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Editorial: RSMag.org and Resistance Studies in an era of Internet surveillance

by Christopher Kullenberg

In May this year, a 22 year old student at Nottingham University, Rizwaan Sabir, was arrested by the police and kept in prison for six days. He had downloaded and printed a number of terrorist training manuals from a US government web site, intending to do research on terrorist tactics. However, according to the UK Terrorist Act (2000), such use is forbidden. It seems that academic freedom has its limits, and the consequences for stepping across the line may be devastating.

Sabir’s research topic, an inquiry into terrorist tactics, could very well have been the subject for an article in the Resistance Studies Magazine. If there is something like forbidden knowledge, this would be the perfect example.
This is however not an isolated event, but has become a reality for academics and scholars. About a year ago German sociologist Andrej Holm was arrested because he was researching activism in the urban landscape.

How can we make sense of this slightly paranoid attitude towards inquiries into the often violent, morally questionable, and disruptive types of resistance? First of all, it shows that the “war on terrorism” is playing a major role in shaping new forms of policing, intelligence and surveillance. Terrorism is said to be a networked phenomenon operating in cell-like structures, which may threaten society from a multitude of points. Economic transfers, Internet based communication, international travels and “fundamentalist” social communities must thus be monitored with great detail to prevent attacks. It seems that critical research at times also will be included in the category of suspects.

The primary problem for Resistance Studies is, however, not the imprisonment of colleagues. Rather it is the possibility of self-censorship among academics, as well as limitations in the choice of research topics. If we arrive at a point where we no longer conduct interviews with certain groups, no longer do field work in certain areas, or even stop reading certain web pages, we have induced a virtual panopticon on ourselves.

What is at stake is not only the policies of certain governments, but also the material circumstances of our everyday research tools. Only a few months ago the Swedish parliament passed a law allowing the National Defence Radio Establishment (FRA) to monitor all Internet traffic leaving and entering the country. A type of technology developed during the cold war, often referred to as signal intelligence, has been transferred to monitor the most important tools used by journalists, academics and in the homes of millions. In an era of globalisation it seems that the panoptic social institutions do not suffice, but surveillance has instead become panspectric, as Manuel Delanda\(^1\) puts it. Instead of relying on obedient national populations, the new perceived threats may appear everywhere, thus everything must be monitored through intelligent filters and search robots\(^2\). Every submission to the Resistance Studies Magazine will pass through this

\(^1\) Manuel de Landa (1991) War in the Age of Intelligent Machines, New York: Zone Books

\(^2\) See also: [http://panspectrocism.org](http://panspectrocism.org)
filter, and since articles often deal with political extremes, terrorism and even violence, there is a chance that a pseudo-military government agency will read it.

But the best way of dealing with this new order of surveillance is probably to embrace the Internet with even more openness. With this new issue we launch an independent web site for the magazine: http://rsmag.org. This way we can publish each article separately as well as part of a whole issue, making it easier to link to us and search inside each piece. Also, statistics show that we are already having about a thousand visitors every month. Monitored or not, there seems to be an interest in reading about resistance studies, and as long as readers think it is important, there is no need to fear a little surveillance. The third issue thus contains five articles from many different areas, all relating to resistance in interesting ways.

Drawing on a theoretical combination of James Scott's conception of everyday resistance and Erwin Goffman's symbolic interactionism, Carol Jo Evans develops an interesting case study of resistance within a North American Appalachian community. Shane Gunderson discusses how resistance movements may gain momentum, as "popular intellectuals" facilitate and combine ideological work with political initiative. Gunderson shows, through a case-study, that structuring resistance in a more strategic fashion, through sequential actions, will increase the possibility of social change. Femke Kaulingfreks writes about the May 2008 riots in Copenhagen, and how such events, when taken seriously, seem to grow politics from the middle, thus shaping grounds for important political agency. What falls outside of normalisation, is not necessary disruptive in a counter-productive way, but may reveal inequalities and open up debates. Thomas Riegler analyses the film The Battle of Algiers and how it has been caught up in debates on whether it has influenced resistance like an instruction manual in asymmetric warfare and guerrilla tactics, or not. Finally, Adrian Bua deals with the problems of pluralism and democracy, and proposes how class analysis can contribute to a more sustainable alternative called pluralist socialism.

As usual, articles may be downloaded and shared for free. More readers are not only the merrier, but make the debates more critical and multifaceted.
Resistance and Cooperation in a North American Appalachian Community

by Carol Jo Evans
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Introduction

People who live in rural places usually define the surrounding territory and land as their home, as the places they recreate, collect and use natural resources, and bury their friends and kin. The land is a part of the people, and the meanings they give to places are reflections of themselves and their self-identity. That building over there is not just a building; it is Uncle Warren’s cabin, built on the site where my grandmother is buried. But what happens to the meanings of the land and places on the land--indeed to the very meanings local people have of themselves--when the land is transformed from private ownership to public ownership and is managed by a government agency for the benefit of conservation, preservation, and recreation by the public? Examples of this include Protected Areas or National Parks. How do local people make sense out of and adapt to the new restrictions on traditional use and access imposed by the agency to meet a political mandate for preservation? How do the employees of a
public-land agency attempt to construct new meanings for the land and places on the land? Do these various social constructions or meanings compete or conflict with one another? What are consequences of competition, conflict, and/or resistance over resources (management problems, degradation of the environment, and vandalism for examples)? What measures can be taken to lessen conflict and resistance over the management of public land?

This paper examines these questions with the overall goal of understanding the perceptions and concerns faced by local residents and United States National Park Service employees over the management of the Big South Fork National River and Recreation Area (BSFNRRRA), located on the Cumberland Plateau of Tennessee and Kentucky. This paper also investigates incidences of conflict and resistance between local residents and National Park Service (NPS) employees over the management of cultural and natural resources within the BSFNRRRA. For example, Uncle Warren’s cabin may be a traditional hunting lodge to local residents, but a management problem for the NPS, or a symbol of human presence to the environmentalist who wishes the landscape to be designated as a wilderness area. Finally, this paper investigates measures that can be taken by the NPS to lessen conflict or resistance and promote cooperation over the management of public land, specifically public participation in the management of the BSFNRRRA. While this paper contributes to the body of resistance and conflict theory by providing a case example supporting the utility of James Scott’s model of “everyday forms of resistance,” it also has applied methodological implications for development projects, especially those impacting local residents’ “social identity” and “livelihood.”

In summary, the central argument put forth in this paper is that resistance is manifested among those who perceive a threat to both their “social identity” and “livelihood.” Furthermore, resistance is either manifested in the form of routine and individual acts or organized and public acts based on the perceived severity of this threat.

Methods utilized in this research study include both quantitative and qualitative methods (a survey, formal interviews, informal conversations, focus groups, participatory mapping, participant-observation, and analysis of issues presented by local residents and special interest groups). Open House meetings sponsored by the NPS were also attended. The purpose of the Open House meetings was to gather public input to help in the
development of an information base to assist in the creation of a General
Management Plan for the BSFNRRRA. Because of the low attendance at the
Open House meetings by local residents, I was hired by the NPS as a
consultant to investigate barriers or circumstances inhibiting residents from
attending the meetings. Upon completion of my consultant position, I
received a grant from the Ford Foundation-Community Forestry Research
Program to collect additional data and funding to live one year within the
research area. Not only did my residency allow for observation of the
annual cycle of resource use, and NPS management policy, but also
presented me with the opportunity to be accepted as a member of the
community and not as a consultant for the NPS. Information collected
during this research period helped to provide information on traditional
access to and use of resources within the National Area, in addition to
incidences of conflict and resistance between local residents and the NPS.

Research site

The BSFNRRRA is unique among public lands in the United States. It is one
of the first attempts to combine the concept of a National River with a
National Recreation Area, thereby promoting both preservation of the area’s
natural resources and the development of recreational activities (U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers 1980:1-2). Because the BSFNRRRA is relatively new in
its establishment, family members still remember when their land was
acquired for the establishment of the National Area. Therefore, not only
does the site provide a unique case study for research on local
environmental knowledge and uses of resources, but also the development
of social conflict over competing management concerns.

The “Park,” as local citizens call it, was established by Congress on March
7, 1974, by Section 108 of the Water Resources Development Act (PL
93-251), as amended by Section 184 of the Water Resources Development
Act of 1976 (PL 94-587). The act created a new public land area and
provided for the protection of approximately 125,000 acres of the scenic and
remote Cumberland Plateau, located in both Kentucky and Tennessee, in
addition to the Big South Fork branch of the Cumberland River. A total of
103.5 million dollars was appropriated for the project, making it one of the
largest development efforts in southeastern United States.
The BSFNRRRA is divided geographically into two sections: the river gorge and the plateau area. According to NPS regulations (PL 93-251), the river gorge must preserve both its recreational and wilderness qualities, while the plateau area should allow for the development of recreational and cultural resources (horse trails, roads and paths to rock shelters, the preservation of significant historical buildings for examples).

Before the establishment of the BSFNRRRA, local residents demonstrated strong ties to the Big South Fork area itself. For several residents, it was their ancestors who were among the first Euro-Americans to settle within the area in the early 1800s, with their descendants continuing to live in the same community for over a century. A few families can even trace part of their heritage to indigenous Native American populations. It was also these early self-sufficient farming families that gave place names to certain locations within the National Area, which are still in use today. For instance, the tributaries of the Big South Fork River on which the early communities of Station Camp and No Business were located still bear their names (Station Camp Creek and No Business Creek for examples).

Because a large section of the Big South Fork (BSF) area was purchased by large lumber and coal industries in the late 1800s, consisting primarily of absentee ownership, local residents were allowed continuous free access to resources within the BSF region. Employees of the industries were actually encouraged to use the forest and river as needed. Local residents could hunt, trap, fish, or gather forest products as “freely” as they pleased. The BSF area acted more as a “commons” for residents. For local residents, the area provided the resources necessary in order to maintain their self-sufficient life-style, from firewood and coal for heat, food for the table, medicinal plants to cure the ill, and swimming holes for entertainment and baptisms. Abandoned log houses of those who settled the area in the early 1800s were welcomed to those who needed a hunting lodge for the night. In addition to selling surplus hogs and other livestock, mountain farmers supplemented their income by cutting timber and gathering roots and herbs, especially ginseng. Not only did the area continue to be important to local residents for hunting, fishing, or the collection of various forest products, but also as a place of ancestral ghosts and family cemeteries; not only a place that symbolizes where they came from, but who they are today in their minds and hearts. In short, the BSF area is very important to local residents’ “social identity.”
With the establishment of the BSFNRRRA, came NPS regulations and restrictive access to resources within the area. In keeping with its wilderness designation, only 11 motorized access points are now allowed into the gorge area. Traditional and meaningful access points to the river by local residents were not primary criteria in choosing the access sites, traditional fishing spots for examples. The choice of areas for these 11 access points was based primarily on constraints imposed by natural or cultural resources and recreational consideration, such as logical canoe trips and compatibility of canoe access with other recreational activities at the site. Other restrictions pertain to hunting and fishing, horseback riding, camping, hiking, and collection of nuts and fruit. It is illegal to collect items such as ginseng, or to pick flowers within the National Area.

Beginning in 1997, the NPS began to gather public input on the creation of a ten year General Management Plan (GMP) for the BSFNRRRA. Following traditional procedures for gaining public input, the NPS held Open House meetings at local courthouses or town halls to obtain local input on the management of the National Area. Symbolically, according to local residents, Open House meetings presented a hierarchical and militant atmosphere, with NPS employees (dressed in NPS uniforms) leading the topics to be presented and discussed. Overall, the meetings were poorly attended.

The final draft of the GMP was completed in 2006, which serves as the overarching policy under which site specific plans are prepared in future developments. Therefore, the study area provides a perfect opportunity to observe and analyze the policy and methodology park officials are required to follow in creating a management plan and eliciting public participation. The BSFNRRRA also offers a setting to monitor issues and sources of conflict, resistance, and/or cooperation among local residents and NPS employees pertaining to the management of the area’s cultural and natural resources.

**Conservation, displacement, and resistance**

Originally, preservation and sustainable management efforts concentrated on the protection of nature and paid little attention to the needs and concerns
of people living in or around newly established protected areas or public lands (Stevens 1997; Hitchcock 1994; Greenberg 1989). Recent studies, however, examine the relationships between conservation/preservation activities and local residents (Chan, Pringle, Ranganathan, Boggs, Ehrlich, Haff, Heller, Al-Khafaji, and Macmynowski 2007; Xu and Melick 2007; Stonich 2001). Several of these studies demonstrate the social impact on local residents, especially in areas where people traditionally depended on resources for subsistence as a part of their “livelihood.”

In other incidences, people living near protected areas or public lands are impacted by both the over use of an area and depletion of resources due to the “implementation of conflicting natural resource policies and laws” (Kothari, Singh, and Suri 1996:61). Others may be subjected to government policies that restrict land use and access to important traditional resources such as forests, pastures, agricultural land, wildlife, and cultural sites (Hitchcock 1999; Hitchcock 1985). Those who were forced to settle outside of protected areas found that the natural resources of their former lands were now off-limits to local use. Traditional subsistence resource use that was critical for survival became criminalized. Traditional resource use became “poaching,” and settlement became “illegal squatting,” with the “protection” of the protected area from indigenous populations through fences, armed patrols, and threats of jail terms and fines. Stan Stevens (1997) places the origins of this model for protected areas with the creation of Yellowstone National Park in 1872.

An example of the utility of indigenous participation in the control of natural resources, and minimal social impact on the local populations is documented in the works of Marshall Murphee. Murphee (2004) has explored the rural development and conservation of Zimbabwe's wildlife through a program referred to as CAMPFIRE (Communal Areas Management Program for Indigenous Resources). CAMPFIRE emerged in the mid-1980s, seeking to restructure the control of Zimbabwe's countryside and giving people alternative ways of using their natural resources. Under CAMPFIRE, people living on Zimbabwe's communal lands, which represent approximately 42% of the country, can claim ownership of wildlife on their land and to benefit from its use. While the program includes the management of all natural resources, it focuses primarily on wildlife management in communal areas, particularly those adjacent to National Parks. Since the CAMPFIRE's official inception in 1989, the
program has engaged more than a quarter of a million people in the practice of managing wildlife and reaping of its benefits.

Research also demonstrates the important role of anthropologists in working with policy pertaining to protected areas in order to maintain cultural diversity (Crespi 1989), to promote cultural conservation and community development (Howell 1994), as advocates for local interests in the planning and management of National Parks (Olwig 1980), to document long-term consequences of tourism (Smith 1989), and in order to limit social conflict (Howell 1993; Howell 1989). While working in the 1970s on a folk life survey project in the area that was to become the Big South Fork National River and Recreation Area, Howell was in a position to answer questions that local residents had pertaining to the new “Big South Fork Project” and hear their opinions about the establishment of the BSFRRA. Because of her position, Howell was able to inform the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers of residents' competing goals for development in the area, thereby curtailing “some” of the initial social conflict and resistance when the project was in its infancy. According to Howell, however, if the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers had recognized the larger social impact that the creation of the BSFRRA was to have on local residents at the time, and not just give “cursory attention” to its social impact, then perhaps the degree of social conflict and resistance that currently exists would have been diminished or nonexistent (Howell 1994; Howell 1989). The social impact statement did not assess the possible social and cultural impacts of residents’ impending relocation.

The previous studies indicate that conservation, preservation, and recreation efforts must address the needs and concerns of local people if protected areas or public lands are to be managed with minimal social conflicts and stress, or impacts on the environment. Research also points to the importance of understanding local environmental knowledge along with livelihood strategies, social organization, and the dynamics of public land management (McNeely 1994; Western, Wright, and Strum 1994; Little and Horowitz 1987). Yet despite the growing awareness of social conflict over public land, minimal attention has been given to issues surrounding preservation activities and its social impact on local residents, especially incidences of conflict or resistance after resettlement of local residents for the purpose of conservation (Oliver-Smith 2006:143). Research in this area is especially important in light of current development projects supported by
global ideological practices for and funding of certain kinds of conservation strategies (Gezon 2006).

**Methods and theory**

Methods utilized in this research study include both quantitative and qualitative methods (a survey, formal interviews, informal conversations, focus groups, participatory mapping, participant-observation, and analysis of issues presented by local residents and special interest groups). A central goal of the research is to investigate the various perceptions towards the management of the BSFNRRA, focusing on potential conflict between the ideology of private versus public land management issues (conflict between conservation, preservation, and recreational goals for examples), and how this conflict and resistance is manifested. In order to gain an understanding of findings, the paradigms of conflict and resistance theory is used as a framework to analyze data.

One could date the beginnings of resistance theory to the writings of Karl Marx in the late 1800s, with Marx’s prediction of the insurgence of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie. Marx’s viewpoint was founded on what he called the “materialist conception of history.” According to this view, it is not the ideas or values human beings hold that are the main sources of social change, but economic changes. Therefore, the conflicts between classes, the rich versus the poor, provide the motivation for historical development. In Marx’s words, “All human history thus far is the history of class struggles.” Numerous interpretations or expansions of Marx’s major ideas are possible, also given rise to various contemporary theoretical positions (conflict and feminist theory for examples). What these various perspectives share in common is a central focus of analysis pertaining to the struggle for scarce resources by groups in society, and how the elites use their power to control the weaker groups. People may invest in meanings over symbols as well as in the means of production, with struggles over meaning as much a part of the process of resource allocation as are struggles over surplus or labor process. Struggles over land and environmental resources are simultaneously struggles over cultural meanings (Peet and Watts 1996).

Drawing on case studies, William Schweri and John Van Willigen (1978) demonstrate three components of what they refer to as a “provisional theory of resistance.” In their own study, Schweri and Van Willigen conducted
research among local residents who organized to resist the proposed development of a dam and reservoir project by the Corps of Engineers in eastern Kentucky. Resistance manifested itself as residents realized the threat of the dam to their every day way of life. They perceived the costs of the proposed dam as outweighing its benefits, such as the lost of cemeteries, churches, and residents’ homes due to flooding of the area.

From these case studies, Schweri and Van Willigen (1978) proposed three components for a “provisional theory of resistance.” The components include: 1) resistance processes require the linkage of behavior to “fundamental beliefs” through “ideology,” 2) the resistance process is fundamentally a symbolization process, and 3) communities will tend to determine the impact and assess its cost. Cost levels [impacts] are related to the motivation to resist. If the perceived costs are high enough, communities will develop and maintain resistance organizations.

This brings us to a discussion on the current division within resistance studies. While early research focused primarily on public, collective, and organized forms of resistance (at times manifesting in violent forms, grand social movements, or revolutions), James Scott (1990; 1985) illuminated the importance of everyday and individualized forms of resistance. While resistance can be understood through multiple theoretical paradigms, this paper situates itself within the framework of the latter.

**The Power of Everyday Resistance**

When coercive power is enforced by the state, whether it is a prison guard or an employee of the National Park Service, an individual’s power to resist is often curtailed, sometimes severely. Yet, it is not wholly destroyed. What remains may be no more than what James Scott (1985) refers to as “the power of everyday resistance.” One of Scott’s main objectives in *Weapons of the Weak* is to examine the relationship between the proletariat (poor peasant class) and the bourgeoisie (the rich farmers) in the Malaysian village of Sedaka (a pseudonym). In his study, Scott attempts to refute the Marxist theory of “false consciousness” by studying the social consciousness of the subordinate classes. For example, false consciousness is recognized in the classical Marxist view that the bourgeoisie create a “false consciousness” among the proletariat who are led to believe that if they were not successful, it is due to their own fault for not working
sufficiently hard enough rather than because their opportunities for advancement were blocked by the powerful upper class. According to Scott, a “false consciousness” rests on the assumption that elites not only dominate the physical means of production, but the symbolic means of production as well, and that this symbolic hegemony allows them to control the very standards by which their rule is evaluated (Scott 1985:39).

Although Scott comes from a political economy background, he chose to approach his fieldwork using a phenomenological methodology. His goal is to discover the meaning of actions based on an understanding of their context in a system of values and symbols. Using the technique of participant-observation, Scott attempts to describe the actions and conversations of all participants in village life in the context of changing social relations that resulted from the green revolution. Scott recognizes, however, that observing behavior alone is not enough, but that consciousness of symbols, norms, and ideological forms underlying behavior is needed to fully understand actions of resistance.

Influenced by the reading of Goffman and his concept of dramaturgy, Scott speaks of “on stage” behavior (where one offers credible performances to the other side) and “public transcripts,” related to the public realm and found under the control of the dominant group. He also speaks of “hidden transcripts” and “off stage,” practiced by both the dominants and subordinates, where both take off their masks and begin to talk safely in the secure limits of their own private spheres. It is in within the private domain that plots start, where discontent and forms of resistance arises. Scott uses this as evidence for a separate ideological consciousness between the peasant class and the elite, thereby weakening the Marxist argument for a “false consciousness.”

In his study of hegemonic control of the peasantry by the elite, Scott found that these peasants are not kept in line by some form of state-sponsored terrorism, but what he calls “routine repression” (legal restrictions, occasional arrests, and warnings for example). It will be demonstrated in this paper that local residents of the BSF area claim to experience “routine repression” by NPS rangers, manifested in the form of “harassment,” believing that they are treated more unfairly than “outside visitors,” especially in the issuance of citations.
Scott also recognizes that because of local economic, political, and kinship ties, the peasants knew that overt political action would cause more harm than good. Therefore, Scott contented that peasant rebellions and revolutions are not always the most effective means of resisting hegemonic control, exploring instead “everyday forms of peasant resistance.” Everyday forms of resistance include: foot dragging, sabotage, dissimulation, false compliance, pilfering, feigned ignorance, slander, gossip, rude nicknames, character assassinations, and arson (1985:29).

Scott notes that while these actions may not alter the peasants’ situation in the short run, it is in the long run that they may be more effective than overt rebellion in undercutting state repression and authority. Furthermore, everyday forms of resistance do not require coordination or planning and typically avoid direct symbolic confrontation with authority or with the norms of the elite. Instead, this form of everyday resistance often acts as a form of self-help for the peasant, acting as an indirect attempt to make an alternative account of the social situation count and to gain back a sense of control. According to Scott, both the peasant class and the elites are simultaneously constructing a worldview.

This is especially true with the changes in class relations due to the green revolution. Although there was always an extreme class division between the peasant class and the elites, there was a mutually held normative ideology that the two classes were dependent upon each other. While the peasants provided needed labor for the rich landowners, the later were obligated to treat the poor fairly, to provide jobs, and to give alms to the faithful and needy during certain times of the year. With the green revolution, class relations shifted due to changes in the method of planting and harvesting of rice. Because of the introduction of combine harvesters, there was no need of hired labor. The landless peasants no longer had a means of “livelihood.” The stinginess of the rich not only brought economic loss to the peasant class, but it also attacked their social identity. The only weapon the peasant class controlled in this struggle was their ability to undercut the prestige and reputation of the rich.

Summarizing, resistance happens because of some perceived threat to a community and its “fundamental beliefs.” We see this in Weapons of the Weak when the peasants’ livelihood is threatened due to the introduction of machinery in the rice fields. Secondly, resistance is a symbolic and dynamic
process, often-using existing social structures or channels of communication. Lastly, resistance occurs when there is a perceived threat to the continuation of one’s livelihood, with the impact and perceived costs to one’s way of life influencing the degree of resistance. The latter is congruent with Schweri and Van Willigen’s third component for a “provisional theory of resistance,” that cost levels [impacts] are related to the motivation to resist. If the perceived costs are high enough, communities will develop and maintain resistance organizations. It is this conceptual framework which is used as a model for identifying manifestations of resistance within the Big South Fork area, that resistance is manifested among those who perceive a threat to their “social identity” and “livelihood,” and the form of resistance is influenced by the perceived severity of this threat.

**Manifestations of resistance in the Big South Fork area**

Examples of Scott’s forms of “everyday resistance” among local residents of the National Area include incidences of vandalism and theft, demonstrated at the historic Blue Heron mining site where display cases describing the history of the former coal-mining town were broken into with artifacts (a mining helmet, lunch pail, and auger) either stolen or destroyed. As one NPS employee relayed:

> There have been many break-ins, vandalism, destruction, and theft at Blue Heron, yet every time the NPS threatens to remove the mining objects on display, there is an outcry in the newspaper and on the radio. You just can’t win.

Other forms of vandalism at the site include the destruction of soda machines and phones at the concession area, in addition to the destruction of signs describing the “ghost structures” located within the historic site. Another form of what Scott describes as “everyday resistance,” arson, occurred when the gazebo located at the Overlook which looks down on the Blue Heron mining site was set on fire, and when the port-a-john at the Overlook was blown up with dynamite. Others examples of arson, which occur throughout the BSFNRRRA, include the burning of historic structures, especially log cabins that were built in the 1880s by residents’ ancestors.
The feeling of local residents being that they would rather “have it burnt to the ground than in the hands of the government.”

Forest fires are also continuously set after the closing of trails or roads that prevent access to traditional areas. According to another NPS employee:

*People around here get really upset when we [NPS] have to close off vehicular access to areas they use to use in the past. They either rip down our signs saying ‘No Vehicles Allowed’ or set fire in retaliation ...I would say that 95% of the fires in the Big South Fork are due to arson.*

Examples of “everyday resistance” also exist in the form of slander, character assassination, and malicious gossip. Examples of these are found in newspaper articles, nicknames for park rangers such as “jack boot nazis,” graffiti such as “NPS Sucks,” and even a song on the radio comparing a female NPS ranger to Lizzi Borden. Looting continues to be a problem in the BSFNRRRA, especially of Native American artifacts, in addition to poaching and the illegal collection of medicinal plants such as ginseng, primarily for profit.

The importance of collecting ginseng to supplement local income is demonstrated in an interview with a local resident who is a waitress at a local restaurant:

*Well I don’t care how much those park rangers tip, they have hurt us financially with all their restrictions on what you can and can’t do now in the park. That’s why I serve them sneezers. I sneeze in their coffee. ...My family use to make a lot of money collecting ginseng, it was like a family tradition. We would all go out together and teach the young ones how to harvest the root and put the berry back so plants would be there for future generations. We can’t do that anymore. We use to get around $40.00 [US currency] for a pound of ginseng. This helped out a lot to buy school clothes and other things we needed. Now we have to depend on a government check to help us out financially.*
In addition to the importance of collecting ginseng in the past to supplement residents’ livelihood, it was also seen as a family tradition and a part of residents’ social identity of self-sufficiency.

Other examples of “everyday resistance” include local residents shunning NPS employees when they met them in public places, such as restaurants, gas stations, grocery stores, or the new Super Wal-Mart. Other NPS employees describe how residents often make derogatory remarks about them through “gossip” or that they will write “a nasty article in the local newspaper.”

Resistance towards the NPS can be seen when local residents boycott the BSFNRA in general, when they “refuse to have anything to do with that Park again.” During an interview with one resident and his eldest son, the resident described the symbolic meaning that the No Business Creek area held for him:

No Business always meant a lot to my family, for camping, now the NPS has turned its meaning on its head. There are restrictions on getting there, and if you do get there, there’s more restrictions. You can’t even pick a flower for your wife without taking a chance of going to jail. I had a ranger almost give me a ticket because I threw an orange peel on the ground. He said I was littering. Can you believe it? I tell, you, as long as I am alive, my son and his kids will never step foot in the park again.

Similarly, another resident describes her memories of the No Business Creek area:

I remember being with my family at No Business, and then later I took my children there to camp, picnic, to just be near the water. It was a family tradition. It doesn’t mean anything to me anymore, because I can’t get there. They [NPS] closed off the road to the river, and I’m too old to walk that far and my children refuse to go without me. I suppose those days are a thing of the past.
The previous statements demonstrate the severity of local residents’ resistance towards the NPS, when they state that they “refuse to ever step foot in that park again.” Resistance also manifests itself when residents boycott cultural festivals sponsored by the NPS, even when the festivals provide educational activities on the history of the area, and when residents resist attending Open House meetings sponsored by the NPS.

**Concluding remarks**

As discussed previously, due to the low attendance of local residents to Open House meetings sponsored by the NPS, I was hired as a consultant to investigate barriers or circumstances inhibiting residents from attending the NPS meetings. It was discovered that residents prefer communication between themselves and NPS employees on a more informal and common ground. A community center or church for examples, in lieu of the more formal Open House meetings held at courthouses or town halls. In addition, in place of a formal meeting, focus groups proved to be more beneficial by utilizing the methodological technique of participatory mapping in order to acquire local participation and input on the management of the National Area. For example, in using the focus group method and a common ground to obtain local input, the hierarchical arrangement of power is diminished, and the intimidating figure of authority is removed, thereby curtailing conflict and resistance between symbolic opposite parties.

Participatory mapping proved to be most beneficial in identifying locations of resources that are essential for the continuance and protection of the indigenous population’s “livelihood” and “social identity.” Currently, manifestations of resistance are in the form of routine and individual acts by local residents. Residents have found others means to support their livelihood. However, with the continuance of additional restrictions to access of natural and cultural resources within the BSFNRRRA, impacting areas that are viewed as a part of residents’ social identity, resistance may transform into more organized and public acts of resistance. An example of this additional restriction being the closing of the Oneida and Western Railroad bed to vehicular access. The railroad bed, currently a dirt road, also leads to traditional places for camping and family cemeteries. Family cemeteries are very important to the social identity of local residents. This fact was expressed during an interview with a local resident.
The park service needs to realize that this [BSF] area is a big part of who we are, my mom is buried here, my dad is buried here, and my great-grand parents, and so on. If the NPS recognizes this [social identity], then folks would participate more, we feel we are treated as if we were outsiders.

The NPS has been hesitant to close the road due to responses from local residents and the actions that they may take.

In conclusion, it is imperative that the NPS recognizes the continual threat to local residents’ “social identity” and “livelihood.” To work towards some means of sustainable access. If the cost levels [impacts] are related to the motivation to resist as exemplified in the works of Scott (1985; 1990) and in the work of Schweri and Van Willigen (1978), then it can be predicted that conflict and resistance will also continue to manifest itself between the NPS and indigenous population, and perhaps in the form of more organized and public acts of resistance. The importance of this research may also be of help to other organizations involved in developmental projects that affect the social identity and livelihood of indigenous populations.

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Social Movement, Spectacle, and Momentum

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Resistance is strategic. In this article I offer a social movement analysis of the 1991 public controversies and resolution of the jailing of the homeless by Fort Lauderdale Police. It demonstrates the role of the popular intellectual in generating the momentum that is essential for change. I argue that two important success elements are missing from the framing processes: the momentum of oppositional argument and goal attainment which should be a statement of repentance from establishment interlocutors who are being challenged to change the existing order. I argue that activists in social movements make mistakes by not building momentum toward a public outcry leading to an outcome which includes a statement of redemption from the antagonist.

Social movement activists can use interpretive frames that promote collective action and that define collective interests and identities, rights and claims. I refer to these specialists as "Popular Intellectuals". They should be viewed as individuals firmly embedded in social networks trying to influence the public during contentious episodes. My aim is to show that
resistance strategies can be taught through a model using a momentum archetype which is the best way to combine ideological work with political initiative.

Visualize Momentum as a Linear Strategy

The term momentum is often associated with the stock market or political campaigns. Revel’s Bolero may come to mind when we hear the term because in this piece of music, we hear repetition build to crescendo. As a child, I was introduced to the concept of momentum through the children’s book, *The Little Engine That Could*. In that tale, a long train must be pulled over a high mountain. Various larger engines are asked to pull the train but they refuse. The request is sent to a small engine, who agrees to try. The engine succeeds in pulling the train over the mountain while repeating its motto: "I-think-I-can". My mother read the story to me and like many other American children, I learned about optimism through my mom’s repetition of the words: "I-think-I-can", "I-think-I-can", "I-think-I-can." As the little engine reached the top by drawing out bravery and then went on down the grade, congratulating itself by saying, "I thought I could, I thought I could," I learned momentum, how it feels and sounds in my mother’s affirming voice.

In 1990, I became a member of the Young Democrats and learned how to build momentum in political campaigns. I learned from a successful campaign consultant named, Monte Belote. He explained the logic and phases of a campaign: Name Recognition, Persuasion, Attack, and the final “Get Out The Vote” or “GOTV” phase of a campaign. An obscure, little known, political candidate needs to follow these steps in sequential order to become prominent and get more votes than the opponent. I argue that social movement actors should visualize an ascending, linear path just like a political campaign.

In this article I am not comparing social movements to political campaigns although political organizing is an important part of social movements. In what follows, I offer analysis of the public controversy of the Fort Lauderdale Police jailing the homeless. This police resistance collective-action frame was produced in the process of contention and proved successful. This collective-action frame and the flow chart model promote understanding of the sequence of work steps that make up the process of the development of frames. It is a practical module available for activists across
the globe. Scholars will gain new disciplinary understandings of Popular Intellectuals and resistance studies using the momentum archetype to secure specifiable objectives conceptualized as movement outcomes.

Popular Intellectuals must select which frame is receptive to the public in order to create the ascendant momentum leading to a public outcry. After an outcry, the interlocutors must call for reparative treatment recommendations which include a statement of repentance. The charismatic Popular Intellectual ought to create a sense of crisis in the public and bring the movement to a watershed event that leads to the consequences of moral repair.

The Fort Lauderdale Case
In 1991, the Ft. Lauderdale Police arrested the homeless in high numbers under their “Zero Tolerance for Vagrancy Policy.” The Police Chief said that the media had a misconception about the police attitude about the homeless; the homeless are not a police problem because they are a societal problem. He said the police help the homeless, and the police never targeted the homeless for arrest. A social movement began to stop the jailing of the homeless. Before I discuss the case, it is important to discuss the theories behind the momentum model.

Current Theoretical Background
Social movement scholars, according to Robert Benford and David Snow look at “framing” as:

> Meaning work—the struggle over the production of mobilizing and countermobilizing ideas and meanings. [1] From this perspective, social movements are not viewed merely as carriers of extant ideas and meanings that grow automatically out of structural arrangements, unanticipated events, or existing ideologies. [2] Rather, movement actors are viewed as signifying agents actively engaged in the production and maintenance of meaning for constituents, antagonists, and bystanders or observers.” (613)

In language, meaning depends on the context, so this principle can be seen as a tool for changing minds by controlling context.
In their article, “Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment,” they explain the verb "framing" as an evolving process:

which entails agency in the sense that what is evolving is the work of social movement organizations or movement activists. And it is contentious in the sense that it involves the generation of interpretive frames that not only differ from existing ones but that may also challenge them. The resultant products of this framing activity are referred to as ‘collective action frames.’(614)

Using a Flowchart Strategy

One might object here and disagree with my choice of constructing a linear flowchart. “A flowchart is a diagram that uses graphic symbols to depict the nature and flow of the steps in a process” (Tribus 2). The purpose of developing a linear flowchart is to show that resistance strategies, which include core framing tasks, can be taught using a standardized process. Admittedly, there are a number of things that can go wrong when you try to standardize action steps and identify only the major action steps in a chronological order. From my research, I have not discovered anyone who has created a flow chart to show social movement steps as a process of core framing tasks leading to goal attainment. I have created this Social Movement Model (Figure 1) to show a symbolic representation of my concept.

Flow Chart Meanings

There is a systematic way to see how controversy moves through the public and between interlocutors. Implicit in our questioning of the intent of Popular Intellectuals should be the notion of how the Popular Intellectual must select which frame is receptive to the public in order to create the ascendant momentum leading to a public outcry. As a starting point for my analysis, I will provide an explanation of how I perceive the Popular Intellectual as a leader who can deploy sequential actions to create momentum. Referring to the flow chart in this article:
The oval shaped symbol with the words, “Individual in private life with political will,” is the starting point in the process. This depicts a trigger action in the process. This case study begins in 1991. I started counting the number of homeless people that were booked into the county jail for city municipal ordinance violations. This was easy for me to do since I was in
charge of the Public Defender Intake Division. At the same time, I joined the Broward County Young Democrats and began sharing my interest in helping the homeless with others in the group. I asked the President of the club if I could organize a “Homeless Project” within the organization. Several club members began meeting with me regularly and one member offered to create a documentary on our project.

**Preparation Step** The next step on the flow chart indicates a set up operation for the individual with political will. I had to prepare by establishing a reliable presence in groups and multiple publics.

**Process Step** This action step tells the individual to become a leader of the group. As Chairman of the Young Democrats’ Homeless Project, I joined a loosely organized group of 70 Homeless advocates and providers who met monthly as the “Homeless Coalition.” I shared my knowledge of a high number of homeless arrests with the Broward Young Democrats, the Homeless Coalition, and the Police Reform Coalition.

**Preparation Step** I had to prepare by establishing name recognition as a leader. The Broward Young Democrats Homeless Project continued and so did the making of a documentary called, “The Flame of Hope Auction,” which featured members of the club and I organizing dissent on the Ft. Lauderdale jailing issue, hosting a sleep out to raise awareness about the homeless, and planning a charity auction to raise money for the Broward Homeless Coalition. The narrator and producer of the documentary filmed me going to club meetings discussing the project. My name recognition increased as my committee gained prominence through all of these activities. Since I was the leader, I was invited to numerous events. From this point on, I will refer to myself as the Popular Intellectual for this particular series of social movement events.

**Decision Step** This indicates a question or branch in the process. Please look at the flow chart to see where this step falls into the sequence. Diagnostic framing of the issue happens at this stage. It is important to emphasize the theoretical background of this activity. Robert D. Benford and David A. Snow describe “Core Framing Tasks.” They refer to these core framing tasks as "diagnostic framing" (problem identification and attributions), "prognostic framing," and "motivational framing." I will only discuss diagnostic and prognostic framing. The first task for the Popular
Intellectual framing the argument is to identify the source(s) of causality, blame, and/or culpable agents. But as Benford and Snow point out, “consensus regarding the source of the problem does not follow automatically from agreement regarding the nature of the problem. Controversies regarding whom or what to blame frequently erupt between the various social movement organizations comprising a social movement as well as within movement organizations” (Benford 616). This was a significant obstacle for the movement organization because religious and charitable organizations are reluctant to challenge the police. In May of 1991, I was able to convince an editor of the Miami Herald to write a story about the Ft. Lauderdale Police homeless arrests because I felt that the police’s wrongdoing has put the standards or their authority in question.

A front page story appeared in the paper, “Police Vagrancy tolerance is ‘zero,’” which investigated the Ft. Lauderdale Police policy for arresting municipal ordinance violators and tied the policy to the opening of a new downtown arts theater. The article said, “In a campaign police call “zero tolerance,” officers regularly arrest homeless people sitting on park benches, fishing scraps from trash cans and munching sandwiches outside convenience stores, records, show” (Miami Herald, 1991). The police arrests that the reporter referred to in the article were from my research that I had conducted on every “at large” address arrest for almost 5 months. There were more than 300 arrests of homeless in the City of Ft. Lauderdale in May 1991. I saw this article and the editorial page that chastised the police saying, “Zero Tolerance is Wrong,” as my first deployment of framing the homeless as victims being unfairly persecuted by the police.

**Process and Decision Steps:** I had to identify the culpable agent’s leader. I decided it was the Chief of Police. Now that I knew how the Police Chief was going to frame the issue, I was prepared to initiate core framing tasks and use diagnostic framing or problem identification and attributions to identify the source(s) of causality, blame, and/or culpable agents. But as Benford and Snow point out, “consensus regarding the source of the problem does not follow automatically from agreement regarding the nature of the problem. The Homeless Coalition was not very keen on attacking the Police Chief. Controversies regarding whom or what to blame erupt between the various Social Movement Organizations. So instead of trying to build consensus from each person on the Coalition, I went out and met with
homeless people and the documentary crew went with me. I brought one of them to a press conference I organized.

I met with a group at a press conference forum of invited guests from the Young Democrats, American Civil Liberties Union, the National Organization of Women, and Union Leaders. I invited the Chief of the Ft. Lauderdale Police to the press conference and meeting held at the United Way. I considered this a coordinated instrumental protest action that directly confronted the decision-making official.

The Police Chief said that the media has a misconception about the police attitude about the homeless. He said, “The homeless are not a police problem because they are a societal problem, and the police help the homeless and the police never targeted the homeless for arrest.” The Chief of Police tried to deflect the problem from being a police problem to a societal problem. He also asked, “Is it the business owner’s rights or the homeless individual’s rights that are important?” He was contradicted when I was able to show the data of the number of homeless arrests.

One guest that I invited to “sandbag”, which is a political term used to surprise a guest into contradicting themselves, was a homeless elderly woman who had been mistreated by the police. She chastised the Chief after he spoke. Since framing shifts context in order to change the moral valence (Fiore 4), I needed to reorient the audience by changing the frame that the Police Chief used as the “police helping the homeless” to the “Police persecuting the homeless.” Framing is competitive between an antagonist and protagonist and I knew that I needed to influence how the problem was understood by presenting a person with first hand knowledge of the police abuse. I presumed that my audience that attended the meeting did not have personal experiences with homelessness and only conceptualized what living on the streets feels like when law enforcement officers encounters them. Through the elderly woman’s testimony of being victimized by Ft. Lauderdale police officers, the press conference became more of a spectacle for the reporters that were present.

My identification of the Police Chief as the culpable agent’s leader is important to establish. This can be seen on the flow chart as a decision. Notice was given to the Chief at the press conference. The second core framing task that Benford and Snow identify is known as “prognostic
framing.” Here is where the mistake is made by activists. Whenever the social movement leaders devise a proposed solution to the problem, a plan of attack, and the strategies for carrying out the plan; they often fail to include a call for reparative treatment recommendations which include a statement of repentance. Using Walker’s theory of moral repair, I argue that prognostic and diagnostic framing must include core framing responsibilities with goals that injustice to the victim does not go unaddressed.

The Popular Intellectual ought to identify the wrongdoer to the movement and urge this culpable agent to address the harm, offense, or anguish caused to those who suffer. If the culpable agent fails to make amends after being asked to by the Popular Intellectual, then the public outcry phase should begin.

At this point I developed the prognostic framing that we need to decriminalize the homeless using the slogan, “Homelessness is not a Crime” and proposed a solution to the problem, a plan of attack, and the strategies for carrying out the plan. I wanted the Chief to cease arresting homeless charged with minor life sustaining offenses. The Chief maintained his reality that his officers were not targeting the homeless. I wanted the Chief to be involved with the Homeless Coalition’s reparative treatment recommendations which consisted of housing and treatment and not jail.

**Process (Refer to the top of the flow chart)**
Since the Police Chief was claiming his Department policy was not targeting the homeless and no apology came from him, I had to coordinate an instrumental and expressive demonstration. I organized a spectacle to show a public outcry of 120 homeless people and their advocates in front of the Ft. Lauderdale Police Headquarters. I considered this an expressive demonstration or a protest that indirectly expresses dissatisfaction to decision-making officials. The protest was featured on the major network English and Spanish television news and in two of the largest daily newspapers in the Ft. Lauderdale metropolitan area. Protestors shouted, “Don’t make us do the time, Homelessness is not a crime.”

**Terminator: Moral Repair as a Strategy**
At the end of the flow chart, I have placed goal attainment as the end of the process. Movement outcomes should be evaluated in terms of goal
attainment for individuals and groups. Margaret Urban Walker in her book, *Moral Repair: Reconstructing Moral Relations After Wrongdoing* says it best, “Moral repair is the process of moving from the situation of loss and damage to a situation where some degree of stability in moral relations is regained” (6). She says moral repair is a communal responsibility which incorporates communities having three ongoing tasks to reassert norms:

First, communities are responsible for the reiteration of the standards that have been contravened and reassertion of their authority, at least if the wrongdoing has put the standards or their authority in question. Second, communities are responsible for the legitimization and enforcement of the individual wrongdoer’s proper acceptance of responsibility and consequent obligations to submit to or perform reparative action, at least if the wrongdoer is identified, available, and subject in some degree to the community’s control. Third, communities are responsible for seeing that injustice to the victim does not go unaddressed, or, more precisely, that the victim does not go unaddressed, but receives acknowledgement that the treatment by the wrongdoer was unacceptable to the community, and assurance that this is a matter of record and due importance to the community. (30, 31)

I articulate these elements of moral repair as a goal of social movements and Popular Intellectuals both theoretically and through reflection on my participation in the Ft. Lauderdale, Florida case.

**Framing the Homeless Issue using the Momentum Model**

The Ft. Lauderdale case was part of a larger social movement for homeless rights because of the group actions that focused on carrying out, resisting or undoing a social change. A key insight to my approach is the significance of the public outcry which relied on large-scale communications in order to matter. The theories behind this model are based on social theory as a technique of illumination. Sharing my experience and calling me a Popular Intellectual may be considered by some a dubious distinction. However, in
order to consider then satisfy the conditions and possible flaws of the model I propose, I had to share my lived experience as it applies to the model.

The momentum became what they call in the news business, “a story with legs” since I frequently appeared on talk radio, spoke to news reporters, held meetings with organizations, and convinced the homeless themselves to stand up for themselves. The publicity caught the attention of one of the largest law firms in the state and an attorney met with city leaders and me and threatened a class action suit. The social movement action came to a crescendo when the Miami Herald wrote a story a day or two after the demonstration, “Lauderdale Police Chief: We didn’t target homeless.” In the article, the Police Chief agreed to have a representative from the police join the Homeless Coalition to help solve the homeless’ problems.

In the end, the Fort Lauderdale Police, City Manager, and Mayor strengthened their moral relationship with the homeless and their advocates by agreeing publicly to join the Homeless Coalition. The Chief made an important reparative statement that the police never meant to target the homeless for arrest. An ordinance was created by the City of Ft. Lauderdale establishing a Civilian Review Board as a standing committee made up of civilians to review police actions. The city opened a tent in front of City Hall to house the homeless until a permanent shelter was opened. This tent remained open for almost a year. Today, there is a new Police Chief and City Manager and the City of Ft. Lauderdale has a special unit that is responsible for diverting the homeless who are committing life-sustaining minor crimes into a homeless shelter that was built when the tent was shut down. Unfortunately, the number of homeless arrests for violating municipal ordinances is climbing once again.

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“Fuck Normalization”

Young urban ‘troublemakers’ as meaningful political actors

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Before I entered the academic world I was working as a policy advisor for the Dutch national union of high school pupils: an extraordinary position because in most countries high school pupils do not have a union, let alone policy advisors working for them. My job became even more remarkable in December 2007 when widespread rioting broke out in several Dutch cities. Teenagers went out in the streets to demand fewer useless classroom hours and a higher quality of education in general. Such large scale youth uprisings had not been seen in Holland for years. The topic dominated the public debate for days.

A while ago I was reminded of this period after reading an interview with the chair man of the high school union in the newspaper. According to the

article this precocious seventeen-year-old was ‘the new hope’ of Dutch politics because of his tactical talents. He was depicted as the architect of the uprisings last December and, also, the catalyst of the return to normality because he closed a deal with the ministry of education. I was rather surprised by the article because I remembered the events quite differently. The union of high school pupils was expected to be in control of the protests. However, we had no idea why the pupils had gone out on the streets so suddenly, let alone where the masses of high school pupils would strike again. We had to watch the news like everyone else to keep ourselves updated. I remember our chair man who sat at a desk with his hands in his hair, not knowing how to handle the wild crowds that he was supposed to be representing.

Seeing things in the middle

While comparing my own memories with the interview I was reading I could not help but think of cows, grass and clouds. This seems strange in relation to a serious topic like derailed teenagers, but this quote of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari explain my rather odd association:

It’s not easy to see things in the middle, rather than looking down on them from above or up at them from below, or from left to right or right to left: try it, you’ll see that everything changes. It’s not easy to see the grass in things and in words ([.....]; never is a plateau separable from the cows that populate it, which are also the clouds in the sky) (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 25)

Deleuze and Guattari explain how words can change the course of events drastically. The words we choose to describe a sudden event necessarily make us look back at it from some distance in time. Looking over our shoulder we loose the capability to be still in the middle of the event, we step outside of it and analyse it from afar. Our structured thinking makes us dissect the event in bite size pieces; we separate the cows from the clouds and the grass.

From our outside position we see a clear hierarchy in the event: we cannot loose ourselves in the meshed grid that carried the event in unexpected
directions. We tend to separate the actors involved in the event from the situation surrounding them, understanding their role as a thing in itself, apart from the total experience that the event provoked when we were still in the middle of it.

This need to subsequently structure events from the outside, applies to my example of the high school riots. When looking back at the riots through the words that were written in the interview, it seems that a different interpretation was created to mask the uncertainty triggered by events. The spontaneous chaos that the pupils created in many cities devoid of an articulated and reasonable political message or demand, was incomprehensible and frightening to many. The subsequent confusion was abated by appointing the chair man of the high school union as the architect of the protests. The idea that there was an initial actor deliberately setting the events in motion, an authority with a clear vision who lead the ignorant masses, was much more comforting then adolescent pandemonium.

It seems that the collective Dutch memory wishes to remember the high school riots of last December according to a hierarchical structure. The idea of a rhizomatic, horizontal movement, a spontaneous network of actions inspired by instant excitement, without rationally formulated demands or motives does not fit into our familiar thought system. We cannot think of such a movement as productive or valuable. Such a movement would lead to mayhem devoid of political meaning and incapable of making political claims.

The incapability to view events ‘from the middle’ is a recurring error in accounts of urban youth riots in Europe. In this article I will explain why this is problematic to understandings of such events by looking at two recent cases of riots that both took place in Copenhagen. Copenhagen was recently the stage of two fierce clashes between angry young people and the police. In March 2007 thousands of alternative left-wing activists protested the loss

4 Deleuze and Guattari emphasise the concept of the rhizome to be able to describe a network shape of organisation. Grass has a rhizomatic growing-structure; it grows randomly in all directions, connecting different points in an unpredictable and untraceable way. This is the opposite of the growing-structure of trees, which grow in a linear direction that can be clearly and rationally understood, traced and reproduced.
of an old squatted youth-house that functioned as their hang out. In February 2008 hundreds of youngsters from immigrant backgrounds went out in the streets after an older man was harassed by the police in their neighbourhoods. In the cases of the Copenhagen riots it was difficult to understand afterwards what drove these youths to reek havoc on the city. However, it is exactly this disturbing and deregulating effect that gives the Copenhagen riots political value. Attempts to give posterior order to the riots serve to distort the political meaning of these events.

I will begin by briefly explaining the general motivation for both Copenhagen riots and by commenting on the differences between the two. Hereafter, I will analyse both cases from a perspective that will reveal some important similarities in the way the rioting youngsters are criticising the rest of society. Although I was not personally present during the riots, I visited the neighbourhood where both events started in May 2008 and interviewed some people involved in the events. I will use material from some of these interviews combined with reflections on the theoretical work of several philosophers to portray the young rioters as meaningful political actors. This analysis will contribute to an understanding of how seemingly senseless violent outbursts become valuable signs of a political struggle, exactly by viewing them as they are: spontaneous disorder generated by an instant excitement, without rationally formulated demands but still with a strong political claim.

After explaining how the violent deregulation of existing structures can be seen as a genuine political act, I will elaborate on the claim of equality, as a universal necessity, emerging in such a political act. In both cases of the Copenhagen riots the youngsters involved opposed mechanisms of normalisation. By doing so they make us aware that true equality lies in the fact that we are all in the same world despite differences of believes, identity and behaviour. This claim for true equality is not only a criticism of existing political structures, but also the starting point for a democratic political

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5 English information on the events can be found on the website of the youth-house, www.ungeren.dk. On the eviction: http://www.ungeren.dk/spip.php?article130

6 See this article in The Copenhagen Post, published Februari 12th 2008: http://www.cphpost.dk/get/105589.html
agency that can lead to the emancipation and empowerment of those unrepresented within existing political structures.

The rioting youngsters were not just uncivilised outcasts, the victims of their poor socio-economic life-circumstances. They are political actors demonstrating the necessity to reinvent politics in an urgently active way, in a way that breaks through the structures of well organised and clearly arranged political institutions and makes clear to us that the battle for genuine justice and equality has still to be fought out on the streets.

These young Danes are just an example of how we could see other rioting European youngsters as meaningful political agents instead of members of a lost generation surrendering themselves to nihilistic violence.

A hot year in Copenhagen

The Copenhagen riots are particularly interesting because two at first sight completely different groups of youngsters set the same neighbourhood on fire in a relative short period of time. Norrebro, the site where both of the Copenhagen-riots took place is a lively popular neighbourhood. There are no superficial indications that this area has been the stage of various violent uprisings throughout Danish history7.

The squatted youth-house Ungdomshuset, located in this area, was the centre of alternative youth culture in Copenhagen until March 2007. The eviction of the youth-house set a series of violent riots in motion that lasted for weeks. During my stay in Norrebro I visited one of the weekly solidarity demonstrations against the eviction and interviewed Else, one of the participants. She told me that the movement grew over time to present a much broader cause than the support for the youth-house alone. People felt affiliation with a general struggle for free space in the city and the right to dissent from the common behavioural norms. The youth-house movement had become the symbol of a struggle for the right to question authority, to question a political system that is increasingly perceived to be the

7 Traditionally a strong working class area, Norrebro is known for its politicized inhabitants. The squatting movement BZ had several violent clashes with the authorities in this neighbourhood in the ’80. The squatters were fighting for better social housing in the then very run down area. A tragedy took place in Norrebro in 1993 when eleven anti-EU demonstrators were shot by the police. In the late ’90 some big riots between young immigrants and the police also took place in the area.
performance of control-politics. Gavin, a 26 year old medical student and the flag-bearer of the solidarity demonstration I attended, gave me a similar account of the attraction of the movement in an interview that I had with him later.

This wish to create space for alternatives to the establishment is best expressed by the plan the youth-house sympathisers had to blockade City Hall; symbolically locking-up the politicians in their own institutional domain while, they, the young activists, would have the whole city to move around in freely. The movement is still going strong today. Weekly solidarity demonstrations attended by hundreds of people continued until the youngsters recently received the key to a new youth-house. Plans are currently made to involve the sympathisers in the activities of the new house.

It seems the youth that went out on the streets of Norrebro in February 2008 was representing a whole different struggle. A couple of hundred youngsters from immigrant backgrounds left a trace of destruction in the same neighbourhood during one turbulent week. The events were initiated by inhabitants of Norrebro but soon they were joined by other youngsters from different areas of Copenhagen. The Danish media were speculating about the reprinting of the offensive cartoons of the Prophet Mohammed in Jyllandsposten as a motive for the youngsters to start off the riots, but both the youngsters themselves as well as different police advocates stated that the cartoons did not play an important role in the violent outbursts. The police suspected the rioting youngsters to be bored because of the lack of activities in their neighbourhood. Anoir, a Moroccan Danish social worker that works with the youngsters from Norrebro who were involved in the riots, told me in an interview that the youth’s frustrations were first of all inspired by the injustice they felt at the hands of the police. The youngsters had told Anoir that the new ‘visitation-zones’ in their neighbourhood had led to constant ‘preventive’ searches that went hand in hand with insults by police officers. Perceptions of constantly discriminated and suspected of criminal behaviour put them on edge. When they saw the police were not only insulting them but also a respected older man from the neighbourhood, they flew into rage.

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8 See: http://www.ungeren.dk/spip.php?article567

9 See: http://www.cphpost.dk/get/105730.html
sparking of riots. Unlike the youth-house sympathisers, these youngsters were not deliberately trying to stand out from their environment, instead their wish was to blend in. Their goal was not to dissent from the common norms of behaviour, but rather to show that these common behavioural norms of behaviour are stigmatising them against their will.

When analysing my interviews and observations differences between the two cases of rioting first caught attention. The youth-house movement seems to have a lot of elements of a traditional political protest movement: The youngsters involved made comprehensible political statements. From the beginning there was a clear demand and they were capable to communicate their message in a co-ordinate way to the outside world. The youngsters from immigrant backgrounds seemed to display a more emotionally inspired protest without conscious-political claims. Only with help of a local social worker they were able to communicate their motives in a letter sent to the press.

This lack of political focus also became clear in the targets they chose to attack. Where the activists of the youth-house destroyed banks and establishments of multinationals like McDonalds, which they saw as representatives of an oppressive capitalist economy, the youngsters from immigrant backgrounds also attacked the library, schools, local shops and even the office of the social workers that support them. The youth-house activist chose deliberately to destroy symbols of the mainstream culture they detest, while the youngsters from immigrant backgrounds seemed to have worked off their anger more randomly. This difference might lead back to the different values and the different view on social participation of both groups. The youth-house activists are struggling for an alternative for the established society they do not wish to be part of because of their divergent behaviour and convictions, whereas the youngsters from immigrant backgrounds are struggling to be accepted as a full part of the same established society that they would very much like to be invited to. The youth-house activists wish to be seen and respected as different, whereas the youngsters from immigrant backgrounds are seen as different, but wish to be

10 a new youth-house.

11 See their website http://www.ungdomshuset.dk/spip.php?page=english

12 An article on the lettre in The Copenhagen Post: http://www.cphpost.dk/get/105741.html
respected as equal. In what follows I will argue that this focus on the differences between the two Copenhagen riots is but a preliminary interpretation of the events.

**De-regulating existing structures**

In an analysis of the riots that took place in the banlieues of Paris in November 2005, Slavoj Zizek interprets these events as a direct effort to gain visibility in a society in which the rioting youngsters experience themselves to be excluded from the political and social space (2007, p.14). The riots in Paris caused general consternation because the youngsters involved did not refer to any political demands or statements and therefore seemed to perform a senseless outburst of violence. Their political claims were misunderstood because their actions did not seem to imply any rational demands. This misunderstanding shows exactly the lack of visibility of these youngsters. According to Zizeks interpretation, the Parisian rioters did not wish to make any other demand than to be taken serious as citizens of the society that seemed unwilling to accept them. Their struggle for visibility had to be performed in a violent way because the closed rational structure of present-day political order did not leave the youngsters any other option. The sense of their actions therefore lay in its disturbing effect in itself. They pushed their way into public awareness in a rather compelling way. This effort to become visible actors in political and social space can also be seen in both cases of the Copenhagen riots.

Despite the fact that the youth-house activists wish to be respected as different and the youngsters with an immigrant background wish to be respected as equal, one could argue that both groups are not taken serious as political actors and wish to gain access to the public domain. The ways in which both groups of young rioters in Copenhagen expressed their political awareness opposes the discourse of established and traditional democratic political institutions. This discourse is reflected in the organisational structure of several European cities like Paris, Amsterdam and Copenhagen where a consensual hegemony of collaborating technocrats from different institutions like political parties, commercial companies and non-governmental well-fare organizations are ruling public life (Swyngedouw 2007, p. 64). This consensual hegemony seems to account for the demands of every social group in civil society because of its horizontal structure that leaves space for diversity. However, one can only participate within civil
society when expressing oneself in the appropriate ‘civilized’ manner or language, when coming up to so called ‘procedural discursive expectations’. If one does not speak the appropriate language, one is not taken serious. Outsiders that are not recognised as adjusted citizens are only noticed inside of civil society if they perform some kind of ‘uncivilised’ intervention. From the institutionalised point of view such an ‘uncivilised’ intervention is perceived as a destructive disturbance of the order and controls that is necessary to keep society safe. From the point of view of the rioters, it is the only way to break free of the control mechanisms that keep them off side.

By directly addressing the emotions and fears of others the rioters claim space to influence the political system, pushing for the realisation that the democratic consensus is leaving them out as active participants. This standpoint is best reflected in the interview I had with Gavin about the youth-house riots. Gavin explained to me that the violent riots were not the exciting choice of adventure seeking youngsters, but a last act of despair, because they realised it was the only means they had to break the power monopoly of the institutions that would not allow them their own space. During the days of the riots people were put in detention just for walking in areas where earlier actions had taken place, or just for wearing black clothes. Gavin told me:

“No one felt safe and everyone felt judged, so then you might as well do something [use violence, FK]. More and more people saw it as the only way to confront the strict measures of the police. The riots turned into an all or nothing situation in which people felt like they were defending the last free space in the city. If we would let go, it would be over.”

Where Zizek accepts violence as a necessary means for non-accepted youngsters to gain influence within social and political space, Alain Badiou takes this one step further. It is, according to him, exactly the violently deregulating impact riots have on their environment that make them a genuine political act. For Badiou politics necessarily finds itself outside of institutional areas, because politics is about prescribing new possibilities that are overlooked in existing structures. Politics is not about affirming a status quo, but about localising the undefined spaces that are not covered under the presentation of a current situation. When the flaw in the system is
uncovered in an event, a whole new perspective unfolds before us and new possibilities emerge to rearrange the situation (Badiou, (2005), p. 72). Those revealing these possibilities can transform from meaningless figures on the sideline into subjects whose actions can influence the world.

The deregulating of a current situation and the appointing of the flaws in the existing system is never a comfortable event, it causes turmoil and disorder13 (Badiou (2005), p. 100/101). It means rupture and confusion, it turns our world upside down, sometimes in a rather violent way. Youngsters that resist a system that they perceive to be false or unjust are performing a political act, exactly because they deconstruct the existing order. They bring into practice the necessary ‘unbinding’ effect of a political act. Their actions are political because they manage to step outside of the blind spot of the political-institutional structure in which they were non-existent as actors so that they too may influence society. By disrupting this structure they affirm their own power to act.

**To stand up against humiliation is to strive for equality**

Following Badiou’s theory we can understand how an ‘unbinding’ and disrupting political event that is shared by singular people in a singular moment can make us paradoxically aware of issues with a universal impact concerning all of us. Badiou states that a just political event should be prescribing a genuine equality which is not founded in mechanisms of normalisation. (Badiou (2008))

In both cases of the Copenhagen riots the youngsters involved challenged the perception of ‘normal’ citizens that make a contribution to society. Their violent intervention in the peaceful course of events in the city contests general ideas about what is normal behaviour for a respected citizen. However, the direct and confrontational character of their uprising makes it difficult to ignore their presence. The provocative disruption of the rioting youngsters could make us aware that we are still sharing the same public domain, whether we accept their behaviour or not. In the terms of Badiou we could come to realize that we are in the same world, whether we accept

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13 The events that take place in such a deregulating situation can’t be predicted nor defined. We can never talk of the politics, but only of diverse singular moments of politics that are each based in a different event and experienced by a different subject. Political truths derived from such events can therefore never become a doctrine, although they do require a full conviction.
it or not (Badiou, 2008). This awareness leads to an understanding of the broader significance of the Copenhagen riots as events prescribing a claim for equality, based on a shared presence in the same world, not on similarity in character, behaviour or belief system.

Fundamental equality does not lie in a shared identity, in who we are, but in the fact that, despite differences of conviction, identity or behaviour, we are in the same world:

...the African worker I see in the restaurant kitchen, the Moroccan I see digging a hole in the road, the veiled woman looking after children in a park. That is where we reverse the dominant idea of the world united by objects and signs, to make a unity in terms of living, acting beings, here and now. These people, different from me in terms of language, clothes, religion, food, education, exist exactly as I do myself; since they exist like me, I can discuss with them-and, as with anyone else, we can agree and disagree about things. But on the precondition that they and I exist in the same world. (Badiou (2008))

An unlimited set of differences is the first and most important thing that characterises the single world we find ourselves in. Exactly because people are always different this is the only just thing we can say of them without being tempted to categorise them. Their equality is therefore not an objective given, but something we decide upon, it is a prescription or a conviction that we decide to follow in every singular political event that we experience again and again.

Political equality is not what we desire or plan; it is that which we declare to be, here and now, in the heat of the moment, and not something that should be. [...] ‘Justice’ is the qualification of an egalitarian moment of politics in actu. (Badiou (2005), p. 98/99)
Therefore the equality between people is the truth that is produced in an axiomatic way\textsuperscript{14} in any event that is aimed at breaking mechanisms of normalisation.

Maybe this truth is best expressed in the jacket that the girl wore who was walking in front of me in the solidarity demonstration for the youth-house that I attended. It had the quote “Un-normal and proud: Fuck Normalization” sprayed on the back of it.

The youth-house sympathisers clearly stood up against mechanisms of normalisation that they perceived to be unjust and that would leave them to be seen as divergent or even unwanted outcasts.

Also in the riots in February 2008 the youngsters who went out on the streets were suffering under mechanisms of normalisation that they perceived as unjust. They felt stigmatised because their identity as young men from an immigrant background is mistrusted and deprives them from the possibility to be respected as normal citizens. The story of one of the boys who explained the motives of the February 2008 riots to the press from his personal perspective makes this confrontation with normalisation mechanisms clear\textsuperscript{15}. The boy was once stopped by two police officers for a search when he was walking around in his neighbourhood. He did not display any suspicious behaviour but the officers still wanted to strip search him and made him take off his pants on the street. The boy did not dare to protest because he feared the things the police officers were capable to do to him if they took him to the station, considering what they were already doing to him out in the open. According to Anoir, the humiliations the boy

\textsuperscript{14} The political truth, like all truths, has an axiomatic character. The axiom prescribes the consistency of our actions without defining what this consistency should look like with help of something outside of the axiom itself. Because the axiom can only point back at itself to explain its validity it can never be generalized or reproduced. For any generalization or reproduction we would have to be able to extract certain elements from the axiom that we could apply in an other setting or context. Since this is an impossibility, the axiom is always singular. We have to declare it to be the truth according to which we are willing to surrender completely with all our thoughts and actions. The axiom prescribes our actions not because we can prove that it is true according to an objective standard, but because we are convinced that it’s true.

\textsuperscript{15} Anoir told me this story in the interview I had with him, but the story is also present in the letter that the youngster have send to the press. (see footnote 9)
had to undergo symbolised the way many others from the neighbourhood felt at the hands of the police.

This kind of humiliation is being described by Hardt and Negri as a modern torture technique that springs from the overall present control-system that should keep our society safe from the harms that could be inflicted to us by ‘unnormalised’ outsiders or strangers. These outsiders or strangers are not literally outside society, they are amongst us but can be indicated as outsiders because of their behaviour that does not fit the general norm of what is accepted. (Hardt & Negri (2005) p. 19) By making people look ridiculously different from the well-behaved, their inferior position is defined.

The general consensus of what is normal or accepted has become a coercive doctrine within the political order, a doctrine one cannot escape from. Badiou states that a genuine political event should be aimed at breaking this doctrine of a general, normalising consensus. It is only possible to perceive people as equal once there are no categories to divide them into accepted and non-accepted groups. These kinds of categories are always propagated by certain privileged groups that are performing a false politics out of self interest or feelings of resentment. (Badiou, 2005, p.97)

**Democracy as a way of direct emancipatory action**

For Badiou, the prescription of equality based on a shared presence in the same world can lead to an understanding of democracy as a liberating process. This is an interesting thought because it indicates how youngsters involved in the Copenhagen riots are not only criticising existing political structures but also how their actions can lead to a positive, alternative interpretation of political agency within these existing structures.

Badiou makes clear that granting certain political privileges to people based on categories of nationality or juridical status can never be a completely democratic act, because it necessarily brings other people, who do not belong to the preferred categories, in an a priori unequal or even prejudiced position. A direct political protest against humiliation, normalisation and exclusion on street-level is therefore more democratic than the dividing structure of democracy in institutional context. In Badiou’s view democracy as a form of government always runs the risk that it is not properly
representing everybody, because it is inclined to sustain the categorisation of citizens that will benefit privileged groups.

'Democracy’ means that ‘immigrant’, ‘French”, ‘Arab’ and ‘Jew’ cannot be political words lest there be disastrous consequences. For these words, and many others, necessarily relate politics to the State, and the State itself to its lowest and most essential of functions: the non-egalitarian inventory of human beings. (Badiou (2005) p. 94)

Jean Luc Nancy shares this point of view. In his essay “Vérité de la démocratie” (2008) on the heritage of the events of ’68, Nancy pleads for a reinvention of democracy as an attitude reflecting the fact that we are always-already-together in the world. Being-in-common with others is a given that does not have to be established by some kind of institutionalised system, it is the way we always-already are. Our most original state of being is always in relation to others; therefor being-together does not have to be realised afterwards. For Nancy democracy is in the first place a state of mind that reflects the awareness of this already being-in-common, even before this state of mind is expressed in a certain organisational form like a state-apparatus or electoral system.

For both Badiou and Nancy democracy is also the state of mind that refuses to bring the common being in a single world under the rule of a consensual, sovereign power-structure. The hegemony of a consensual identity of society or the good citizen should be traversed by democracy as a way of direct emancipatory action that gives freedom to the multiple singularities that make up the world. This kind of democracy is emancipatory because it is aimed at the liberation of those who are not represented in the consensual power structure of governmental democracy.

For Badiou politics can never be seen as means to an end. Politics is not aimed at the implementation of a structure outside of it is own event that will guarantee the control of just and equal relations between people. Politics is always an end in itself, in the sense that only within the political event itself the truth of being on an equal basis can be prescribed, and never outside of it. Consequently, democracy should be seen as the political prescription of equality brought into practice in a singular event.
For Nancy democracy is not a prescription that we have to believe in, it is an infinite regime of meaning that we find again and again in the common being in a single world and that precedes any valorisation of this common being. Before we decide whether the being-in-common is beneficial to us or not, or whether we should support or enhance it, we realise that this initial state of being is the only state of being in which we are together on a completely equal basis. Therefore democracy is not an end, but just the beginning of an infinite search for a means to create space for just politics. For every emancipatory political act we first need democracy as an attitude based in the realisation of the being-in-common. However, democracy as an initial attitude will never guarantee us that the outcome of our political actions will truly be a just situation.

Keeping Nancy in mind, I do not wish to claim that the rioting youngsters of Copenhagen are bringing a new organisation of democracy into practice that should be adopted by others. I simply wish to suggest that we could see their uprising as a search for means to open space for a just politics. One can see democracy as their initial attitude and motivation to strive for genuine equality, but it can be debated whether the actions of the rioters are an appropriate way of searching for equality.

In any case, whether we approve of them or not, both Copenhagen riots can be seen as singular events of genuine politics because of the desire of its actors to strive for equality by breaking an existing and paralysing institutional structure. Experiences of injustice have lead the young urban ‘troublemakers’ to fight exclusion caused by mechanisms of normalisation in a confronting, disturbing and sometimes emotional way. Their ‘abnormal’ and ‘uncivilised’ uprising brings the injustice that is produced by the framework of accepted social and political participation to light. By confronting us actively with this injustice, the rioters are showing that they are meaningful political actors in society instead of bored teenagers or passive victims of their deprived life-circumstances. Seeing their actions in this light will also make us aware that our misunderstanding of their behavior is not a sign of their incapacity to make a meaningful contribution to society, but of our incapacity to understand equality as the shared presence in the same world despite any differences.

The spontaneous, rhizomatic and irrational character of riots like the ones in Copenhagen and the Netherlands leads many to think that they just imply
antisocial behaviour, because we tend to recognise relevant political and social behaviour only as such if it has a hierarchical structure and a clear, premeditated political program. I believe that this is rather owing to our incapacity to understand the political value of rhizomatic, irrational direct outbursts like named riots, than it is to the incapacity of the rioters to make a significant contribution to society. I hope to have made that clear by explaining that it is exactly the disrupting impact of such riots that make them a genuine political act. Furthermore it is precisely this disrupting impact that can force us to think about equality, democracy and emancipation in a fruitful and renewing way.

The Copenhagen riots show us that youngsters from different backgrounds and with different ideals can still point at the necessity for a common struggle for equality and emancipation, in actions on street-level, but not necessarily performed in a co-ordinate way. I do not see the events in Copenhagen as an argument to strive at one new, generally organised, movement of resistance. The difference that Hardt and Negri make between the masses that let itself be ruled and the multitude that rules itself comes to mind here. (Hardt & Negri (2005)). For Hardt and Negri the multitude is radically democratic, because it does not accept any central sovereignty that is placed above the rhizomatic network of a multitude of singular and autonomous acting and thinking people. The multitude therefore is a movement of movements, in which groups with at first sight contradictory interests can work together because they struggle against a commonly perceived subordination and for a transformation of existing unjust structures (Hardt & Negri (2005), p. 86/87).

The two Copenhagen riots represented two different struggles, but still some basic similarities can be analysed from both cases. Maybe the rioting Danish youngsters show that a shared struggle for equality could exist once the various urban ‘troublemakers’ become aware of their common goals. They don’t have to be brought together in a single protest-movement, since the singular events of local politics are the battlegrounds where present day emancipatory struggles should be fought out. A mutual recognition of one another as political actors will be enough for the various young rebellious people to support each other in the moments it is needed. In Copenhagen this awareness is already slowly raising. Gavin told me that a lot of youngsters from immigrant backgrounds had helped the youth-house activists to hide in their houses when they were being chased by the police.
Anoir asked me grinning where I thought his rioting clients had gotten the Molotov cocktail from that had destroyed the front door of his office in February 2008.

Who knows what this kind of practical and beneficial recognition will lead to in the future?

References

Nancy, Jean-Luc (2008) Vérité de la démocratie, Galilée, Paris
Gilberto Pontecorvo’s *The Battle of Algiers* dramatises a well-known episode during the Algerian War of Independence (1954–1962). It began as the National Liberation Front (FLN) made a calculated decision to move the existing conflict into the capital. By making Algiers a central battlefront and deliberately striking against civilians, the rebels could count on media coverage as well as French reprisals that would in turn gain them popular support. Their move was effective: In January 1957, after a string of bombing attacks on cafés and public places, the army was called in to deal with the "emergency situation". General Jacques Massu and the 6,000 men of his 10th Paratrooper division responded with indiscriminate violence, torture and repression. This event was called only afterwards "Battle of Algiers" – it lasted until September 1957, when the last FLN-activists were either killed or arrested. Though the French won it, they proved to lose the war, granting independence to Algeria in 1962 (Horne 1977: 183–202).
Pontecorvo’s film would probably never been made, had the FLN not displayed an interest in telling its story. Saadi Yacef, who had commanded the bomb-network during the last months of The Battle of Algiers and had come to hold the post of government-minister, proved critical. Not only did he publish a memoir, but he also founded the first production and distribution company to make a movie about the struggle. He enlisted Pontecorvo and script writer Franco Solinas and with a budget of US$ 800000, half from private sources and half from the Algerian government, The Battle of Algiers was then produced on location during five months in 1965. The film was an outstanding success: it won the grand prize at the Venice Film Festival, and survives as one of the most important movies in cinema history (Mellen 1973: 16–23). This contribution explores not only the film’s extraordinary impact on left wing revolutionary groups since the late 1960s as a model for revolution, but also the usage of The Battle of Algiers as a training device for anti-guerrilla warfare by different militaries. In regard to sources, this article draws almost exclusively focuses from Western publications.

**A model for revolution?**

Because of Pontecorvo’s goal of realistic representation (“dictatorship of the truth”) through a distinct grainy newsreel-like cinematography, use of real locations and pedantic observance of both factual information The Battle of Algiers still resonates across the years as an authentic and unique insight into the Algerian conflict. Part of this intimate knowledge came from personal experience: Since Pontecorvo was a leading member of the antifascist resistance in Northern Italy during the Second World War, he was familiar with the inner workings and tactics of an underground movement: “The methods of concealment of an underground movement in Rome, as in Paris, as in Algiers, are very similar, so I remembered many things that we ourselves had done when we were an armed underground movement” (Srivastava 2005). As Turin erupted in insurrection in 1945, Pontecorvo took command of the „Eugenio Curiel assault brigade“: “He was intensely involved in propaganda for the insurrection: writing slogans and painting placards […]. He once hijacked a fruit seller’s truck with a loudspeaker, put a tape of anti fascist speeches inside it, and left it with the tape playing in Turin’s main square, under the Germans’ noses. Again, it is hard not to imagine that this was the origin of the scene in The Battle of Algiers when a young boy starts making pro-FLN statements from a PA set
up by French soldiers.” (Behan 2008). Furthermore the movie is based on extensive recherché: Before starting shooting Pontecorvo and Solinas spent eight months researching all aspects of The Battle of Algiers, meeting representatives of the FLN in Rome, Paris and Algiers, but also taped hours of interviews with French commanders and veterans. For days, former FLN-activist Sala Bazi toured the filmmakers around the Casbah, and told them how his organization made explosives and put them to use. Ultimately, the casting of Saadi Yacef as the rebel leader – the same position he filled out during the real Battle of Algiers – added much plausibility: “I played that part for real. […] I told myself (that by being in the film) I would be able to guide Pontecorvo, warn him when something didn’t ring true. All the events in the film, we shot them in the exact spot where it happened “ (Interview by Liza Bear 2004).

As final product of this process The Battle of Algiers reveals much of the tactics inherent in asymmetric war – such as random shootings, bombings of public places and even a „suicide“-like mission – but also explores the rationality and effectiveness of “asymmetric” terrorism. The adaptation of a „cell“-like organisational structure is explained in detail as well as the propagandistic aspect of pamphlets and communiqués. „Perhaps no other film in the history of the art has shown so sympathetically and so minutely the delicate workings of a revolutionary organisation“ (Mellen 1973: 68). Thus, from the beginning it was argued that the film could be adapted as a blueprint for revolutionary action. For instance, Jimmy Breslin declared on TV in 1968 that The Battle of Algiers is a „training film for urban guerrillas“. Pontecorvo did not challenge such assessments: „The film champions everyone who is deprived of his rights, and encourages him to fight for them. But it is an analogy for many situations: Vietnam for example“ (Egbert 1969). Indeed, The Battle of Algiers had such a “stirring” effects upon its audiences. At the New York Film Festival in 1967, a Newsweek commentator noticed an aspect that troubled him: “Many young Negroes cheered or laughed knowingly at each terrorist attack on the French, as if The Battle of Algiers were a textbook and prophecy of urban guerrilla warfare to come” (Hoberman 2004). Within the radical Afro-American community, there was a heated discussion, if and how the film could be used in the major black ghettos. “Are The Revolutionary Techniques Employed in The Battle of Algiers Applicable to Harlem?”, asked an essay by Francee Covington in 1970. She reached negative conclusion, arguing that „importing“ revolutionary techniques may prove
disastrous results, since popular support for a revolution was lacking even within the Black community (Covington 1970).

Many other revolutionary forces had a different take: Both the Black Panthers and the IRA are said to have screened *The Battle of Algiers* for its members and according to Bruce Hoffman the film is the „favourite“ of Velupillai Prabhakaran, leader of the Tamil Tigers (Hoffman 2002). It is however difficult to determine if there was any direct nexus between the viewing *The Battle of Algiers* and the evolution of insurrectionary strategy/tactics. Certain is that the film’s inspirational force roused passions, made people identify with the cause of anti-colonialism and international struggles, which were in full swing at that time. Time observed that the leftwing radicals of the early 1970s looked up to the depicted Algerian rebels as role models for their own fight: „Young people have plenty of examples of glamorous, if not always successful revolutionaries [...] Cops in San Francisco and New York both say that the movie *The Battle of Algiers* influenced much of the bombing surge. It centres on the moral dilemma of killing innocent people in the cause of revolution“ (Time 1970). During the „Days of Rage“, a violent 1969 demonstration in Chicago’s fashionable Gold Coast district, the „Weatherpeople“ imitated the terrifying war woops of the Algerian women. „We shrieked and screamed as we ran, ululating in imitation of the fighters of *The Battle of Algiers*,“ Bill Ayers tells us, „I saw us become what I thought was a real battalion in a guerrilla army, and it felt for the moment like more than theatre, more than metaphor“ (Ayers 2003, 170). A few months later, Weather Underground leader Mark Rudd would urge his comrades to wage their own own Battle of Algiers against military installations and police departments in the US (Time 1970).

Of course, young Western European spectators were also receptive: An admirer and observing student was Andreas Baader, leader of the Red Army Fraction, Western Germany’s most prominent urban guerrilla group, who regarded *The Battle of Algiers* as his favourite movie. Biographers Klaus Stern and Jörg Herrmann noted remarkable analogies between the movies and Baader’s path. They even claim that Baader orchestrated the „Dreierschlag“ of 1970 – three bank robberies in West-Berlin during only 10 minutes – after the model of guerrilla action as depicted in *The Battle of Algiers* (Stern and Herrmann 2007: 104, 105). Only three years before, when the Student revolt was in full swing, Baader had planned to make a „socialist“ movie about the events in West-Berlin – closely modelled on *The
Battle of Algiers. He is said to have handed director Peter Fleischmann a script, which is now lost (Stern and Herrmann: 90).

And finally, in an interview for the documentary “Terrors advocate” (2007), Yacef Saadi, recalled how he watched the movie in the company of Carlos Ramirez Sanchez, also know as the “Jackal”: After the attack on the OPEC-conference in Vienna (1975), this “international terrorist” and his group had taken a pause in Algiers and were comforted by the government: “Carlos had already seen The Battle of Algiers. They asked to see me. I went there, we saw the film again and we even played soccer. [...] We tried to have fun like that.” (Schroeder, 2007). Far from suggesting any direct connection between Middle Eastern terrorism and “postcolonial” Algeria this anectode illustrates the film’s resonance with all kinds of resistance forces.

Since then The Battle of Algiers and the memory of the French-Algerian War as a revolutionary call to arms slowly faded. Pontecorvo himself had remained “silent” after his last movie Ogro (1979): “Because (our) certainties have failed. And to make an epic film you can be wrong about the idea behind the film, but you must believe it strongly. Then maybe you will communicate. Now, everyone is uncertain” (Glass 1998). Much of the “grand narratives” Pontecorvo was referring to may indeed have been lost since, but recently the War on Terror and the occupation of Iraq sparked a new wave of political films like The Road to Guantanamo (2006), Redacted (2007) or Battle for Haditha (2007) – all of which were referring aesthetically to the “dictatorship of the truth” and reflected contemporary struggles. And before his death in 2006 Pontecorvo witnessed renewed recognition and interest in his work. Against the background of mounting political and social discontent time is “rife” again for a new Battle of Algiers.

A model for Counterrevolution and Counterinsurgency?

A surprising after-effect of The Battle of Algiers is that it not only inspired revolution, but also counterrevolution. In some paradox way, the movie can be read as an ode to the Para, which projects all those familiar clichés of military precision, virility, stealth and omnipotence. But also the film’s insight and documentary quality has been crucial in attracting the attentions of right wing dictatorships and many different militaries across the world. From their perspective, the movie, with its attention to the mindset of the French military, can function as a guide in defeating revolution and insurgency. This „expertise“ is articulated through Lt. Colonel Mathieu,
described by one reviewer as „the very model of the modern counterinsurgency warrior“ – handsome, supremely confident, steely and by far the most developed character in the film. Through him the viewer becomes familiar with the tactical dilemmas of the paratroopers and their counterstrategy: They have to fight an enemy, who not only disregards the „rules of war“, but moves unrecognisably within a densely populated urban area. The FLN is protected by its clandestine structure in different „cells“ of only three activists with the least possible contact one below the other. Thus according to the Colonel, the challenge is to „know“ an enemy, who does not know even „himself“ – which means collecting any kind of relevant information – names, addresses and hideouts: „For this we need information. The method interrogation. […] We need to have the Casbah at our disposal. We must shift through it […] and interrogate everyone.“ In a very graphic way, Mathieu compares the FLN to a tapeworm, who can only be killed, if it loses its head (Solinas 1973: 117).

Quotes such as these form together an effectively compressed analysis of the thinking behind the French counterinsurgency approach. Mathieu is in fact a „composite“ character combining several key officers, one of them Colonel Yves Godard, who served as Chief of Staff during the battle. Like his alter ego in the film, Godard emphasized the overall necessity of intelligence. For him a bomb layer was only an „arm“ that could be replaced, so it was much more important to identify the „brain“ behind the attacks. Without a „brain“ there would be no more terrorism (Hoffman 2001: 81). That meant of course subjecting the Muslim population of Algiers to an indiscriminate and complete „screening“ process in order to get the needed intelligence. In the process of „fishing“ through the cordoned off casbah, the French arrested according to some estimates between 30 and 40 percent of the male population; many of them were „interrogated“ by special teams and subjected to gruesome torture. When the battle was concluded, police commissioner Paul Teitgen, who had personally signed warrants for 24,000 detainees, reported 3,024 persons „missing“. Many of the „disappeared“ had been thrown out of helicopters into the sea or were shot in secret by an execution squad outside Algiers (Horne 1977: 201). As the film demonstrates, the blank „organigramme“ was filled little by little with information coming directly out of the torture centres, symbolizing the dismantling of the FLN network through a long and painful process. The cornering of the last remaining leader Ali La Pointe brings The Battle of Algiers to its conclusion. Unwilling to surrender with three companions,
their hideout is blown apart. A General present at the scene comments: „And so the tapeworm no longer has a head“ (Solinas 1973: 153).

Although the French eventually lost the Algerian War, *The Battle of Algiers* was considered a victory. Thus their accumulated „expertise“ was in demand and France established several military missions to war academies and training centres both in the US and a number of Latin American countries. For instance, the teachings and instructions of Algerian War veterans such as Colonel Paul Aussaresses, who had been in charge of secret torture teams in Algiers, fell on fertile ground within the Argentinean military. From 1975 on, the Junta was involved in „crusade“-like struggles against „subversives“ and, in this “Process of National Reorganisation”, many of the „methods“ which had been used by the French in Algeria were applied. That meant for example making torture victims „disappear“ by dumping them from „death flights“ into rivers and the ocean. As General Reynaldo Bigone told researcher Marie-Monique Robin, he and his comrades had learned „everything“ from the French: “The squaring of territory, the importance of intelligence in this kind of war, interrogation methods. Our model was *The Battle of Algiers*“ (Robin 2005: 50).

The film was itself was integrated into these teachings as a visual aid: In 1967 – after exiled French Colonel Jean Gardes, a veteran of the battle and member of the rightwing Secret Army Organisation (OAS) delivered a series of counterinsurgency-lectures at the School of Naval Mechanics (ESMA) in Buenos Aires – *The Battle of Algiers* was screened for the cadets. One of them recalled: „They showed us that film to prepare us for a kind of war very different from the regular war we had entered the Navy School for. They were preparing us for police missions against the civilian population, who became our new enemy“ (Verbitsky 2005). The movie was also used during courses for Latin American police officers at the International Policy Academy (IPA) in Washington. One scene was picked out in particular: therein French policemen and hardcore elements of the settler population conspire to counter-terrorize the Muslim population by putting a bomb in front of a block of flats in the Casbah, which is promptly destroyed with loss of innocent live. In reference to clandestine police tactics used by some Latin American dictatorships, A. J. Langguth for example has pointed out, that *The Battle of Algiers* was in fact used as a blueprint for police-terror (Langguth 1978: 120). Martha Huggins reached the same conclusion: „Interestingly […] *The Battle of Algiers* was banned from movie houses in
Brazil during most of the military period for fear that Brazilian victims of security force violence might recognise that the French techniques of search, arrest, and torture depicted in the film were those used by Brazilian security forces“ (Huggins 1998: 135).

It was the Iraqi insurgency that aroused a renewed interest: One film critic even claimed, that „Operation Iraqi Freedom, which officially began March 20, 2003, started at the movies“. This referred to the special screening of The Battle of Algiers by the Pentagon’s Office for Direction for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflicts on August 27, 2003 (Hornaday 2006). As New York Times writer Michael Kaufman noted, the Pentagon audience – a civilian led group with „responsibility for thinking aggressively and creatively“ on issues of guerrilla war – were „urged to consider and discuss the implicit issues at the core of the film: The problematic but alluring efficacy of brutal and repressive means in fighting clandestine terrorists in places like Algeria and Iraq“ (Kaufman 2003). In a 2004 interview, Pontecorvo said he had found the Pentagon’s interest in his film „a little strange“. The most The Battle of Algiers could do, he said, is „teach how to make cinema, not war“ (Povoledo 2004). From Pontecorvo’s point of view the Americans screened his film not because “they thought the details were identical to Iraq, but because the overall atmosphere is very similar.” But he added that “establishment figures will never like this film, because it shows that when people unite they are strong.” (Behan 2004). Saadi Yacef was equally critical: “Algeria was a settler colony. Iraq is a modern colonial occupation; geographically, economically and sociologically it’s unlike the Algerian situation. The Battle of Algiers should be able to teach people some lessons, but the Americans are bad students, like the French were, and they are making things worse“ (Harrison 2007: 411).

**Conclusion**

Utilising film as a showcase in counterinsurgency was a poor choice in the first place: What it did not portray as prominently as torture was how non-violent means, like the recruitment of informers, worked much more effective than simply tormenting people indiscriminately. The French even operated a group of FLN-turncoats, who infiltrated the casbah and reported on the whereabouts of their former comrades. Their information proved critical for the arrests of almost the entire FLN leadership in Algiers (Alexander 2002: 237–242). „The French had gained accurate intelligence
through public co operation and informant, not torture“, notes Darius Rejali and criticises the *The Battle of Algiers* strongly for promoting the „myth of professional torture“ (Rejali 2007: 481) since the FLN in the movie is defeated solely because „torture worked“ (Rejali 2007: 546). The history of the Algerian war tells a far different story on this alleged effectiveness of torture: The violence and repression merely antagonised the Muslim population, harmed France’s international reputation as well as the support for the war in the mainland. Further it happened to be the best „recruiting agent“ for the rebel movement. In the end, torture was not an efficient mean against terrorism, but proved counterproductive. It is both ironic and deeply troubling that a movie, which is so committed to reveal the horrors of torture, was indeed used as a blueprint for further violence.

But when insurgent groups looked up to the movie as model closely to follow, they also committed a mistake: Western Germany was not Algeria, nor were the black Ghettos of the US. „Thus the film has been misunderstood, particularly by the Black Panthers who have used it as a manual for guerrilla warfare, because it has not recognised that the terrorist tactics carried out by Ali La Pointe and the others were the means not the victory but to temporary defeat“ (Mellen 1973: 64). The original outcome of *The Battle of Algiers* was a heavy blow on the guerrilla, not only in manpower but also in matters of prestige: „The FLN’s own command structures were damaged, and its principal political leaders went into exile in the wake of the battle; this no doubt made it easier for them in important respects to pursue subsequent diplomatic and political initiatives, but it had not been their plan, and it deepened the internal divisions that were to resurface violently after independence. In many respects, the ‘battle’ was a disaster“ (Harrison 2007: 398). Employing terrorism had failed; it did not spark any popular insurrection but left the isolated network to be crushed. It was a combination of political and military failures, a sceptical French home front and an extremist, uncompromising stance of the settler population and continuing support for the guerrillas from outside that made „L’Algérie française“ a lost cause. The movie tends to oversimplify this outcome. Depicting the mass demonstrations of 1960, when protesters almost overran the European quarter, the voiceover in the coda tells: „Two more years of struggle lay ahead. And on the 2nd of July 1962, with the advent of independence, the Algerian nation was born“ (Harrison 2007: 401). Constructing this casualty between *The Battle of Algiers*, which was in fact only a minor episode, and Algerian independence is misleading in many
ways: It leaves out the long and desperate guerrilla war in the mountains, as well as the long and difficult path to the settlement. Thus The Battle of Algiers should not be seen as documentary „truth“ in literary sense but – in Pontecorvo’s words – as „a hymn in homage to the people who must struggle for their independence, not only in Algeria but everywhere in the third world.“ (Mellen 1973: 24).

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Towards a Pluralist Socialism

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Introduction

Since the 1950’s pluralism has become perhaps the most influential theory of the political process in democratic capitalism. Due to pluralism’s embrace of capitalist property relations it is not surprising that Marxism and Pluralism are viewed practically as diametrical opposites. Marxists view the pluralist notion of “polyarchy”, where apathy is turned into a sign of health for democracy, as a super-structural construct which legitimates capitalist socio-economic structure thus encouraging mass acquiescence to its logic. However, in what could be seen as a vindication of the Marxist critique of polyarchy, pluralism’s failure to account for the poor performance of the American political economy in the period following the second world war led major pluralists such as Dahl and Lindblom to call for considerable structural reforms, advocating the need for substantive equality through wealth distribution. They called the American capitalist system itself into question, contending that it “remains both sluggish and feckless in advancing on problems on which it has the advantage of decades of
experience in policy making: poverty and mal-distribution of income and wealth, racial inequality, healthcare, public education, inflation and unemployment and industrial relations, for example” (Dahl & Lindblom in Manley 1983 p 372)

Since then Dahl has increasingly called his own theory into question, reflecting upon the notion that polyarchic democracy is the most the current capitalist system can deliver or allow, “In the twentieth century, the existence of a market oriented capitalist economy in a country has been favourable to democratization up to the level of polyarchy; but it is unfavourable to democratization beyond the level of polyarchy” (Dahl 1996 p 646)

Considering this, Dahl’s posed the question “under twenty first century conditions would democracy be better served by some new institutions, that would complement or perhaps even replace polyarchy? (Ibid p 648)

The failure of the “real socialist” alternative in the twentieth century is taken by many to provide a negative answer to this question. The high hopes bought about by the October revolution were undermined by the real socialist system’s incapacity to mediate political difference (cf Held 1999) When politics did not begin to “end” with the dictatorship of the proletariat, as Marx was deemed to have envisaged, Soviet Marxism became wrong footed, leading to many gross repressions. Therefore, with the sudden collapse of much of the socialist bloc in the late twentieth century it became fashionable for free market ideologues to write with a strong triumphalist streak (c.f. inter-alia Fukuyama 1989 & 1992, Friedman 1997) This even led Fukuyama to proclaim that pluralist politics and free market economics constituted the end of ideological history as envisaged by Hegel. Considering the dangerous situation humanity finds itself in at this present juncture, such complacent views are hugely undesirable. They seem more of a case of unsubstantiated theoretical ecstasy than a credible account of the state of the planet. As a sober Alexander Solzhenitsyn warned shortly after the collapse of the Eastern Communist bloc “although the earthly ideal of socialism-communism has collapsed, the problems it purported to solve remain: the brazen use of social advantage and the inordinate power of money, which often direct the very course of events. And if the global lesson of the twentieth century does not serve as a healing inoculation, the vast red whirlwind may repeat itself in entirety” (in New York Times, 28/10/1993) Humanity urgently needs to find a more sustainable, equitable and democratic alternative.
To approach this end the essay will demonstrate how democracy can be improved through a reconciliation of the Marxist focus on the economic structure of society and the pluralist focus on the mediation of political difference. That is to say, I will demonstrate why class analysis is a better critical tool to understand the nature of power in advanced Western societies - laying the groundwork for an improved democratic model for modern societies - and argue that the establishment of a post-capitalist society needs the mediating influence of ‘the politics of autonomous groups’ if it is not to repeat the mistakes of “real socialism” in the twentieth century, ultimately posing the case for a pluralist-socialism.

The ruling class in polyarchy

The notion of a ruling class is extremely corrosive for pluralism. Clearly, the harmony of interests between competing groups would be completely corrupted by the privileged position afforded to a ruling class. If democracy is taken at its etymological meaning “rule by the people”, indicating that the electorate is sovereign, there is not much space to call polyarchy democratic at all if sovereignty is, in fact, possessed by a ruling elite. This is the central notion behind Robinson’s (1996) critique of “polyarchic democracy”. In contrast, “popular democracy”, though it does not enjoy a theory as fully elaborated as its counterpart (thus strengthening the hegemony - in the Gramsican sense - of the polyachic view) is rooted in Rousseauian-Marxist traditions and places much of the criteria for democracy in outcome. In doing so, “popular democracy” incorporates various considerations of ‘social justice’, “in which the construction of a democratic political order enjoys a theoretically internal relation to the construction of a democratic socio-economic order” (Ibid p 624). Unlike “popular democracy”, by separating the economic from the political, “polyarchic democracy” is able to place the criteria for democracy completely in process eliminating considerations of outcome, thus enabling elites to embrace “democracy” without fearing a challenge to their power. Essentially, in this section I aim to begin to show through class analysis how social outcome can itself corrupt the democratic process. Notwithstanding the liberal separation of economic and politics, the analysis of power (which the essay shall argue to be economically formulated, thus showing this separation to be largely illusory) retains make or break implications for any theory of democracy.
There has been much debate and disagreement as to how power is structured in western capitalist societies. However, C.W. Mill’s dismissal of Pluralist theory and its assumed harmony of interests as a “set of images out of a fairy tale” (Mills in Barrow 2007 p 407) was one of inter-disciplinary appeal, accepted by Marxists and elitists alike. Nevertheless, Mills was dismissive of the Marxist notion of a ruling class. Instead he maintained that both practically and theoretically, military, economic and political institutions are a separate source of power, the division of which hinders the emergence of a “ruling class” which would dominate the three spheres. For Mills “ruling class” was a “badly loaded phrase” which presupposed the automatic translation of economic power to political power by joining the purely economic term “class” with a political term “rule”. Instead of assuming such “vulgar economic determinism” Mills contended it was more appropriate to talk of the “Power Elite”, constituted by institutionary trident (economic, political and military) providing separate sources of power.

Mill’s dismissal of Pluralism as an adequate description of the way power was structured in American Democracy was well received by pluralism’s critics across the political spectrum. However, it is of no great surprise that his separation of the economic, political and military spheres was heavily criticised. Sweezy was the first to elaborate what would become the most popular critique amongst Marxists - “the ‘power elite’ is overwhelmingly recruited from the upper levels of the class system, the same families contribute to the economic, military and political elites and the same individuals move easily and imperceptibly back and forth from one to other of these ‘elites” (Sweezy in Ibid p 410) Essentially, Mill’s own empirical research showed that the “institutionary trident” was controlled by the same social class. Furthermore, Mills failed to appreciate the emerging role of finance capital and financial groups as the emerging vanguard of the capitalist class, which has grown to unprecedented levels at the present. Gore Vidal (born into this class and thus in a good position to know) marks out this ‘capitalist class’ as the richest 1 percent of American society. He provides an interesting account of how this class rules in the US- “they do get together at Bohemian Grove and they do a lot of picking of Secretaries of State. But they don’t have to conspire. They all think alike…. You don’t have to give orders to the editor of the New York Times. He is in place because he will respond to a crisis the way you want him to, as will the President, as will the head of Chase Manhattan Bank” (Gore Vidal in Schweickart, 2002 p 106)
Admittedly, it is too simple to say that the ruling class rules by virtue of them ‘all thinking alike’. Another basic and crude mechanism in modern polyarchies for political control is the funding of political campaigns, but there is a variety of other ways in which economic power translates into political power. Schweickart notes that ruling class rule is of an implicit and tacit form, “for in capitalist polyarchy, where it is theoretically possible for a political party to challenge the basic institutions of the system, it is crucial that the interests of the capitalist class are well formulated and buttressed by argument and data that will make it appear that these interests coincide with the general interest” (Schweickart 2002, p 108) This is done through an array of private foundations and think tanks (in the USA varying from moderate conservative or “liberal” such as the Ford Foundation to right wing bastions such as the Cato and Hoover Institutes) which draw up legislation, research policy providing a steady supply of “experts” to testify before representatives and appear on the media.

However, the most formidable weapon to make government conform in the capitalist class’s arsenal is the “investment strike”. Should government seek to instigate policies which are unfriendly to “business interests” or the “free market”, contradicting the interests of Capital, this mechanism comes into play. Recession ensues and unemployment increases, especially in poorer nations where the “investment strike” of local capitalists is made worse by the backing of western capital. In polyarchy government leaders are held responsible for economic performance, so as long as production is directed by those who make no contribution to actual production (i.e. as long as investment remains in private hands) governments will automatically cater for the needs of the capitalist class in order to survive. A capitalist economy is structured in such a way that any alternative seems undesirable. As long as the basic institutions required by capitalism remain in place, prima facie it appears favourable to everyone to appease the needs of capital. Even if capitalism’s blatant deficiencies are crystal clear and a more rational and humane mode of production is possible, once in place, capitalism has an extraordinary ability to perpetuate itself. By limiting democracy to political process polyarchy enables ruling class domination of polyarchic systems, producing an outcome which would be defined by Aristotle as “oligarchy” or “plutocracy” with considerable accuracy.

This is the central notion behind Manley’s critique of revised pluralism. What he calls “pluralism II” still denies the importance of class, whilst
contending that “business interests” dominate polyarchy. Furthermore, it attempts to reconcile the need for major structural change through distribution of income and wealth, more social ownership of productive means whilst supporting incrementalism and the continued necessity of “social pluralism” for democracy (Manely 1893 p 369 - 373) The problem is that “Pluralism II” defends and attempts to justify the same system that bought about the need for revision in the first place. Pluralism II is still dominated by the perceived necessity and desirability of a capitalist mode of production, blinding it from the central cause of these inefficiencies within polyarchy, the capitalist economy. Conversely, class analysis “sees the maintenance of inequality under capitalism not as a failure of polyarchy - not as an incapacity or even a perversity - but as the whole point” (Ibid. p 372) Pluralism laments polyarchy’s failure to promote equality but, regardless, still views capitalist production as inherently linked to social pluralism and thus justifies its continued existence, even following reform. However, class analysis transcends this view seeing polyarchy’s shortcomings as part of the larger picture - the political economy of capitalism. Essentially, pluralism II fails to accept that economic transformation is the sine qua non of a radically democratized political system and this incapacitates it from proposing anything new.

Socialism and “TINA”

However, the “failure” of the “popular democratic” alternative in the twentieth century has served to justify such a limited definition of democracy. Karl Marx has long been criticised, with justification, for the failure of his predictions concerning the spread of Socialist revolutions. It is not surprising that his analysis of history is more respected than his ‘futurology’, this is especially so in the contemporary world were alternatives with the potential to mobilise the masses in opposition to the current market capitalist/liberal democratic order seem virtually non-existent (Fukuyama 1989 & 1992) The pervasiveness of the “There is no alternative” (TINA) ideology has even come to dominate discourse on the mainstream left in Western societies, where hopes for a more humane society are limited to ‘taming’ or ‘humanising’ capitalism rather than replacing it. Even the most fervent opposition in Western societies to the current globalised capitalist order, embodied by the anti-globalization movement, at most calls itself “anti-capitalist”, when alternatives are proposed (whether based on “old-left” or “autre-mondiste” thought) they are often convoluted and confused.
with fundamental areas of disagreement (Schweickart 2002) Here one can invoke another, somewhat ignored aspect to Marx's predictions, concerning the future of capitalism, which can serve to redeem him from the failure of so many Socialist revolutions - “The advance of capitalist production develops a working class which by education, tradition and habit looks upon the requirements of that mode as self evident natural laws. The organization of the capitalist process of production, once it is fully developed, breaks down all resistance” (Marx in Lebowitz 2006 p 29)

Considering Rosa Luxembourg’s stress that “the working class demands the right to make its own mistakes and learn in the dialectic of history” (Luxembourg 1904) whilst adding a Gramscian perspective concerning bourgeois “hegemony” and the creation of “false consciousness” (Gramsci 1971) complements Marx on this point and can liberate Marxist analysis from the crude economic determinism expressed in the quote above. However this essay shall not consider the views, though by no means are they discarded, that Socialism “failed” due to the mistakes of the proletariat and its leaders, or that TINA is a result, not of Liberalism’s “victory” but of the ideological hegemony of bourgeois values and the ensuing passivisation of the working class. For now I wish to bring attention to an aspect of the relationship between capitalism and democracy, which is somewhat ignored by Marxism and discourse in general.

Capitalism’s corrosive influence upon democracy is an area which has attracted much debate among and between Marxists, Pluralists, Liberals etc. Classic liberal philosophers at times of early capitalism were extremely concerned about the threat to property that an extension of political equality (suffrage) to the mass propertyless would entail. Thus at a time of such capitalist hegemony, where universal suffrage has been the norm in many Western societies for over a century, the dominant “common sense” view that capitalism is democracy’s natural concomitant poses a paradox. As well as explaining this in terms of “bourgeois ideological hegemony” Marxism should pay more attention to the influence “democracy” has had upon capitalism.

Far from being a tool to passivise the masses, as some forms of “vulgar” Marxism suggest, increases in political equality served to limit capitalism’s excesses, in some places more than others, preventing the system from implosion. The application of universal suffrage and the myriad of rights
gained through years of class struggle has served to curb capitalism’s tendencies for exploitation. When critiquing CW Mill’s exaggerated image of “the Power Elite’s” (Mill 1956) omnipotence Herbert Aptheker states this in different terms - “Between the will of that elite and its capabilities of implementing that will, stands public opinion… and this public opinion does affect what the elite tries to do and what it does and how it does what it does… in whole areas of life as in wages and working conditions, housing and education… the desires and power of the masses do exert a great influence…” (Aphtheke in Barrow 2007 p 415) Arguably it is polyarchic democracy’s ability to mediate, even if such mediation is not satisfactory or favours certain forces over others, between the conflict of interests outlined in the excerpt above that curbed or obstructed to some extent (in some places more than others) the dictatorship of property that unbridled capitalism would create. The vehement and justified opposition an unbridled dictatorship of property would entail is something which undoubtedly influenced Marx’s predictions. Clearly, the ruling class has consistently looked to curb and undermine the power of organized labour and has been granted a position of privilege and power in capitalist society to do so. Nevertheless, capitalism has survived, not just due to ‘bourgeois ideological hegemony’ and the failure of the twentieth century Socialist alternative, but also, in no small part due to ‘representative democracy’ or “polyarchy” itself. To an extent, this enabled the working class to imprint its class consciousness upon many Liberal societies, enabling them to adapt and incorporate ‘socialistic’ influences, whilst their “real socialist” counterparts became politically stagnant and almost monolithic.

Bill Warren argues this notion reflects an original aspect of Marxism which years of revision has obfuscated and confused, even forgotten. He laments the fact that the established socialist powers of the twentieth century and the organized working classes in Western societies came to support anti-colonial nationalism in the developing world following the Second World War. This resulted in “the domination of the (third world) working class movement by populist nationalism… reinforced by the petty-bourgeois ideology of ‘neo-colonialism’, which tends to divert and dampen internal class struggles by channelling mass discontent against external alleged enemies” (Warren 1980 xii) The theoretical fulcrum of this corruption of Marxism is the revised/ignored role capitalism has to play as a bridge to socialism. Specifically the capitalist transformation of traditional/feudal agriculture and the encouragement of substantial industrialization thus creating the industrial
working class and laying the groundwork for socialised production. The upshot of this “corrupted Marxism” is a crude and a-historical “anti-capitalist romanticism” which entails a premature dismissal of bourgeois/parliamentary democracy as the best political environment for the socialist movement. Following the Bolshevik revolution, Marxists of the Kautskian tradition became wrongly discredited. To Warren, the success of the Bolshevik revolution in a relatively backward country did not disprove the classical Marxist theory on the conditions for revolution, but damaged the socialist nature of the Russian State by having the it play the industrializing bourgeois role. Essentially, “the view that capitalism could be an instrument for social advance in pre-capitalist societies was erased from Marxism” (Warren 1980 p 8) in what led to a convoluted and mutated return to pre-Marxist Socialist utopianism.

Manley may be correct in his criticism of Dahl for subordinating class to “just another group” (Manely 1983) However, one should not underestimate the extent to which “the politics of autonomous groups” within representative democracy enabled organized labour to compete with other interests (even if business or ‘ruling class’ interests have dominated polyarchies overall) and enabled it to imprint its class consciousness upon society. In no small part, this is due to the Liberal preoccupation with how to secure freedom of criticism and action, choice and diversity and accountability in the face of political power, something Marxist theory has arguably underestimated. Even if the capitalist economic structure denies such freedoms to some and grants it to others. Conversely to the Liberal overemphasis upon the separation of the economic from the political sphere, Marxism’s tendency not to treat political activity sui generis (expanded upon in the next section) incapacitated “Real Socialism” from mediating political conflict adequately.

The “End of Politics”

Though the stress upon the concomitance between politics and economics is one of the most useful features of Marxism, especially when providing a critique of Liberal Democracy, the assumption following that thought that politics would “end” with a classless society was perhaps the most harmful aspect of twentieth century Marxism. In Marxist thought this was born out of the subjection of politics to economic structure, a rejection of politics as a
form of activity in its own right, leading to a lack of emphasis upon how politics is managed in a socialist society.

Alex Callinicos is correct in criticising the equation “Marxism = Leninism = Stalinism” (Callinicos in Held 1999 p 285) Indeed, he develops a criticism using classical Marxist theory influenced by Trotsky (1936) to explain the demise of Stalinism through the concept of “state capitalism” and the exploitative relations it created between the bureaucratic/political class and the working class. However his attack upon Stalinism as a complete violation of and departure from Marxist thought is a dangerous one. For, following Rosa Luxembourg, if the project of the working classes is to learn from “the mistakes made in the dialectic of history”, Marxism should incorporate the failure of Stalinism and adapt accordingly. Here, briefly, I wish to suggest how Marxism could begin to learn from this experience.

In order to do this, Stalinism cannot be understood as completely separate from Marxist theory but as one of the possible outcomes, amongst many, which came to dominate the application of Marxist thought to practical reality. By limiting politics to an outcome of the economic structure, Marx did not adequately address just how politics functions in a post-capitalist/socialist society. Indeed, this was in large part due to Marx’s aversion to “utopian blueprints” manifested in his polemic against Proudhon in his critique of “historical action [yielding] to personal inventive action, historically created conditions of emancipation to fantastic ones, and the gradual spontaneous class organizations of the proletariat to an organization of society specially contrived by these inventors” (Marx and Engels, 1986, 64) In this light Marx is a scholar of capitalism, it was not his place to tell future revolutionaries how to conduct their post capitalist economy.

Thus Marx limited himself to proclaiming “politics” to be replaced by an “association of free producers” where “the development of each is the development of all” (Marx & Engels 1848) admittedly, vague at best, but never intended to be more than that. It has been argued Marx’s theory doesn’t provide an adequate basis for the realisation of this ideal (Held 1999 p 288) The practical application of Marxist thought in the Soviet Union led to a lack of institutions which could manage differences of opinion, alternate political strategies and difference between social forces - notably the peasantry and the working class. Politics involves discussions and negotiations, thus, when politics did not “end” along with the establishment
of the “dictatorship of the proletariat”, Soviet style Marxism became somewhat wrong-footed, leading to some of the most extreme repressions of the twentieth century.

This is due to the Marxism’s underestimation of the Liberal preoccupation with the significance of freedom of criticism, action and the importance of accountability with checks upon political power (Held 1999) In this theoretical vacuum a kind of “faith” in the end of politics following the abolition of private property and the development from “socialism” to “communism” emerged. As experience shows, this vacuum could not be completely filled by the autonomous power of the “soviets” (workers councils) and led to the reification of an already centralised political authority which increasingly coordinated and controlled events (Trotsky 1936) Indeed, Lenin’s theory on the “revolutionary party” (Lenin 1917) was as an attempt to fill the empty space within Marxist theory, between the establishment of Socialism and the “withering away” of the state, with a centralised “political vanguard”. Length constraints prevent a discussion upon how much Stalinist practice followed Leninist theory. Nevertheless, suffice it to say, that for a renewed attempt at a “democratization of polyarchy”, Marxism should learn from the negative aspects of the Russian Revolution and adapt accordingly, perhaps the politics of autonomous groups could replace a “vanguard party” in this respect.

Despite the prophetic qualities that some of its advocates have granted it, Marxism is not perfect or monolithic, it must be open to change. In order to do this crude economic determinism must be left behind, everything does not root squarely into and is not perfectly explained by production alone. Indeed, from very early thinkers from the rich neo-Marxist tradition laboured to remove Marxism from its crude economic determinist implications (Gramsci 1971, Lukacs 1923 cpt 2) However, any proposition even slightly hinting at a Weberian separation of the economic and the political has become an anathema for Marxist intellectuals, attacked as if by reflex reaction as a “bourgeois myth” (Barrow 2007) In response, it could be suggested to “vulgar” Marxists that the expectation that politics would “end” along with a classless society is an ethereal notion, born out of a crude determinism which subjects the political sphere completely to the economic. It ignores the intricate web of relationships which form the political sphere, even if ultimately they are subject to economic structure. More analysis is required upon the relationship between economic structure
and political institutions in post-capitalism. Can it really be expected that politics will disappear completely in Marxist society?

The immediate "end of politics" is not something even Marx envisaged, he accepted the "bourgeois state" would survive into the beginnings of Socialist society, "Bourgeois law ... is inevitable in the first phase of the communist society, in that form in which it issues after long labour pains from capitalist society. Law can never be higher than the economic structure and the cultural development of society conditioned by that structure." (Marx in Trotsky 1936 cpt 3) To which Lenin adds "It follows that under Communism not only will bourgeois law survive for a certain time, but also even a bourgeois state without the bourgeoisie!" (Ibid) Even within Marx and Lenin’s account there is a “phase of development” where, under a communist economic structure the old “cultural laws” of the previous capitalist society along with a “bourgeois state” remain. This implies some form of separation between the economic and political spheres, even if this separation is limited to a delayed reaction by political structure to economic change. It would improve Marxism to accept that though the economic strongly impinges on and tends to determine the political, this is not necessarily automatically so, the relationship is more complex.

**Conclusion**

Pluralism and class analysis have always been viewed as diametrically opposed, competing theses. Nevertheless, Dahl and Lindblom attempted to reconcile their pluralism with “Marxist Humanism” in order to enable pluralism to tackle the exigencies of the American political economy’s poor performance. This is not possible if pluralism does not give a massively increased significance to class analysis (Manley 1983) and the role classes have in the politics of autonomous groups within capitalist society. However, conversely, a revolutionized society under which democratization of polyarchy is achieved through a reconnection of politics and economics, with ensuing substantial decreases in inequality, will repeat the experience of the twentieth century if it does not provide adequate institutions which can mediate political conflict and relies on centralized authority to do so. Dahl himself acknowledged that socialism and pluralism are not necessarily opposed; “if by definition socialism entails social ownership of economic enterprises...and unless by definition it must be centralized, then a socialist economy could be highly decentralized and organizationally
pluralistic” (Dahl in Manley 1983 p 371) Following his thought I propose that Marxism and class analysis should replace Pluralism to democratize polyarchy, whilst Marxism should incorporate “the politics of autonomous groups” to mediate adequately, once polyarchy has been democratized and politics fails to “end”.

This attempt to reconcile Marxism and Pluralism may be viewed with scepticism. It goes against a rich amount of literature placing these theories as diametrical opposites. Clearly, Marxists view Pluralists as apologists for the capitalist system. However this need not be the so. The case has been made for “Socialist Pluralism” before, such thought was a strong current amongst the Czech reformers of 1960’s (Barnard and Vernon 1977, Rustin 1895) The point is not to embrace Pluralism as valid model for democracy per se necessarily embedded within capitalist productive relations, but as a methodology to mediate political conflict, which could serve in post-capitalism. Indeed, C.W. Mill’s dismissal of the “harmony of interests” within pluralist theory as “a set of images out of a fairy tale” (Mills in Barrow 2007 p 407) is correct if accepted that real power lies in the “power elite” formed by a trident of separate political, economic and military institutions (Mills 1956) or in the exploitative power afforded to the ruling class across governing institutions in capitalist society, whether that be due to the nature of the relations between capitalist actors within the state (Milliband 1973) or the inherent nature of state structure (Poulantzas 1976) This influential debate is not entirely relevant to the essay. Suffice it to say that Dahl and Lindblom tacitly accepted the notion of a ruling group when they accepted that business groups are privileged in American “Democracy”. However, since it is unrealistic to expect politics to “end”, under different productive relations that do not create a “power elite” or a “ruling class” and thus do not render a genuine “harmony of interests” implausible, there is no good reason to believe that “the politics of autonomous groups” could not serve as an appropriate methodology to mediate political conflict. This would not necessarily lead to the “withering away of the state” but to its continuation as a space to contend political ends whilst free from economic privilege.

However, Marxism’s credibility as an alternative to the current global order is at a historical low. It is commonly underestimated even ignored in advanced Western societies, attacked as ‘outdated’ or even ‘useless’. Those who harbour such opinions manifest their own ignorance. Marxism maintains
many extremely useful features which could serve to democratize polyarchy, notably its analysis of capitalism and stress upon the relationship between the economic and the political. Dahl himself followed this logic when he suggested that capitalism cannot not allow a further democratization of polyarchy (Dahl 1996) It seems polyarchy cannot be democratized any further without a restructuring of the economic system it operates under. Following the argument expressed in the previous section, that democracy has undermined capitalism (even if capitalism has undermined democracy to a greater extent) in answer to Dahl’s question in the introduction, only in a substantial resolution of class conflict, achieved through the incorporation of democratic values into the economic sphere, lies a realistic prospect for a radically improved democracy than that permitted by Polyarchy. The politics of autonomous groups has a lot to contribute if the world’s next “October Revolution” is not to degenerate from this goal.

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