Among others, FoE accused the transnational oil companies of manipulating the people of the oil and gas rich region.

Given the political, economic and social dynamics of the Niger Delta crisis, the people of the region have had to engage the oil companies and the Nigerian government in a fierce battle to gain access to oil wealth. This has informed the recent struggle by the Governors of the Niger Delta states to control the resources in the region. The Governors seem to be finding a support base in the communities. Recent history shows that the relationship between oil-bearing communities and MNCs has been largely acrimonious. Due to the frustration of these communities, which stem from MNCs indiscriminate activities and state insensitivity to their plight, they have often had to press home their point through protests and shut downs. The table below illustrates how oil-bearing communities have disrupted Shell’s operations because of perceived insensitivity to the plight of the local people.

52 Ibid.

Table: Alleged community disruptions to Shell’s Niger Delta operations

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of incidents</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total project days lost</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>243</td>
<td>407</td>
<td>1432</td>
<td>1316</td>
<td>NA</td>
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A look at the activities of MNCs in Africa shows how oil exploration has engendered environmental and social problems including instability. The use of divide and rule tactics by different governments from the 1960s in Nigeria is equally a pointer that no government in Nigeria has been willing to address the problems of the oil producing areas in the country. Therefore the only option (though not to be interpreted as being justified by the authors) open to the people is to be confrontational in their approach. Looking at the activities of the Nigerian state, oil multinationals and different communities in the Niger Delta region one can tentatively conclude that the crisis and politics inherent in oil production are a complex one.

As noted above, oil politics and the Niger Delta crisis continue to attract international attention. The internationalisation of the crisis has brought into focus the need for the Nigerian state to redress the perceived contradictions arising from the provisions of the Land Use Act of 1978 as a prelude to promoting sustainable development in the region. From the observations during field work, it is very difficult to substantiate that the government and MNCs have the interests of the local people at heart. The deplorable situation of most oil-bearing communities presupposes that the government and MNCs need to be more alive to their responsibilities towards the communities. This would surely work both ways, if not in three ways – for the Federal Government that relies on oil wealth, the MNCs that seek to maximise profit and the oil-bearing communities who want a ‘share of the pie’. In the long run the attitudes of the government and oil companies in not addressing the effects of pollution and other associated problems of oil exploration will continue to affect their operations and undermine their interests; the same will equally perpetuate increase in government spending on security at the local level.
The military and human rights in the Niger Delta

All modern nation-states have incorporated into their fundamental documents or constitutions, the security and protection of their territorial integrity and independence – a function that is performed statutorily by the armed forces. Hence it is evident that the military is an indispensable part of any collectivity (which needs protection) and by extension, nation states. The experience of Nigeria over the years shows that the military had not kept faith with this role but had intervened in the country’s politics. The country had witnessed military rule for much of its post-independence years. Indeed, from January 1966 to May 1999, not less than eight military heads of state ruled Nigeria. The road to long period of military rule began on January 15, 1966 when a group of young army officers toppled the first democratically elected government. Since then, it had been one coup after another and Nigeria became infested with what was later known as the “Nzeogwu Virus.”

Aside the fact that the military in Nigeria had not stuck to its traditional role, it had acted as an aggressor to the people, especially in the Niger Delta. At different times military forces in collaboration with oil companies have held the civil society in disdain and contempt. Beyond this, the local people have been subjected to military repression, an unpleasant reality that has further impoverished the oil-bearing communities. The Egbema operation of July 11 and 12, 2004 was one of the many instances of military invasion of the Niger Delta communities. Security personnel on Operation Restore Hope, the military task force in charge of security in the Niger Delta, on the aforementioned dates raided Ijaw communities in the Warri North Local Government Area of Delta State under the guise of search for killers of two American expatriates and other oil workers killed in the area.

Messrs Tari-Emiyen Benson and Momotimi Gule, in a petition they wrote under the aegis of Concerned Egbema Citizens, alleged that 13 communities

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54 The January coup 1966 was said to be a counter-reaction from the core Northern military cadre to put a permanent stop to the political challenges to Prime Minister Tafawa Balewa’s government from the Southern part of Nigeria. In order to check this, Nzeogwu/Ifeajuna’s Operation Damisa was stage-managed by Five Majors in the Nigerian Army. For more analyses on this, See M. Chris Alli, The Federal Republic of Nigerian Army: The Siege of A Nation. (Lagos: Malthouse Press Limited, 2001), pp 211-215.

were razed during the operation. Some of these communities are Oghudugbudu, Idebagbene, Ifelegbene, Arantigbene, Kirigbologhagbene, Oboribigbene, Zenijeregbene and Beka Zion.\textsuperscript{56} The military, it was reported, used eight gunboats and military aircraft during the operation, shooting indiscriminately from land, sea and air. Benson and Gule also corroborated this arguing that the “use of military aircraft, war boats and heavy weapons such as bombs on fellow citizens is barbaric and need to be condemned.”\textsuperscript{57} Another organisation, the \textit{Egbema United Front}, also speaking through Sunny Jero and Israel Tiemo, reported:

\begin{quote}
On Sunday, July 11 and Monday 12, those men in military uniform attacked our village with all the paraphernalia of an invading army, shooting indiscriminately, killing innocent people and destroying villages. The people came in gunboats and heavy weaponry as early as 9 a.m. and started shooting at anything\textsuperscript{58}
\end{quote}

Chiefs Layema Kuruma and Jackson Lawuru, community leaders from the area, put the number of buildings destroyed during the operation at 500. They added that no fewer than 200 persons, mostly women and children, who escaped into the forest in the wake of the military invasion, are feared missing as their whereabouts could not be ascertained days after the attack by the military.

However, the military authorities disagreed with the claim that they killed and destroyed communities during the operation. The taskforce commander, Brigadier General Elias Zamani, absolved his men from all the allegations. Zamani, speaking through the military outfit’s Public Relations Officer, Major Said Hammed, maintained that the aim of the operation was to fish out criminals in the area and persons believed to have killed two America expatriates and some oil workers around the area. His defence:

\begin{quote}
The taskforce is not an invading army. The outfit is appropriately positioned to restore hope and peace to the Niger Delta. In line with our operations in July 11, the taskforce deployed men on cordon-and-search operations to recover arms and ammunition; to apprehend
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{56}Ibid.\textsuperscript{57} See \textit{Daily Independent} (Lagos) 19 August 2004, p. A7.

\textsuperscript{58}Ibid.
pirates operating along the Benin River to Sapele as well as criminals operating under the banner of militant youths; and to re-open the water-ways to ensure the return of economic activities along the creeks.\textsuperscript{59}

A villager alleged that the operation was actually ordered by the presidency, as it did in Odi, with the aim of apprehending suspected criminals. Says the source, “if the only option available to arrest criminals in Ijaw territory is by use of military artillery, aircraft, warboats, bombs and weapons of mass destruction, then we are afraid of the kind of democracy we operate as a nation.”\textsuperscript{60} The Ijaw leaders in Warri confirmed that gun battle between Joint Security Task Force, Operation Restore Hope, in Warri has led to sudden disappearances of about eighty people and many houses burnt. The Publicity Secretary of the Egbema United Front (an Ijaw Pressure group), Prince Gandy Soroaye, was of the view that the soldiers were upset by unknown youths, “the actions taken was to the extreme and damage done colossal.”\textsuperscript{61}

Various regimes and administrations in Nigeria are known to have supervised ignominious looting of state treasury. Successive regimes have also been noted for flagrant human rights abuses and retarding the developmental process of the country, the Niger Delta inclusive. The Niger Delta, for over three decades, has been a battleground between the local people and the Nigerian security forces. The state has since then adopted the military approach or repression as a means of silencing opposition from the youths of the region and this has resulted in extra-judicial executions and violation of the rights of the people to association and freedom of expression among others. The use of armed forces by the state and oil companies in the region to protect oil production has been responsible for the death of thousands of people, arbitrary detention, torture and villages being razed by soldiers.

However, there is a general assumption that the transition to democracy in May 29, 1999 would automatically improve the lots of the people of the Niger Delta. However, government continues to use the military method, as


\textsuperscript{60} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{61} Vanguard Online, \url{http://www.vanguardngr.com/articles/2002/niger_delta/nd412032004.html}. 

76
confirmed in the cases in Odi, Warri, Ilaje and other areas in the region. From all indications, the Nigerian military is yet to come to terms with the principles and practice of democracy. It is therefore true that the years of military in politics have given the leaders a feeling of power and misplaced priorities in their relations with the public without due consideration for peoples opinion and rights.

The general outcry against military operations in Odi could in reality have served as opportunity to restructure relations between the Nigerian military and the public. But the reverse is the case as military operation in Uwheru, where over twenty persons were killed and eleven houses burnt down in the name of “Operation Restore Hope” on January 15, 2004 has shown. Their reasons for such action stem from Brigadier General Elias Zamani team’s search for arms, while others argued that the soldiers came to the community to plunder the local people’s property after a clash between the Uwheru people and some Fulani cattlemen.62 The region has witnessed such brutality in the heydays of military rule but the continuation of the practice raises serious questions about Nigeria’s democratic credentials. The military approach adopted by successive governments has contributed to the spate of militancy in the Niger Delta with the cumulative effect that the region has become militarised. In turn, the militarisation of the region has been responsible for the proliferation of arms in the region. The repeated violent clashes between the youths and security forces has been characterised by the use of semi-automatic rifles, shotguns, machine guns, shoulder-fired rockets, and traditional weapons like fishing spears and cutlasses. These weapons are easy to procure in Warri, for example, at prices that local militants can afford, ranging from US$570 to US$2,150.63 In many cases militants engage in hostage taking of oil workers as a means of raising money to purchase these weapons.

The proliferation of these small arms in the Niger Delta has had implications for politics in Nigeria. Politicians are able to enlist the services of militants to attack and intimidate opponents. The origin of these small arms is still unclear but there is consensus that they were recycled from other


trouble spots in Africa. For instance, “in 2002, the Nigerian Customs Service reported that it had intercepted small arms and ammunition worth more than N4.3 billion (US $30 million) at border posts during the first six months of the year,”\(^64\) confirming that some of the weapons used in the Niger Delta conflict are imported, even as some are produced locally. According to Human Rights Watch investigation at the wake of the crisis in Warri, some state security personnel appeared to be dealing in small arms. Local manufacturing of arms take place in the industrial zones of Nigeria’s South-east region, including Aba and Awka.\(^65\) The menace of small arms and light weapons has heightened the general insecurity in the region, threatened oil supplies and reduced government revenue – and with concomitant implications for the Nigerian state. In fact, it is apposite to state that it is the very existence of the Nigerian state that is at stake. Little wonder that the current government has placed the Niger Delta at the top of the national agenda. Indeed, the battle to save the Niger Delta is invariably the battle to save the Nigerian nation from collapse and extinction. There is little doubt that the survival of the state is inextricably tied to the resolution of the Niger Delta crisis.

**Concluding Remarks**

The Niger-Delta crisis is a culmination of the combination of the structural deficiencies in the Nigerian state and the negative consequences of oil exploration and exploitation that have gone on over the years. The 1990s opened a new chapter for the struggle as the local and international political landscapes experienced changes favourable to the upholding of individual and peoples’ rights as well as issues of environment degradation. Hence, MOSOP and other human rights/environmental rights groups used several international platforms, including the United Nations, to bring the plight of the people of the Niger Delta to the fore. The transition to democracy has not substantially altered the scenario in the Niger Delta. The region has

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This position was substantiated during field research in Warri (between April and July 2003) where, as interviewees opined, it was relatively easier to get a rifle than a loaf of bread. The Warri crisis forced many of the oil companies to relocate their headquarters to Port Harcourt and Lagos. This was also responsible for the sudden rise in the number of displaced people who sought refuge in Ughelli, Aladja and Agbarho.

\(^{65}\) This report was based on Human Rights Watch findings in Warri in September 2003 and it can be found in [http://wwwchrw.org/reports/2003/nigeria1103/7.htm](http://wwwchrw.org/reports/2003/nigeria1103/7.htm).
continued to witness the gross violation of human rights since 1999. This is an area that the Nigerian state and the international community must give serious attention to forestall the exacerbation of the Niger Delta crisis and the eventual implosion of the Nigerian state.

Notes & References

15. The January coup 1966 was said to be a counter-reaction from the core Northern military cadre to put a permanent stop to the political challenges to Prime Minister Tafawa Balewa’s government from the Southern part of Nigeria. In order to check this, Nzeogwu/Ifeajuna’s Operation Damisa was stage-managed by five Majors in the Nigerian Army. For more analyses on this, See M. Chris Alli, The Federal Republic of Nigerian Army: The Siege of A Nation. (Lagos: Malthouse Press Limited, 2001).


Koyeima government school was established in 1930 to give practical and technical training to chiefs’ sons in Sierra Leone. This was the colonial government’s view of the project. The reality proved to be different, and was an example of the resistance shown by Africans to the British view of what ‘their place’ was. The school was aimed at boys from the rural Protectorate area of Sierra Leone, rather than the better-educated elite of Freetown. The colonial government’s strategies to use the school as a means to reinforce and continue colonial rule of the Protectorate were disrupted when the boys walked out of school to demand better conditions. This strike action was part of a larger movement by Africans in Sierra Leone to take control of education to better themselves, rather than promote colonial interests.

While colonial rule is often associated with force and policing, colonial powers also had to provide basic infrastructure to their colonies in order to maximise their return. This included not only roads and transport to extract goods, but also government offices to ensure stability and order. Employing native people in colonies not only saved on wages costs, it also provided a veneer of self-determination and democracy, along with an invaluable link to existing power networks and traditions. Schools were an integral part of this system; providing the literate workers for low-level positions in the administration. By looking at the history of a school in one of the smallest
countries in West Africa, Sierra Leone, and the resistance of school students to the imposed education system we can draw out the role played by colonial education in the implementation of colonial rule.

European contact with Sierra Leone was among the earliest in West Africa, with Portuguese explorer Pedro de Cintra mapping the area in 1462. By the 1700s it was an important slave-trading hub with the market’s base located on Bunce Island, in what would become Freetown harbour. But, in 1787, Sierra Leone became the location for a radical plan to settle the ‘Black Poor’ from London. These settlers were mainly descendents of former slaves who lived in poverty in England, supported by the Committee for the Relief of the Black Poor. The first attempt proved unsuccessful, but the recently established Sierra Leone Company was able to establish a settlement, Freetown, in 1792. The Company was styled as a philanthropic endeavour, but its owners refused to grant the settlers freehold of their land, leading to an unsuccessful revolt in 1799. Despite this inauspicious beginning, thousands of liberated slaves were settled by the British in Freetown, which became one of their first colonies in West Africa in 1808. The settlers brought there were not native to the area, but had their origins in all parts of Africa and became known as the Krio people, with their own language and distinctive culture. They controlled trade along the coast, and became part of the movement to ‘civilise’ West Africa, alongside the colonial powers.

This colony was not what was to become modern Sierra Leone. It extended only over the capital city, Freetown, and its environs. The British were reluctant to expand the size of the colony and take on additional responsibility. But, they also felt a need to thwart French expansion in West Africa and increase trading in the hinterland. The Brussels Act of 1890 had given the colonial powers free reign to expand their empires, using the ‘civilisation’ of Africa, and particularly the eradication of slavery as a


69 Krio, translation Creole, is based on English and African languages and is now widely spoken throughout Sierra Leone.
justification. The British feared the Colony was too tiny to survive and would become an isolated enclave surrounded by the French. And so a slow, careful expansion of ‘influence’ began. But it became clear over the course of 1890 to 1896 that disturbances in the area required more drastic action. The ‘sphere of influence’ had left the boundaries of British control difficult to establish. This, combined with the adoption of a more pro-active and aggressive policy at the Colonial Office, led to the declaration of the rest of Sierra Leone as a Protectorate in 1896. The declaration allowed the British to gain control of this vital trading area, without the responsibility of creating a colony.

So, from the beginning of its life as a colony of the British government, Sierra Leone was effectively divided in two by different forms of rule. This divide between Colony and Protectorate was pronounced; socially, culturally and economically. It was not to become a settler colony, like Kenya, instead the ‘settlers’ were the Black Settlers, Europeanised ex-slaves of African descent who inhabited the Colony. The Protectorate was seen as an opportunity, not only to stymie French expansion in the area, but also to extract resources and conduct trade. In order to accomplish this, it was necessary to exert sufficient authority over the area to ensure traders’ safety and to transport goods. However, with no white population to settle or support there was little incentive to invest heavily in infrastructure. Rather, it made better business sense to attempt to run the colony with as little investment as possible, achieving the maximum return.

The Protectorate was ruled indirectly, through the existing chieftain system, and a Hut Tax was imposed in 1898 in order to pay for administrative costs. This led to an uprising led by Bai Bureh in the north, and a secret society, the Poro, in the south. The revolt was easily put down by the British, and colonial records show that they believed it to be led and instigated by Bai Bureh alone. A report commissioned by Chamberlain, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, concluded that the revolt had been inspired by the new collection of taxes and was part of a wider dissatisfaction and anger

70 John Grace, 1975, Domestic Slavery in West Africa, Muller, London

71 Bai Bureh, a Temne leader, is still revered as a hero in Sierra Leone.

over the declaration of the Protectorate itself.\textsuperscript{73} The Colonial Office attempted to suppress this conclusion and instead promoted the view that it had been caused by British attempts to quell slavery in the area, thus casting the British colonial project in a more acceptable, ‘civilising’ light.\textsuperscript{74} This propaganda linked up with earlier claims to be civilising Africa, bringing light to darkness. Missionaries saw the acme of this process to be the conversion of Africans to Christianity, while governments saw an opportunity to create nation-states run on orderly European lines. This promotion of humane imperialism can be seen in the humanitarian rhetoric used at the Brussels Conference of 1889 where the ‘Scramble for Africa’ was organised and planned.

The British had to balance the desire to be seen publicly as a scourge of slavery and barbaric practices with the need establish trust and confidence with the chiefs of the Protectorate. They adopted a policy of ‘standing aloof’ from issues like slavery. Official policy was not to become involved in individual cases or enforce owners’ rights, though reality on the ground proved different. In addition to this legal detachment, little investment was made by colonial authorities in the Protectorate, particularly in education and infrastructure. The Protectorate area was taken to facilitate trade, and was soon being exploited for its natural resources: iron and diamonds. It became an extractive colony, and there was little incentive to install a complex infrastructure. Instead authority was concentrated into particular areas. The British maintained ‘islands of interest’ in the Protectorate, following the natural lines of valuable mineral deposits.

This created an unusual system of power and control. Foucault, for example, argues that power is diffused through modern European states using the example of a capillary system bringing blood to extremities. However, in a colony like Sierra Leone, the colonial power was more like a localised virus. It was concentrated in a particular area and only spread for its own survival and advantage. Cooper argues that this was a common


\textsuperscript{74} Danial Magaziner provides an interesting account of the conflict over the Chalmers Report in Removing the Blinders and adjusting the view: A case study from early colonial Sierra Leone, History in Africa, Vol 34, 2007, p 169-188
feature of colonial power; to establish islands of influence, related to their interests, such as mining or agriculture.\textsuperscript{75} Thanks to this distribution, colonial power was applied unevenly, what Guha calls “dominance without hegemony”.\textsuperscript{76} There was no absolute control over the whole of Sierra Leonean society, and no desire to take up such complete control. In the modern era, anthropologist Ben Jones argues that the state in developing countries can become outward-facing, dependent on foreign aid and so disinterested in rural affairs.\textsuperscript{77} It seems by looking at the colonial state in Africa, we can see a similar process. The attention of administration is directed towards those activities which feed into the interests of the foreign power.

However, the needs of administration compelled the government to take some control of education from the missionary schools which had multiplied in Sierra Leone. Missionary schools trained freed slaves to read the Bible and become part of the Christian mission.\textsuperscript{78} But the demands of the colonial administration required more literate Africans to work in low-level clerical positions. The “open-ended academic education” offered by the missionaries was deemed to be to demanding of the Africans “mental development”.\textsuperscript{79} Aside from these benevolent concerns about the limitations of African minds, the main aim in limiting education for Africans was to prevent an educated elite forming, which would challenge colonial rule and develop political resistance to the British government. Even without an overt resistance or rebellion, the build-up of an educated elite creates an


\textsuperscript{76} Quoted in \textit{Ibid}, p 1531


\textsuperscript{78} Kingsley Banya, Illiteracy, Colonial Legacy and Education: The Case of Modern Sierra Leone, \textit{Comparative Education}, Vol. 29, No. 2 (1993), pp. 159-170

\textsuperscript{79} Richard A Corby, Bo School and its Graduates in Colonial Sierra Leone, \textit{Canadian Journal of African Studies}, Vol. 15, 1981, No. 2, pp. 323-333, p. 32: Paulo Freire (1970) argues no literacy is politically neutral freighted as it can be with the assumptions of the establishment, and so it could be argued that providing some, but not adequate, education helped the British consolidate their rule.
imbalance in the power relationship established by colonial rule. When a colonial power seeks to ‘civilise’ or to educate colonised people for its own needs the essentialised difference between coloniser and colonised fades. It is best illustrated by Homi Bhabha’s argument that gradually the colonised person acts as though “white but not quite”.  

This puts colonial rule itself into question. How can colonial rule be justified once the people are ‘evolved’, ‘educated’ and, most importantly ‘civilised’ like a European?

For this reason, at first colonial education was limited to the area around Freetown, and concentrated on the existing elite of Krio people. But as the British colonial government expanded its influence over the Protectorate the demands of the administration increased and it was necessary for them to provide education to create a greater pool of workers for the regime. It could also be argued that the increasing power and education of the Krio people was a threat to the stability of the colonial order, and the people of Protectorate were viewed as a means to shift the balance of power. The demands of the British system of indirect rule exacerbated these needs. By ‘sub-contracting’ the bulk of administration to the traditional chiefs and native rulers, the British government could maintain its colonies ‘on a shoestring’. It expected that each colony would be self-sufficient. 

By shifting the burden of local government onto the native population, the British could minimise the number of staff they needed.

They admitted Africans into the central colonial government, but with a strict bar on advancement. The government schools served to fill these vacancies with literate, qualified candidates. This policy was publicly acknowledged at the time. A *Times* article of 1928 states;

“Our educational policy in West Africa is the logical deduction and corollary of the idea of ‘trusteeship’.”

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80 Frederick Cooper, 1994

81 This policy was continued until the establishment of the Colonial Development and Welfare Fund in the 1940s.

82 *The Times*, Tuesday, Oct 30, 1928; pg. xiv; Issue 45037; col A, Education In West Africa. Insistent Demand., Adaptation To Native Environment. (By the Right Hon. W. Ormsby-Gore, M.P., Chairman of the Colonial Office Advisory Committee on Education in Tropical Africa.).
These aims were served by limiting the education received at the schools. As Ormsby-Gore says, “Education must be adapted to the genius and requirements of peoples in their own environment.” For African graduates to be content with occupying the lower echelons of colonial rule (and getting paid considerably less) it was important that they were not more highly educated than their British superiors.

One of the first schools set up by the government with these aims was Bo school. It established some of the basic principles future government schools would adopt. The instruction consisted of a mix of academic subjects and practical skills, in order to prepare the future chiefs for implementing British development plans for the Protectorate. The school was located in a rural area to avoid the boys becoming ‘citified’ and contemptuous of rural life. The training also included moral training and reinforcement of ethnic identity. By retaining elements of the pre-colonial polity, the authorities attempted to usurp and utilise the existing methods of control and authority.

The layout of the school mimicked a typical native village, again to keep the boys ‘grounded’ in their place in rural village life. Food and clothing followed the traditional rural style, rather than the Westernised style preferred by the elite in Freetown. The archival records of the school’s working show how the government attempted to keep the boys connected with their home villages and life. It did not represent an opportunity for advancement or education for ordinary people. Boys were selected by chiefs to attend the school, and so most were chiefs’ sons or the sons of local dignitaries. This template was followed in the development of the new government school at Koyeima.

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83 Ibid


85 For details see Richard A Corby (1981) and (1990)


87 TNA, CO271/11, Sierra Leone Royal Gazette, 29th September 1905
The British established Koyeima School in the Bo District of Sierra Leone in 1929 and recruited boys from Njala to attend. The school was part of the attempt to increase education in the Protectorate area, codified in the Education (Protectorate) Rules of 1930. Mr Greenhill described it to the Governor as;

“in the nature of an experiment and intended to inaugurate a policy of providing facilities to the natives of the Protectorate for obtaining practical and technical training.”

The Governor noted that the establishment of the school had gone well, with little disagreement over the appointment of the key members of staff. And, at first, the school seemed to be running smoothly, receiving favourable reports from visitors to the colony in late 1929. On the 17th of May 1930, though, the experiment appeared to have failed. Lord Passfield at Government House in the UK asked the Governor to report on events at the school, showing how seriously the school was regarded as part of the colonial mission. Governor Byrne reported that 30 Temne boys had left the school and laid complaints before Provincial Commissioner of the Northern Province. In response the Governor sent Mr Blackmore, the Depute Director of Education, to investigate and he visited with Lady Byrne in January 1930. By that time, Mr Keigwin was acting as Principal in the absence of the Director of Education. On his visit to the school the Governor found the situation acceptable, reporting that the boys seemed happy. But the archive contains a copy of the letter sent by the boys. The letter outlines their complaints; arguing that not only did the Koyeima school offer less privileges than the school they had been persuaded to leave, but the standard of teaching was poor, the manual work required harder and the teachers rude and abusive. According to the boys, and later confirmed by the Director of Education, at Njala they had been offered free transport to and from school. They also had access to adequate medical

88 TNA, CO267/630/13, Letter to Governor Byrne from MA Greenhill 20th June 1930

89 Mr Moss from Agricultural Dept, Mr Edminson as Organiser of Industries and Rev AT Sumner MBE (the only African) as Vice Principal.

90 Mr Stockdale, Mr Hooper (Sec of the Church Missionary Society) and Professor Labourre.

91 TNA, CO 267/630/13 Enclosure 1, despatch dated 17th May 1930, Letter to the Provincial Commissioner, Maburaka, 3/11/29 from the 30 Temne boys
facilities while at Koyeima they had to visit the wife of a government official, which some boys found embarrassing. In terms of education, at Njala they had regular daily classroom time, with time set aside for ‘practical’ activities. However, at Koyeima, they were engaged in hard manual labour, while their time in the classroom was irregular and inadequate, averaging only 2 and a half days a week. As the boys themselves said; “Our prospect for real education beyond severe manual labour is remote.” Even worse the teachers used excessive corporal punishment and abusive language.

The Director of Education dismissed the letter in a brief note, written at the request of the Governor. He brushed off the complaints, stating that the school was no harder than similar establishments in the Gold Coast, and had only been running for ten weeks, so it was impossible for the boys to judge. The Director of Education omitted some key facts in this report. While the school was only open for ten weeks, 80 boys had been working there for up to nine months, to build the facilities. The Director’s report was also belied by a more reasoned and detailed response from Mr Blackmore, the Deputy Director of Education.

Mr Blackmore, after interviewing staff and pupils, came to the conclusion that the boys had been harshly treated and some compromise and reform was necessary. In their letter, the boys had offered a detailed compromise solution. In summary, they wanted more hours in classroom. This indicates their understanding of the colonial system. By offering up a compromise, and following the protocol of contacting the Provincial Commissioner, the boys were playing the game by the book. They were keen that their act of resistance should give a result in their favour and so, instead of walking out and not returning, they sought redress through the administration. By resisting the oppressive regime of the school through strike action, they did not mean to destroy the education system, or even their unsatisfactory

92 TNA, CO 267/630/13 Enclosure 3, Report from Mr Blackmore, Deputy Director of Education, 16th April 1930

93 TNA, CO 267/630/13 Enclosure 1

94 TNA, CO 267/630/13 Enclosure 3

95 The boys suggested from 7:30 to 11:30am at least five days a week, with fieldwork limited to the afternoons from 2 to 4pm.
school, but rather to mould it to better fit their own expectations and ambitions. Richard Corby and Kingsley Banya, through surveys of education in Sierra Leone have shown how Sierra Leoneans viewed the British schools as a means of advancement.\textsuperscript{96} The British had attempted to create an education system as a means of control and to support the colonial system. Sierra Leoneans saw it as an opportunity to gain a Western education, and progress into government and professional careers.

However, correspondence at the level of the Colonial Government shows that this form of resistance, no matter how it was framed, was seen as an unacceptable rebellion against authority. The Governor’s report to London indicated that he believed the rebellion would spread through other schools, if not immediately quelled. He blamed the incident on the insubordination of the Protectorate people. He saw it as a blow to the increasing British control over the area.\textsuperscript{97} In their own terms, the boys were doomed to fail. The colonial government was never going to deliver the Western education they wanted. The power disparity was too sharp for the parties to come to compromise. While some changes were made when the school re-opened and it continued to attract students, the general policy and aims of the education system remained the same: to create a literate and docile workforce for lower-echelon administrative posts and malleable chiefs. And while, as Corby has argued, some went onto use their education to resist British rule, like so many other African countries, Sierra Leone was left with almost no educated elite to take up the reins of government upon its independence in 1961.

The education system in Sierra Leone was seriously and adversely affected by the colonial era and the system was perpetuated by the post-independence government. The country remains affected by one of the highest illiteracy rates in the world.\textsuperscript{98} This short incidence of resistance against the imposition of the colonial ideal of a school that would pay for itself, that would concentrate on the manual labour and practical work


\textsuperscript{97} TNA, CO 267/650/13, Letter from the Governor to the Colonial Secretary, Whitehall

involved in empire-building in rural areas, and would limit the opportunities of its students was not a success story. In the end, education remained a tool for the colonial government to use, and access to even this remained limited almost entirely to the sons of the local rulers.
Review of “Conceptualizing Resistance”99, by Jocelyn A. Hollander and Rachel L. Einwohner

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Resistance has become a fashionable topic within a diversity of disciplines. The rapid increase of scholarship on resistance is both exciting and productive, but according to Hollander and Einwohner also problematic in the sense that different authors understand and make use of resistance differently, often with a clear lack of attention to definitions (Hollander and Einwohner, 2004:533-534). Their work shows that resistance has been used to explain a diversity of behaviors and settings that are very different in terms of the Mode and scale of resistance, as well as the targets and direction or goal of the resistance (Hollander and Einwohner, 2004:535-537). Perplexed, the authors ask; “how can all of these phenomena be described with the same term?” (Hollander and Einwohner, 2004:537). In their paper, Hollander and Einwohner aim to clarify the conceptual confusion by presenting a typology of resistance that seeks to move beyond definitional debates and focus instead on the analytical qualities of resistance (Hollander and Einwohner, 2004:534). How to proceed on such an

ambitious enterprise? The authors choose to focus on social scientists’
published work on resistance where hundreds of books and articles dealing
with resistance in one way or another serve as the theoretical and empirical
material. Their examination of this literature leads them to conclude that
action and opposition (in different forms) are core elements that basically all
literature on resistance engages with (Hollander and Einwohner, 2004:538-
539). However, whereas the basic idea that resistance naturally and/or
always deals with some kind of activity that occurs in opposition to someone
or something is seen as unproblematic the authors suggest that recognition
and intent lies at the heart of disagreements in scholarly debates about
resistance (Hollander and Einwohner, 2004:539 ). The questions of whether
resistance must be recognized by others (“Must oppositional action be
readily apparent to others, and must it in fact be recognized as resistance?”)
and whether it must be intentional (“Must the actor be aware that she or he
is resisting some exercise of power—and intending to do so—for an action
to qualify as resistance?”) are clearly important questions that scholars
researching on resistance, in whatever form and discipline, need to consider
and be aware of (Hollander and Einwohner, 2004:539, 542). By organizing
literature on resistance according to how it deals with recognition and
intent, the authors inductively develop a typology of resistance, identifying
seven distinct types, each defined by a different combination of actors’
intent, target’s recognition, and observer’s recognition. By characterizing
resistance according to these parameters, they distinguish between ‘over
resistance’, ‘covert resistance’, ‘unwitting resistance’, ‘target-defined
resistance’, ‘externally-defined resistance’, ‘mixed resistance’, and ‘attempted
resistance’ (Hollander and Einwohner, 2004:544).

Although the authors briefly discuss the empirical and theoretical material
behind the typology, it would have been interesting to have more insight into
their sampling procedures, e.g. what does it mean that the bulk of literature
comes from sociological papers and how did they decide on the ‘influential
works’ published prior to 1995, and since not all of their references, due to
lack of space, are not published it becomes very hard to know if they have
missed out on certain important works, e.g. there is no reference to the
influential work by Guha on subaltern resistance.

The authors suggest that the typology is a means to sharpen the analytical
practicality of resistance and help the researcher to move beyond
definitional debates that obscure the sociological aspects of the concept. In
that sense, the typology helps to control for the diversity of resistance and effectively guide the researcher through the chaos of meanings and uses. Problematizing recognition and intent in the light of resistance is an original but yet interesting approach that emphasizes the diversity of understandings and uses of resistance in academia. The authors rightly claim that here is a big gap between everyday forms of resistance such as satire and style of dress and more conventional forms of resistance (political mobilization) such as demonstrations and revolutions, as well as, between understanding resistance as something that needs to be intended by the actor and resistance as something where the actors’ intentions are not at all important. Whereas the first part of the article seeks to conceptualize resistance by laying out some parameters for the concept, the second part seeks to problematize the concept from the position of the typology and draw attention to innate complexities of resistance. The idea is that before engaging with the complexities of resistance, it is necessary to first sort out the concept. Here, the article gives special attention, though very brief, to the complex nature of resistance. By examining its interactional nature, the notion that resistance is not defined by the resisters, but also by targets and/or others’ recognition of the resistance, the authors seek to draw attention to the role of power (Hollander and Einwohner, 2004:547-551). However, the analysis remains superficial, and the connection between resistance and power is not developed beyond the notion that resistance and domination have a cyclical relationship. Slightly more nuanced is the discussion about accommodation, the notion that agency may constitute both resistance and accommodation to different aspects of power and authority. However, although it is noted that resistance is complex in the sense of being impure, interactional, socially constructed and complex, the authors never engage in any fruitful discussion what this means for the understanding of resistance. Considering the aim of the article—to boost the analytical practicality of resistance—the second part feels somewhat awkward and only remotely connected to the first part. Although the second part brings up very interesting issues, it is never made explicit how these relate to the typology of resistance, and with the brief treatment of these issues they are mainly confusing. Nevertheless, the article is a justified reminder how crucial it is to elaborate on and be aware of strengths, weaknesses, limitations etc. of how one uses resistance as an analytical concept. Considering that resistance constitutes complex social phenomena, it becomes especially important to be clear on how one approach the concept and what consequences that approach has for inquiries into social change. However, it is important to notice that a
diversity of understandings and employments of resistance is not problematic per se. Resistance as a discipline is an underdeveloped area within social science that is lacking in both theoretical and practical experience (Vinthagen and Lilja, 2007). A diversity of meanings and methods should be welcomed and recognized important to extend the practical utility of the concept and understanding of the world. Following this line of reasoning, the author’s skepticism, referred to in the beginning, that so many diverse phenomena are called resistance, seems unjustified. Rather, for the concept of resistance to have an analytical potential to understand social change, it seems particularly important to link resistance with an extensive analysis of power relations that emphasize complex social relationships such as structure, agency, choice, identity and knowledge. In their analysis and categorization of resistance, Hollander and Einwohner fail to develop this link at any lengths. Although categorizing/theorizing resistance by the means of a typology can be a good method to draw attention to conceptual confusion, a typology gives an unnecessarily restricted notion of resistance that makes it difficult to think of resistance outside the parameters of recognition and intent. The scientific aspiration to order and classify social phenomena runs the risk of expelling uncertainties and irregularities into a group of others; “…the very act of classifying creates even more ambivalence by relegating everything that does not fit into a sphere of otherness” (Bleiker, 2000:105-106). The author’s ambition to find a solid foundation for drawing generalizations rests on the notion that the purpose of social science is to observe empirical regularities. This view is problematic because it gives a restricted understanding of resistance and social change that is poorly equipped to deal with the complexities of the social world. With its diverse and complex nature it becomes particularly important to analyze resistance in specific and context-bound situations rather than by grand theoretical models. Arguing, like the authors of the article, that it is problematic that “different parties (actors themselves, targets, in situ observers, and scholars) interpret the intent behind a particular behavior in different ways” (Hollander and Einwohner, 2004:543) alludes to a positivistic epistemological position where the researcher’s experience is supposed to be invisible. The idea that it is possible to produce a ‘neutral assessment’ of the concept of resistance is problematic in the sense that it conceives of a world that is stable and fixed (Bleiker, 2000). Although it is an ambitious enterprise to clean up the theoretical foundation by constructing ideal types of resistance, this aim fundamentally misconceives of the relationship between theory and practice. In contrast to
positivist understanding, theories cannot be separated from the empirical world that they seek to explain since it is theories that constitute the world (Smith, Booth and Zalewski). In other words, how we perceive the world, and what we think we can do about it, fundamentally depends on how we think about it (Smith, Booth, and Zalewski, 1996). Following this line of reasoning, definitional and theoretical disputes over the meanings of resistance are important in themselves and cannot be reduced, packaged and labeled according to a few criteria in a typology, ready to be unpacked and employed when the researcher sees fit. From this perspective, fussy theory and diverse meanings of concepts are not only signs that there is a lack of attention to concepts and definitions, but also that there is an inherent and ongoing power struggle over these concepts. Rather than finding the ‘truth’ about social change, it is the researchers responsibility to reflect on where this truth comes from “What are the legacies of past theories? Whose facts have been most important in shaping our ideas? Whose voices are overlooked?” (Smith, Booth, and Zalewski, 1996).

Accepting the diversity of resistance requires the researcher to come to terms with the death of God, the Nietzschean notion for the loss of certainty (Bleiker, 2000). A post-positivist approach is equipped to do this, and meanwhile, to provide the tools necessary for enquiries into the social world that can embrace complexity, rather than rejecting it.

**Bibliography**


