Building Resilience to Repression in Nonviolent Resistance Struggles

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Abstract

Nonviolent movements are more effective than violent ones and casualties will be fewer than if the resistance was waged through armed struggle. However, nonviolent movements are still not immune to repression. This article presents a new framework that orders theory and practice – how nonviolent resistance movements can effectively respond to repression by opponents – across five dimensions: strategy, tactics, organisational structure, individual activists and advance preparation and planning. The framework is applied to the situation in West Papua, arguably an exemplar of a 'worst case scenario' – an internationally isolated Indigenous population resisting an extremely ruthless opponent – and is supplemented with examples from other nonviolent resistance movements. A proactive and systematic response to repression by opponents makes it more likely that acts of violence against activists will function to strengthen the movement and weaken the opponent.

Introduction

All collective nonviolent action involves risk. When activists go outside conventional politics to nonviolently pursue political and social goals that are deeply opposed by powerful corporations and/or governments, the stage is inevitably set for some kind of confrontation. Indeed, that is a purpose of nonviolent action: to make latent injustice visible to a wider audience so that it can be acknowledged and resolved through nonviolent means (Curle 1971). That process generates conflict and, although nonviolent movements seek to transform that conflict without resort to violence, or the threat of violence, there is no guarantee the adversary will do the same. In fact, they rarely do. Indeed

repression is often an indicator the opponent is taking resistance seriously. When opponents do respond with violence, activists can face arrest, incarceration, torture, injury, seizure of money and assets, and even death. In some places an extremely ruthless opponent will target activists' family and friends.

In many struggles, disciplined nonviolent resistance in the face of violence from opponents has often been the trigger that has generated greater support for movement goals. Richard Gregg (1960) referred to this dynamic as moral jujitsu, named after a martial art that uses the energy and momentum of one's opponent to throw them off balance. Gene Sharp in his classic three part series 'The Politics of Nonviolent Action' (1973) renamed the dynamic, political jujitsu. Brian Martin (2007) picks up where Sharp left off. Through systematic, comparative, and grounded research he analyses how perpetrators use a variety of tactics to reduce outrage over their actions. By countering these tactics, activists can sometimes generate more attention on the original injustice and more support for movement goals than if the opponent had not used repressive tactics at all. Martin describes the dynamic as backfire.

What these scholar activists insist on then, is creative tension between repression, nonviolent discipline, persistence and movement success. Effective nonviolent action cannot be made so safe as to reduce all likelihood of risk. That is why training, preparation, planning and organisation are so vital. It is often only when activists persist in carrying out nonviolent action in the face of repression, raising the political and economic costs for the opponent and drawing more and more people into the resistance that the balance of power shifts in favour of the movement. Martin Luther King Jnr understood this dynamic so well that he, and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference he led, intentionally waged campaigns of nonviolent action in the places where their opponent was most likely to respond with hate and violence – Birmingham and Selma, for example (see Halberstam 1998). This poses a range of ethical and strategic dilemmas for practitioners of nonviolent resistance. It is not an invitation to recklessness.

Because nonviolent action requires risk and, often, intentionally placing people in harm's way, it raises the question: how might

nonviolent resistance be carried out in ways that minimise the negative cost of repression to individuals while maximising the effectiveness and potency of the nonviolent movement? This article seeks to explore just that. I scan the literature on nonviolent resistance and repression, organising it around a five-part framework that is practical, theoretically robust, and grounded in the historical experience of people working for social change. In doing so I look at one particular movement, the nonviolent struggle for self-determination in West Papua, and examine the ways Papuans are building – or could build further – resilience. I complement the framework with examples from other struggles.

The article begins by addressing some preliminary contextual problems and a few recurring assumptions about violence and the relationship between repression and mobilisation. Why is nonviolent action a wiser strategic choice when faced with a repressive – even an extremely ruthless – opponent? What is the political purpose of repression? How effective is repression; does repression lead to more or less mobilisation? I then proceed to outline a practice framework (Westoby and Ingamells 2011) which is organised around strategic, tactical, organisational and personal ways to build resilience to repression as well as the vital role of advance preparation and planning. This section, which comprises the bulk of the article, looks at how to reduce the likelihood and negative impact of repression. The intention here is to outline the framework and its component parts rather than exhaustively explore the history and theory behind each section and how it is applied.

Sceptics about nonviolent resistance often present worst case scenarios. Although the challenge of repression is an important strategic question for armed struggles as well, and that questions of effectiveness are rarely applied objectively and equally to both armed and unarmed resistance movements (see Chenoweth and Stephan 2011 for a refreshing exception to this), the challenge is an important one. It can be expressed as a question: how might a resisting population in an isolated area, far from local or international media and networks of support, who face an extremely ruthless opponent which views them as less than human, defend themselves against acts of state violence? This is an important question for me personally because I work as a reflective practitioner, accompanying nonviolent resistance in a place that easily fits the description of a worst case scenario: West Papua.

Although this article will focus more on building resilience to repression in nondemocratic contexts against a state opponent, the central insights will also be useful for activists residing in countries governed by parliamentary democracies but who face repressive policing and corporate and state harassment. Some of what is suggested will also be useful for resistance campaigns against extremist militants like ISIL (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant) and the Lord's Resistance Army in Uganda. However, responding to warlords and repressive non-state actors is really a separate topic and beyond the scope of this article.

Why is Nonviolent Action a Wiser Strategic Choice when Faced with a Repressive Opponent, Even an Extremely Ruthless One?

According to Wintrobe (1998, p. 34) repression can be defined as:

> restrictions on the rights of citizens to criticize the government, restrictions on the freedom of press, restrictions on the rights of opposition parties to campaign against the government, or, as is common in totalitarian dictatorship, the outright prohibition of groups, associations, or political parties opposed to the government.

If power-holders choose repression, three broad options are available to them. They can impose negative sanctions, use force, or wage war by proxy, either by overlooking vigilante activity or by actively encouraging and supporting it. According to Carlos Martín Beristain and Francesc Riera (1992), psychologists who researched repression and supported survivors of torture and trauma in El Salvador during the 1980s, repression has several purposes. Understanding these is a vital part of resistance. Beristain and Riera argue that repression is employed by authoritarian regimes to maintain control by limiting or eliminating dissent. Repression is employed to break the bonds of collectivism and solidarity by destroying cultural practices, social norms and kinship ties. It is used to control any form of opposition,

intimidate the population into submission, and establish impunity. In its most totalising form, write Beristain and Riera, it transforms entire populations into collaborators, willing to supply the regime with information and assistance against would be dissenters.

Faced with repression there are six ways activists can respond. They can stop their work temporarily or permanently. They can go into exile (although mass emigration has also been used as a nonviolent tactic including by West Papuans in 1984). They can work clandestinely. They can collaborate with the opponent. They can respond with violence. Or they can respond in ways that build movement strength.

For those with an appetite to fight injustice, the first reason why nonviolent resistance should be the weapon of choice is because nonviolent struggles against autocratic governments are more effective, particularly in anti-regime, pro-democracy struggles (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011). Examples of nonviolent resistance movements succeeding – at least in a limited sense – against ruthless opponents include movements in the Philippines (1986), Chile (1988), South Africa (1988), East Germany and a range of other authoritarian communist regimes (1989), Serbia (2000), Egypt (2011) and many others. Given the success rates of nonviolent movements are increasing and the success rates of armed struggles falling (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011), there is reason to believe that the above list, which is by no means exhaustive, will grow longer.

The second reason to use nonviolent resistance against an extremely ruthless opponent is that it is likely there will be fewer casualties. In a little known essay that deserves to be more widely read, Gene Keyes (1991) demonstrated that although nonviolent movements should certainly prepare for casualties, the number of deaths and injuries will almost certainly be far lower than if the struggle is waged through violent action. Keyes compared Gandhi's independence campaign with Mau Mau resistance in Kenya. Both movements were anti-colonial struggles against the British Empire. In Kenya the Mau Mau predominately waged a campaign of political violence while the Indian independence movement predominately used nonviolent action. During the Mau Mau uprising the British killed 11,503 Kenyans (out of a resistance movement that numbered little more than 100,000). In contrast, during the Indian Independence struggle – which lasted more

than 30 years – the total number of recorded deaths reached 8,000 of a total population of 350 million (Burrowes 1996, p. 239). Keyes' findings correlate with the empirical evidence comparing the relative costs of armed and unarmed movements (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011).

It is also important to note that in nonviolent movements where there has been a significant death toll from a single repressive event like a massacre (Francisco 2005) there were significant tactical, strategic and organisational deficiencies that in all likelihood increased the number of casualties (Burrowes 1996, p. 240). During the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre, for instance, 2,600 people were killed by the Chinese People's Republic Army. In this case the strategic goal of democracy was displaced by the tactical objective of holding the square, which was not necessary to usher in democracy. In addition to some other tactical and organisational mistakes, the Chinese pro-democracy activists had no contingency plan in place. As a result, when the army marched in to clear Tiananmen Square the movement was ill-prepared. There is good reason to believe that if these shortcomings were addressed earlier they would have greatly reduced the loss of life. Unlike military campaigns, nonviolent resistance movements are rarely concerned with holding onto 'turf'. In the long-term, winning over large numbers of uncommitted third parties, including the opponents' supporters is more important than maintaining control of territory.

As well as looking dispassionately at the risks from the movement's point of view it is also important to look at the costs of using extremely ruthless repression from the ruler's point of view. As previously stated, a worse-case-scenario is a ruthless ruler or military officer willing to kill large numbers of demonstrators. From a dictator's point of view will this strengthen or weaken their rule? Roland Francisco (2005), a social movement scholar, examined this exact question. Francisco found that massacres do not help dictators maintain control. Public killings of large numbers of demonstrators by the authorities nearly always increases mobilisation in the short-term. In the long-term – and it may be a long time, especially in the absence of a strategic nonviolent movement – massacres hurt dictatorships. Chenoweth and Stephan (2011, p. 202) made a similar observation. In their large N study of 323 violent and nonviolent struggles between 1900 and 2006 Chenoweth and Stephan found that overt repression of

nonviolent movements disadvantages power-holders. Repression appears to increase sympathy for the movement's goals from third parties and undermines support within the opponent's own ranks. Smithey and Kurtz (1999) call this the 'paradox of repression'.

From the point of view of the state, repression is deployed to stop challengers. What appears to be important in this regard, is whether repression is targeted or indiscriminate, and whether the repression is captured by a third party and made available to a sympathetic audience who mobilises large numbers of people in support of the target, or not. Targeted repression of activists is more effective at quelling dissent than indiscriminate repression. Mass killings of unarmed citizens by the regime are more likely to ignite the backfire dynamic (Martin 2007), pushing moderates towards the resistance. This is especially so if the resistance creates low cost ways for people to participate in the movement (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011) and if the repression is documented and widely disseminated to audiences who can mobilise on behalf of the oppressed (Martin 2007).

The problem for activists is that repressive regimes are also continually learning and adapt their strategies accordingly (Dobson 2013). Take Indonesia for example. The Indonesian government occupied East Timor from 1975 until 1999 and forcibly controlled Aceh from around the time of the Beureu'eh rebellion in 1953 until the signing of the Helsinki Peace Agreement in 2005. The Indonesian government has occupied West Papua since 1963. In each colony they used massacres, including mass killings of unarmed citizenry, to deal with dissent and maintain their rule. The Dili Massacre on 12 November 1991 – which was one of many mass killings in East Timor – certainly hastened the end of the Indonesian occupation in that colony (Martin 2007, pp. 23-33). Learning from their experience in East Timor, the Indonesian government has shifted their strategies of rule in West Papua. Prior to the Dili Massacre the Indonesian army had carried out mass killings in West Papua in places like the highlands in 1977 and in Biak on 6 July 1998. After 1999, when they had already lost East Timor, the occupying Indonesian military and police forces began to use terror as an instrument of governance (Hernawan 2013).

Terror, as it is employed by the state in West Papua, takes two particular nefarious forms: targeted individual killings of activists and

torture of ordinary citizens, carried out in public places. In recent years one organisation targeted by counter insurgency forces has been KNPB (the West Papua National Committee), a nonviolent group calling for a referendum on West Papua's political status. The United States and Australian-armed and trained state sanctioned death squad, Detachment 88, summarily executed 29 KNPB activists between 2012 and 2014 (Bachelard 17 December 2012; author's interviews with KNPB activists). As well as targeted killings, the Indonesian security forces use torture and random brutalisation of its citizens. Again it is nonviolent activists and, more often than not, ordinary citizens that are targeted, not members of the armed resistance. Of 431 cases documented by Budi Hernawan (2013) only two of the victims were involved in the armed struggle. Most of the victims did not even speak Indonesian. Given the fact that Indonesian soldiers – who are ethnically different from West Papuans – do not speak any of the Indigenous languages in West Papua, there is no way Indonesian soldiers would have been able to question their captives in order to pursue their stated goal of eradicating the armed resistance, which is used as a public rationale for military operations in West Papua.

Unlike the use of torture practiced against Arab militants by the United States in Abu Ghraib, for instance, where the (alleged) purpose was to extract strategically useful information in a war against violent extremism by those the United States and its allies opposes, the purpose of torture practised by occupying Indonesian forces in West Papua is to intimidate. Police, intelligence and security personnel assume this enables them to govern with less interference from dissenting citizens.

According to Hernawan (2009, pp. 3-4) the Indonesian state's use of torture 'does not aim at extracting real information [about] the OPM [Free Papua Movement]':

> Instead, torture represents larger machinery that aims to control the whole community by conjuring and maintaining the spectre of terror. The survivors of torture remain living in their own families and communities and thus share their stories with them. By telling their stories, the survivors inadvertently transfer and reproduce the mark of terror into the community

and thus reinforce its impact on their lives. The authorities might assume that such practice will deter the whole community from joining the resistance movements and eventually eradicate the OPM itself.

In order to perpetuate a strategy of rule based on torture the Indonesian government depends on two things. First, the Indonesian state needs to keep West Papua isolated internationally. Restricting foreign media access through its repressive *Surat Jalan* (Letter of Police Permission) system is essential to the Indonesian government's desire to control the narratives coming out of West Papua. Social media and rapid uptake of mobile internet communication technologies in West Papua, however, is making it harder for the state to control the flow of information. However, keeping journalists out is still effective precisely because Papuans have limited international networks, internet speed makes it difficult to send out photos and videos in a timely fashion, and because many activists do not speak English. The second thing the state depends on is lack of sympathy for Papuan grievances from the rest of Indonesia. The Indonesian government partly retains control of West Papua through an elaborate system of structural racism that, amongst other things perpetuates a culture of otherness and impunity, ensuring that brown Indonesian soldiers are rarely punished for crimes against black Papuan activists. Therefore, from a narrow realist perspective, the Indonesian government's shift from installing fear through mass killings to governing the body politic through individualised executions, torture and keeping reporters out is smart. Torture and extra-judicial killings are less likely to ignite moral outrage when they take place far from the gaze of the international media.

The problem for the state is that repressive Indonesian rule in West Papua is unstable and unsustainable. It relies on continuing violence. Repression, even covert repression, fuels dissent. At the same time internet communication technologies make state control of the media impossible. The more the Indonesian government tightens its iron fist, the less Papuans support and identify with it. Repression undermines trust and cooperation which is a basis for a ruler's legitimacy (Sharp 1973). In a 'worst case scenario' like West Papua nonviolent activists need to first ensure that their movement becomes much more visible and much more connected, both domestically –

within Indonesia – and internationally. That will necessitate, in part, getting rid of the *Surat Jalan* system and opening up West Papua to the international press. This requires local and transnational campaigns of nonviolent resistance backed up by detailed research and reportage.

In summary, two things are clear. First, nonviolent resistance movements are more effective than armed struggles, even against extremely repressive opponents. Second, nonviolent resistance movements result in fewer casualties than political violence such as guerrilla war or terrorism. Burrowes (1996, p. 239) concludes that while nonviolent resistance movements operating in repressive contexts *should* prepare for high casualties, they are *not likely*. What is needed are more detailed examinations of how movements might reduce the risk of heavy casualties while at the same time not abandoning and even seeking to increase, their effectiveness.

How Effective is Repression? Does Repression Lead to More or Less Mobilisation?

As Figure 1 illustrates, the relationship between repression and dissent is remarkably inconclusive. For every study illustrating that repression leads to mobilisation you can find another demonstrating that the effect of repression leads to demobilisation. Other studies suggest certain thresholds of repression trigger different movement reactions. Some researchers, notably Tilly (2005), Barkan (1980) and Gurr (1969), even contradict themselves, finding evidence that repression, and different levels of repression, can amplify or dampen mobilisation, depending on the context. Tilly concludes (2005, p. 218) that 'repression and mobilisation regularly interact' … but 'those interactions do not conform to covering laws; at the most general level, for example, repression sometimes flattens resistance, but sometimes magnifies it.' This variance is also reflected in the choice of how populations resist. For every instance where an insurgency has taken up arms because they argue that there is no way their opponent can be defeated through unarmed resistance, you will find a movement that resorts to nonviolent resistance precisely because they claim they can never defeat their adversary through an armed insurrection, particularly where the state has a monopoly on the use of force.

Figure 1: Studies examining the links between political repression and social movement mobilisation

There may not be general covering laws at the level of episodes and classes of episodes, however, when one's gaze moves away from examining bounded sequences of political contention and focuses on the level of processes and mechanisms, at least four distinct causal pathways emerge (Tilly 2005, p. 224):

1. Repression decreases mobilisation ('dissidents rationally reduce their efforts when authorities raise their costs,

authorities rationally beat down opposition that will impede their programs').

2. Repression increases mobilisation (repression of dissidents threatens their survival and causes recoil amongst the opponent's elite ranks which 'spurs dissident mobilisation').

3. Mobilisation decreases repression (dissidents mobilise, reaching out to, recruiting and/or neutralising/pacifying elite segments, 'thereby facilitating alliances between 'ins' and 'outs,' and thus [promoting the protection] of dissidents').

4. Mobilisation increases repression ('dissidents rationally reduce their efforts when authorities raise their costs, authorities rationally beat down opposition that will impede their programs').

If therefore, repression can lead to either mobilisation or demobilisation the question becomes: how to maximise the former while inoculating against the latter?

A Framework for Building Resilience in Civil Resistance Struggles Operating in Repressive Contexts

The social sciences have borrowed the term 'resilience' from the natural sciences. The concept is now part of a growing field of research in disaster management, international relations, peacebuilding, development, security studies, education, social work, planning, psychology, gender and queer studies and elsewhere. There also exists a discussion on the links between resistance and resilience with some arguing that the concepts do not sit well together. This is a vast research field. For more see, for instance, Rogers (2015), Chandler (2014), Juntunen and Hyvönen (2014), the United Kingdom's Department for International Development (2011) and Weinstein (2007). For the purpose of this article it is enough to say that I am using the term

resilience to refer to the capability of nonviolent resistance movements to persist in pursuing their social and political change goals, to re-organise, and to learn and adapt to changing circumstances, in response to repression from authoritarian opponents.

It should be clear from the previous discussion that a commitment to nonviolent resistance may limit bloodshed, but it is not a guarantee against repression from the state. In any struggle of people against power there is no guarantee that 'the people' will not sustain casualties, or that they will win. But movements can minimise the likelihood of repression and its negative impacts on demobilisation while at the same time maximising the power of nonviolent resistance. One framework for building movement resilience to repression that has emerged in the course of my practice and research is based on strengthening strategic, tactical, organisational, personal responses to repression and on thorough advance preparation and planning. That framework is depicted visually in Figure 2. Each one of the components is mutually reinforcing of the others.


Figure 2: A framework for building resilience of nonviolent resistance movements to repression from an authoritarian opponent

Strategic Responses to Building Resilience to Repression

Strategy, I maintain, is the single most important determinant in developing movement resilience to repression. If movements do not undermine passive and active support for the opponent's violence then tactical responses will be misguided and ineffective. Tactical objectives need to be subordinated to the movement's overarching strategic goal. For each tactic, movement strategists need to be clear who they are influencing and what they want them to do (Burrowes 1996, pp. 6-7).

Creating a strategy involves careful analysis of the opponent's sources of power (Sharp 1973) in particular the direct and indirect dependency relationships between the ruler and ruled (Summy 1994), why people obey (Sharp 1973) and the ways in which their power is expressed through the pillars of support (Sharp 1973; Helvey 2004, pp. 9-18). The literature suggests two particular kinds of inter-related and mutually reinforcing strategies. At the level of the strategic counter-offensive (Burrowes 1996) activists will need to design interventions that promote division amongst the opponent (see for instance Schock 2005; Tilly 2005; Chenoweth and Stephan 2011; and Nepstad 2011). When it comes to strengthening the nonviolent defence, strategists will need to draw in new allies particularly those from the opponent's own rank, class, religion and ethnicity, as well as others who can influence the opponent's policy and behaviour (see for instance Galtung 1989; Burrowes 1996; and Thurber 2015). Generating division amongst the opponent and encouraging defection helps create inside-outside alliances that will, the above authors argue, increase mobilisation. Simultaneously this increases the likelihood that activists will enjoy greater protection.

In some circumstances undermining support from within the opponent's own ranks might mean generating tactics that expose, even precipitate, extreme violence by the opponent in order to trigger the backfire dynamic. This is an extremely risky strategy. Activists will want to keep the focus on the opponent's norm-violating behaviour and the nonviolent discipline and reasonableness of the movement. Movement leaders will also need to avoid or re-frame charges that they intentionally provoked violence. Most importantly they will need to make sure the opponent's violence (and the movement's nonviolent

discipline) is communicated to audiences who will mobilise on behalf of the oppressed. That includes makings sure tactics are filmed and photographed and there are plans for circulating these images widely, accompanied by clear and powerful interpretations that amplify support for the movement and decrease and divide support amongst the opposition.

Anti-occupation and secessionist struggles are more complex (Burrowes 1996, pp. 85-91). They require challengers to develop strategies of resistance not just inside the occupied territory but also in the territory of the occupier and in the societies of the occupier's international allies (Stephan and Mundy 2006; MacLeod 2012; and MacLeod *in press*). For Palestinians, for example, that means organising inside Palestine and the occupied territories, inside Israel and inside the societies of the Israeli government's key allies, principally the United States. For West Papuans it means organising inside Indonesia, in the societies of Indonesia's elite allies and sphere of influence, as well as inside West Papua. Movements need plans for altering the opponent's *will* to conduct aggression and undermining their *power* to do so in each of the three domains of struggle – the occupied territory, the territory of the occupier and in the societies of the occupier's international elite allies (Burrowes 1996; Macleod 2012; MacLeod *in press*). For ethnically or socially homogenous movements fighting against an opponent of a different race or class, critical thought needs to go into how to diversify the social base of the resistance so that people from the opponent's own rank and class are brought into to support the movement (Galtung 1989; Thurber 2015).

By being clear about the dynamic and multi-focal nature of power, challengers have a better chance of designing effective and innovative strategies and tactics that also minimise risks. In the event of a repressive incident – which all movements should prepare elaborate contingency plans for – Brian Martin (2007) has developed an empirically sound and practically useful model he terms 'backfire'. It is to that model we turn next using the case of West Papua to illustrate how the model might be used in practice.

Using the Backfire Model to Ignite Outrage

One reason massacres are ineffective is that they generate backfire. A massacre is worse for the regime than if they had done

nothing. But even the mistreatment of a single person by the regime can, under the right conditions, be perceived as unacceptable injustice and generate massive public backlash. Martin (2007. p. 2) uses the word 'backfire' to describe this dynamic. He defines backfire as 'an action that recoils against its originators. In backfire the outcome is not just worse than anticipated – it is negative, namely, worse than having done nothing.'

All sorts of situations can backfire. The Indonesian government's occupation of West Papua involves cases that most Papuans widely consider to be an injustice, where one side – the Indonesian government, the security forces, and foreign corporations such as the Freeport mine – has all the power and the other side, the Papuans, is unarmed. Martin demonstrates that in order for injustice – including ruthless repression – to backfire two conditions must be met. Firstly, the behaviour of the power-holders must be widely perceived to be unjust and disproportionate. Secondly, significant audiences need to be aware of this injustice and take action on behalf of the oppressed.

It is useful to look at what the Indonesian government does to try and inhibit outrage. Understanding what the power-holders do will help Papuans design strategies and tactics that are more likely to make repression backfire.

What the Indonesian Government does to Inhibit Outrage

The Indonesian government's strategy to control and quell resistance in West Papua has five mutually reinforcing elements: cover-up; devaluation and stigmatisation of Papuan identity and culture; re-interpretation of reality; the use of policy and procedures to give the appearance of justice; and intimidation.

First, the Indonesian government effectively restricts international media and independent scrutiny of what is happening in its restive Pacific periphery. The banning or tight control of foreign media and Red Cross visits to political prisoners in West Papua is just one tactic used by the Indonesian government in a long sequence of silencing and marginalising critical voices. By controlling what foreign media, diplomats and others see and who they talk to, the Indonesian government can deny that there is a problem.

Second, the Indonesian government stigmatises Papuan dissent and devalues Papuan identities. This is systematic racism on the part of the occupier. Oswald Iten, a Swiss journalist who was jailed in West Papua in 2000 after recording a nonviolent demonstration, witnessed this dynamic while in prison. Indonesian police taunted scores of Papuan students and political prisoners who had been wrongly imprisoned for attacking a police post. They taunted, tortured, and even killed activists who had been arrested. Iten witnessed the police telling those detained: 'You eat pig meat which is why you look like pigs'. (Pigs which are highly valued by Melanesian Papuans are considered unclean by the mostly Muslim Indonesians.) Papuans know only too well the ways they are devalued by migrants and a racist system that keeps them in less powerful positions.

Third, the Indonesian government reinterprets and criminalises Papuans' legitimate grievances with words like 'separatism' and 'rebellion'. The state lies about what happens. For example, in Paniai on 8 December 2014 when Indonesian police shot dead four unarmed young people, the police falsely claimed that they were being fired upon by Papuan guerrillas hiding in the hills, which is why they opened fire. The government also justifies its actions claiming it is defending the integrity of the state or it minimises the effects of its actions claiming that few people have been hurt or killed. At times when perpetrators are charged the government will either claim that they are heroes – as the former General and current Indonesian Defence Minister Ryamizard Ryacudu said of those soldiers accused of murdering independence leader Theys Eluay in 2001 – or they will claim troops disobeyed orders. The Indonesian government expresses more concern about those who raise the Morning Star flag and engage in other forms of nonviolent protest than the violent repression – including murder – carried out by the state security forces.

Fourth, formal procedures are used to give a veneer of legitimacy to what Papuans privately say amounts to an occupation. The Special Autonomy Law of 2001, designed to address many of the root causes of West Papua's problems, has been ineffective because the regulations that enable the law to be implemented have never been passed. This allows the Indonesian government to give the appearance of responding to Papuan concerns and satisfying the international community it is responding to Papuan grievances, while not genuinely

addressing the root political causes of Papuan grievances. In cases where perpetrators from the police and military have been accused or even found guilty of carrying out acts of violence against unarmed demonstrators, individual perpetrators have been given light sentences (or none at all).

Finally, the Indonesian government will use threats and intimidation to silence dissent. This is certainly what happens to Papuan political leaders and their families. While Papuans like Filep Karma receive a 15-year jail sentence for organising a nonviolent flag-raising and Papuans present at the Third Papuan Congress are shot dead and leaders sentenced to years in jail, few Indonesian police and soldiers are brought to justice for human rights violations. Some perpetrators have even been promoted.

So, How Might Papuans Ignite Outrage?

If the action is perceived to be unjust, and significant audiences are aware of this, there are a number of things activists can do to ignite justice. They can expose cover-ups, value those who are targeted, reframe what the power-holders have done as an injustice, use campaigns rather than get drawn into official procedures, and finally, resist injustice. Papuan activists are doing many of these things.

First, Papuan activists can expose the repression to the national and international community. Papuans will need to document and publicise violence and oppression and the nonviolent ways they are working to change this and make this evidence available to sympathetic audiences. Documenting repression and nonviolent resistance by taking photos, videos and recording accurate details about who did what to whom, when, where, how and why, is vital.

Second, Papuans can validate those targeted by the repression and reframe the actions of those targeted in ways that appeal to allied third parties. One important technique is to show Papuan targets of state violence as real human beings (rather than abstract ciphers or stigmatised enemies), with faces, families and histories, in ways that resonate with large sectors of the population, particularly in Java and amongst mainstream Muslim Indonesians. The nonviolent resistance by Papuans as well as the violence and repression of the Indonesian military also needs to be made visible to the international community and solidarity networks that can mobilise action on behalf of Papuans.

Third, the activists can tell a different story from what is being told by those responsible for or supporting repression, one that emphasises the difference between the activists and those who are carrying out repression (see for instance Reinsborough and Canning 2010). Movements for freedom are a kind of drama and the difference between the 'goodies' and the 'baddies' needs to be made crystal clear to the audience. This drama needs to make the nonviolent action of Papuans explicit, in contrast to the violence of the security forces, promote Papuan demands, and undermine Indonesian government legitimacy. Most importantly it needs to value and promote the dignity, courage, and intelligence of Papuans who put their lives on the line for freedom. This is why maintaining nonviolent discipline is so important.

There is a clear example of using ridicule to tell a different story that comes from a scene in the film 'Bringing Down a Dictator' (York and Zimmerman 2001) which is about activists from *Otpor!*, the Serbian resistance movement who nonviolently overthrew Milosevic in 2000. This was at a time when *Otpor!* was being accused of being a terrorist organisation and individual activists within it were being accused of being terrorists, fascists, criminals, drug addicts and other derogatory labels. With the press gathered to watch, the focaliser of the action invites an *Otpor!* activist onto the back of a truck. The activist is young, perhaps only a teenager. The focaliser – who is also wearing an *Otpor!* t-shirt along with the majority of the audience, all who are unarmed, addresses the crowd and press. He says,

> We are here reporting from in front of the Nis police
> station and here is an example of a terrorist on the
> border between Serbia and Montenegro. The terrorist is
> about six feet tall, and he is wearing a t-shirt of the
> terrorist organisation *Otpor*. [Points to the t-shirt with a
> pointer.] He is wearing eye glasses which mean he reads a
> lot. It is dangerous to read a lot in this country, so
> beware. [People laugh and clap.]

Fourth, Papuans can mobilse nationally and internationally. By putting less energy into formal procedures imposed by the regime, or diplomatic and legal channels that favour the powerful, Papuans can instead put more energy into using non-institutional actions that

challenge state power. By using nonviolent action and maintaining the initiative, activists will make it harder for the regime to use tactics designed to dilute and dissipate popular outrage at the repressive acts of the Indonesian security forces and government.

Finally, Papuans will need to resist and expose any attempts by those in power to bribe or intimidate activists into giving up.

Tactical Responses to Building Resilience to Repression

In addition to having a well-developed strategy informed by a detailed analyses of the opponent's and movement's power, and constantly reviewing strategy in light of changing threats and opportunities, there are a number of ways movements can design tactics that blunt the force of repression.

One way movements respond to repression is to phase campaigns so people can build up their experience and courage. In the first few years of the *Otpor* movement, for example, activists avoided organising large demonstrations in the capital city. They felt that this would only result in a violent and premature confrontation with Milosevic. Instead they recruited, trained and organised activists to build the movement, working in the smaller cities and towns to give ordinary Serbs low-cost ways to participate in the struggle.

In Uruguay, in Latin America, violence by the military was so severe and so extensive that leaders decided it would be too risky to engage in demonstrations. Instead some of the leaders, including a popular priest, undertook a public fast. At the end of the fast they called for everybody all over the country to turn off the lights. The leadership did not know if people would have the courage to do this but on the appointed time virtually the entire country went dark. Energised by this collective display of disobedience, people poured out into the streets banging pots and pans, creating a deafening noise. The junta knew its time was up.

Burrowes (1996, pp. 241-245; 2014), lists other things, at the level of tactics, that a movement can consider:

- Using protective accompaniment and national and international networks to protect nonviolent activists

facing threats from the regime. Examples include Peace Brigades International, Nonviolent Peaceforce and Christian and Muslim Peacemaker Teams.

- Designing tactics that emphasise dispersed action (such as a go-slow day, stay at home strike, or fasting). In places like Belarus activists have used 'lightning protests' where small groups will assembly simultaneously in different parts of the city and carry out a protest that lasts for only a few minutes before dispersing into the crowd.

- Designing tactics that concentrate people in one place by investing traditional practices with new meaning (such as using a religious, national or cultural festival or a funeral). In this way activists find subtle and creative ways of demonstrating. The anti-apartheid movement in South Africa, for example, used funerals as opportunities for people to gather and protest. Buddhist activists in Burma and Tibet have also used gatherings for religious ceremonies as opportunities to protest.

- Building personal relationships with the security forces. These relationships humanise the movement to the opponent and can make it harder for security forces to carry out dehumanising and brutal actions. Establishing advance relations with security forces also helps maximise the likelihood of divisions and defections within the police and/or military's ranks, which are often a major contributor to movement success, particularly in pro-democracy struggles (Nepstad 2011).

- Using music, song, dance, costumes and banners to boost morale.

- Having contingency plans in place when organising demonstrations. People who participate need to know what to do if something goes wrong. There needs to be clear systems for making decisions and communicating those decisions to activists in the field.

When planning nonviolent tactics in repressive contexts it is also important to consider methods that increase participation while reducing risk. Successful movements need to maximise the ability of ordinary people to participate in political action. That means designing tactics that are low-risk but enable lots of people to participate in. Examples of low-risk/high-participation nonviolent actions include wearing the same symbol or clothes (for example, black), walking or driving slowly, stay at home strikes and turning lights off at night at appointed time. Movements can also use 'tester actions' to help gauge how the regime will respond and at the same time increase people's courage. An example of a highly effective 'tester action' was Gandhi's salt march.

Organisational Responses to Building Resilience to Repression

Schock (2005, pp. 143-145) has argued persuasively that in repressive and nondemocratic contexts at least, decentralised network structures like coalitions, federations, alliances and umbrella organisations are more resilient than hierarchical social movement organisations. Schock outlines five factors that help explain why coordinated networks of decentralised organisations in repressive contexts are more effective than hierarchical and bureaucratic organisations. First, a decentralised movement structure is more likely to withstand state repression because one organisation or leader cannot be targeted. This was a major weakness of the *Presidium Dewan Papua's* (Papuan Presidium Council or PDP, a West Papuan pro-independence organisation) hierarchical structure. When the Indonesian military assassinated the leader of the PDP in 2001 the organisation collapsed. Second, devolution of leadership means that the movement can continue to function when movement leaders are imprisoned or murdered by the state or state-backed militia groups. Failure to develop a decentralised (but coordinated) leadership structure was a factor in the failure of the 1989 Chinese pro-democracy movement and the first (unarmed) Palestinian Intifada. Third, decentralised movements are likely to be more democratic, which increases the commitment of the activists involved, makes the leadership more accountable, decreases the likelihood of co-option, and lays the foundations for a new democratic society. Fourth, decentralised network structures are more likely to help

develop an oppositional consciousness which enhances the ability of diverse groups to work together toward a common goal despite a lack of ideological consensus (see also Reed and Foran 2002; Chabot and Vinthagen 2007). Finally, because of their flexibility and capacity to distribute information horizontally, decentralised movements are likely to be more creative and better at developing innovative tactics than more hierarchical and rigid organisational forms.

Broad based coalitions were a central feature in the success and resilience of people power movements in the Philippines, East Timor (the CNRT), Serbia, Poland (Solidarity), India (The Indian National Congress) and elsewhere. In South Africa, the United Democratic Front (UDF) brought together hundreds of people's organisations under one umbrella to resist apartheid. Also in South Africa the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) formed a federation to unite labour organisations. Both UDF and COSATU coordinated action to undermine the power of the state and resist repression.

There are many different ways decentralised network structures can be conceptualised. Figure 3 illustrates one way.

Figure 3:
A decentralised
network structure

This structure addresses the problem of resilience. It is harder to destroy because leadership is dispersed throughout the 'nodes' in the network. The decentralised nature of the structure also supports participation and tactical innovation, particularly on the edges of the network. But in structures like the one above, additional resilience and increased opportunities for participation and creativity come at the expense of enhanced coordination and communication, which is the strength of hierarchical organisations. The question then is how to get the best of both worlds: more participation, more innovation and more resilience combined with better communication and coordination? Figure 4 depicts an example of a movement structure that provides one answer to that question.


Stronger relationships develop between groups

National leaders or a leadership council that supports strategic leadership teams

A strategic leadership team that supports local leaders

A local leader who supports members of a local group

Figure 4: An example of a decentralised network structure that enables coordination

The 'snowflake' structure depicted in Figure 4 is more resilient to repression than a traditional hierarchy. It also gets around the problems of lack of communication and coordination that can sometimes exist in decentralised networks. It includes the important addition of strategic leadership teams (Ganz 2010). Members of strategic leadership teams recruit local leaders and then work with them to form groups who analyse problems and take collective nonviolent action. This is essentially what Nelson Mandela, Mohandas Gandhi, Martin Luther King Jnr and many other leaders of liberation movements did; they encouraged local leadership. During the anti-apartheid struggle in South Africa, for example, each town had hundreds of civics (small local citizen-based groups) responsible for some aspect of the struggle. People in Port Elizabeth, for example, organised civic groups under the United Democratic Front.

Strategic leadership teams help build strategic capacity of the local groups and provide a mechanism for coordination and communication between the national leadership and the local level. Over time the creation of numerous small groups who form relationships with one another and forge broad alliances strengthens the number and quality of activists involved in the movement.

It is important to emphasise that while the above models of organisational structures may be decentralised they still facilitate unity. However, it is unity around purpose (vision, goals and objectives), planning (strategy and tactics) and people (Merriman 2010), rather than a single hierarchical organisational form. This is what Benny Wenda, a West Papuan leader, talks about when he says: 'let's not try and have a single organisation, let's have a shared agenda' (MacLeod, *in press*).

This kind of work, building broad-based participation in social and political struggle, has been recognised as central to nonviolent resistance struggles. However, the ways in which this actually happens and is sustained over time has received insufficient attention from scholars of civil resistance who are more interested in the dynamics and trajectories of struggle once a mass movement has formed and become active. Those examining community organising have put more attention on how mass movements develop but their gaze has been more focused on democratic contexts, not repressive societies. Understanding the skills and knowledge required to build and sustain mass-based

organisations and mobilise large numbers of people to participate in nonviolent resistance movements in repressive contexts is one area that requires further research.

In West Papua, the recently formed United Liberation Movement for West Papua (ULMWP) has a five person representative leadership council (secretariat) based outside the country who work closely with the leadership inside the country. The secretariat represents the three largest coalitions of resistance groups plus a number of other groups not affiliated with one of the three coalitions. Wisely, leaders based inside the country rejected a proposal for a central coordinator in favour of collective decision-making. This complex insider-outsider arrangement is designed to protect leaders inside the country. Solidarity groups, members of the West Papua Diaspora, and representatives from the Pacific Conference of Churches, a regional body with 7.5 million members, were also invited to witness the process of formation of the ULMWP and to provide ongoing support. This is significant. It is useful to find a role and place in the decentralised network structure for members of the Diaspora and solidarity groups in other countries in order to keep the struggle in the 'international public eye'. When in-country leaders suffer extraordinary repression solidarity groups and members of the Diaspora can then activate their transnational contacts to mobilise a response.

Individual Responses to Building Resilience to Repression

Steve Biko once said that 'the most powerful tool in the hand of the oppressor is the mind of the oppressed'. Biko was the founder of the Black Consciousness movement in South Africa which strengthened the anti-apartheid struggle in South Africa. Biko knew that unless the oppressed truly believe they have what it takes to win their freedom, they will never be free. So the first step in the struggle for freedom is what Doug McAdam (1982) called 'cognitive liberation'. One must throw off the shackles of the mind. Freeing the mind requires self-respect, self-belief and self-confidence. Casting off fear – or rather getting to a point where action is possible in spite of the fear one feels – is essential because repression can only work if it instils fear and fear is transmuted into blind obedience (Sharp 1973; de La Boétie 1576).

Social movement researchers Jeff Godwin and Steven Pfaff (2001) agree that casting off fear is necessary to resist in repressive contexts. These two academics looked at how activists dealt with fear in East Germany, under Communist rule, where one in ten people was working for the secret police and in the south of the United States during the Civil Rights struggle, where activists were killed and disappeared for organising for equal rights.

In East Germany the overwhelming power of the Communist Party apparatus was based on social exclusion. Intimidation, isolation and moral discrediting all served to create the conditions under which broad sections of the society conformed their behaviour so they acted in concert to the desires and demands of the state. This left many dissidents insecure and feeling threatened. As a result, civil courage had to be achieved through lengthy experience and required social support that could be gained through solidary relationships in the church or through membership in opposition groups.

In both East Germany and the southern US the following things all helped people cast off fear and take action:

- intimate social networks (small groups of trusted friends);

- mass meetings and other communal gatherings of movement participants;

- strong identification of activists with the movements, grounded in a belief of both their righteousness and the inevitability of victory;

- shaming activists into taking action (many took risky action because they did not want to be seen as cowards);

- formal training in the techniques of nonviolent resistance; and

- mass media coverage of movement activities and protest events.

Even though facing fear can only really be achieved at the level of the individual, in many of the examples above you can see that working through fear involves collective processes. It is rarely something one does in isolation from other people or the social context. Goodwin and Pfaff also found that some activists felt as if

they lived under divine protection. The knowledge of that feeling was more powerful than all the brutality of the state.

Beristain and Riera (1992, p. 13) also emphasise the importance of maintaining social solidarity:

> Whenever people organize themselves in order to satisfy their necessities as persons or as communities (to reclaim a plot of land and build on it, to defend human rights, to secure a source of water for the neighbourhood, to demand respect for the rights of ethnic minorities, etc.), the fabric of social unity is woven.

The kinds of collective action mentioned by Beristain and Riera and Godwin and Pfaff, directly challenge repression because repression is often designed to sever the bonds of solidarity between people. Dictators and other kinds of authoritarian rulers do not want the oppressed to understand the purpose of repression. They want to spread confusion and self-doubt; to make people feel like they are going crazy because of everything they have experienced. Because when you do not understand why you are being attacked it is much harder to defend yourself and your community against the repression. That is why Beristain and Riera and others urge activists to remember that there is always a purpose to the brutality of the state. Activists need to understand why the government uses violence against them in order to make sense of what is happening and to devise some tactics of their own with which to confront it.

Too often, however, the view that overcoming fear belongs only to the innately courageous, dominates narratives of resistance. Thalhammer et al. (2007) disagrees. She and her colleagues argue that courageous resisters are made, not born. A hero acts once or twice. A courageous resister takes nonviolent action for peace and justice repeatedly and often at great risk to themselves. Becoming a courageous resister, however, is a long process. There are six major crossroads that people face on the journey to become a courageous resister. At each crossroad decisions need to be made. First, a person has to become aware of the issue. The second crossroad is that the issue has to be interpreted as an injustice. The third crossroad is that the person needs to accept personal responsibility and then identify

possible choices for action (the fourth crossroad). The fifth crossroad is taking action and the sixth crossroad is sustaining action over time. Working together in small groups and encouraging one another to keep taking nonviolent action for justice (regardless how small or seemingly insignificant such action feels) will make each decision at each crossroad easier to face than working for change alone. This journey and the pathways to becoming a perpetrator or bystander are illustrated in Figure 5. The choices people make are critical. For better or worse, they transform the individual, the networks they are a part of, and the political context.


Figure 5: Thalhammer et al. The journey to becoming a courageous resister

Not for a moment do I want to suggest that any of this is easy. Committing to take nonviolent action for justice and peace is difficult … and risky. But not taking action for justice and peace is also costly. A

few years prior to East Timor achieving independence I had a conversation with Rev Vasconcelos from the Evangelical Church of Indonesia in East Timor. Rev Vasconcelos became an outspoken leader of the nonviolent movement during the Indonesian government's occupation of East Timor. At the height of Indonesian military violence in 1999 he had to fake his own death in order to protect himself from militia groups searching for him. At the start of the conflict he supported integration with Indonesia because he thought that the Indonesian government would develop East Timor. When he saw that this did not happen he became 'neutral'. He did not become involved in the struggle for *merdeka* (freedom) because he thought it would be too risky, but then he realised that there is no path in life that does not involve suffering. Supporting the Indonesian government's claim on East Timor involved suffering. Staying 'neutral' also involved suffering as many people saw this as a decision to abandon his flock and support the occupation. Fighting nonviolently for *merdeka* also involved suffering. But not all suffering is the same. Echoing Bonhoeffer, Rev Vasconceles told me that when you fight nonviolently for *merdeka,* your suffering is redemptive. He said that God uses it to transform the individual, empower communities, and build a better world. When he realised this Rev Vasconcelos became a nonviolent activist for *merdeka*. He became a courageous resister. If he had continued to do nothing he would have become a bystander. Worse, if he had supported Indonesia he could have become a perpetrator as pressure mounted on him to support militia violence in East Timor.

This same journey is being undertaken in West Papua. As MacLeod and Moiwend (2014, p. 182) observe:

> Papuan religious leaders like Benny Giay, Neles Tebay and Sofyan Yoman have walked the path to becoming courageous resistors. So too are many political prisoners …. When Rev Benny Giay learnt he was on an Indonesian intelligence hit list he responded 'I cannot just sit there whenever children of the Lord are being abused or murdered. I have to stand up and fight for their rights and give voice to the voiceless.' People like Rev Giay

enlarge the possibility for others to cast off fear. Their courage transforms their political and social environment.

One final point about fear, there is a clear physiological response to feeling frightened: the heart rate increases, the mouth goes dry, breathing becomes shallow and adrenalin levels surge. The body can also react in other unpleasant ways. There are a number of tactical interventions that can help reduce physiological stimuli and therefore reduce individual experience of fear (see for instance Popović et al. 2007, pp. 156-159). Music can be used to increase morale and drown out intimidating noises like the beating of police batons on riot shields. Banners can be raised high to block out the site of armed troops. In addition to the points mentioned above in the section on tactical responses activists can articulate the reaction they are seeking and rehearse in order to maximise the likelihood of getting the response they want.

Humour can also be used to reduce the effect of fear. I recall, for instance, facing a phalanx of riot police on the barricades of the World Economic Forum in Melbourne in 2000. When the riot police appeared replete in black armour and helmets, visors down, advancing in unison while beating their batons on their shields, someone started to hum the soundtrack that was played in Star Wars films whenever the Storm Troopers and Darth Vader appeared. Others took up the chant. Suddenly the whole crowd was singing it. Many laughed and morale soared as we sang the music, positioning ourselves as Jedi Knights against the Evil Empire. The performance tapped into a powerful shared aural memory. We knew who we were and how the story would ultimately unfold. This helped people stand their ground and maintain nonviolent discipline.

Preparation and Planning to Build Movement Resilience to Repression

Preparation and planning are essential ingredients for waging a military conflict. This is equally true for nonviolent struggles. I have already alluded to the importance of analysing the opponent's power and the dynamics of conflict, crafting strategies, and developing resilient movement structures that enable coordinated mass participation. Obviously this is an important part of planning and

preparation as well. In addition there are several other things that movement leaders can do to prepare citizens to wage nonviolent struggle against ruthless opponents.:

• *Creating secure information and communication systems.* It is particularly important that movements operating in repressive environments develop a sound security culture and behaviour. At the very least movements need to find ways to keep names, addresses, financial systems, and other sensitive information safe. There are a range of ways of doing this, including using code and different types of encryption. This is a rapidly changing field and it is beyond the scope of this article to assess different technological options. Securing information and communication does not mean operating in secret. Sharp (1973, p. 485) and Burrowes (1996, pp. 230-232, 235) argue convincingly that movements should not rely on tactics that rely on secrecy to succeed.

• *Undertaking risk assessments and devising safety plans.* Frontline Defenders and Peace Brigades International (PBI) have devised useful systems for assessing risks and developing personal and organisational safety plans. These can be developed in advance.

• *Engaging third party accompaniment.* Movement leaders can also make contact with organisations specialising in unarmed civilian protection. Groups like Nonviolent Peaceforce and Peace Brigades International use unarmed strategies of protective engagement, monitoring, capacity development and relationship building to protect civilians (Schirch 2006; Duncan et al. 2015). The evidence suggests that these strategies can be extremely effective, even working in places of extreme violence.

• *Building personal relationships with members of the security forces.* Advance contact with the opponent's security forces should be designed to reduce fears and counter any ideological conditioning intended to dehumanise the resisting population in the eyes of the opponent's troops, thereby making it harder for security forces to carry out brutal actions. This strategy functions to promote security force divisions and defection, encouraging security forces to refuse to obey orders and to come over to the side of the people. When there is significant social and cultural distance between the movement and opposition troops, movement leaders should cultivate links with strategic allies closer to the adversary who can take action to humanise the movement (Galtung 1989; Burrowes 1996, pp. 87-88; Thurber 2015).

• *Developing contingency plans.* For each tactic that might be subject to extreme violence it is important to have contingency plans in place. That might include having teams ready to supply first aid and document the opponent's violence.

• *Training.* It is vital that activists are trained in advance. Training needs to include ways to maintain nonviolent discipline in the face of provocation. This kind of training can also help select activists more able to maintain discipline in the face of extreme violence.

• *Advance media contact.* Movement leaders need to utilise the media and transnational linkages with external solidarity networks to expose the violent repression of nonviolent resisters. That requires cultivating relationships with mainstream and progressive media outlets and individual journalists and editors, ideally prior

to violent incidents, to ensure they understand the movement and are willing to do all they can to cover incidents.

Conclusion

Nonviolent resistance movements, particularly those that confront an authoritarian opponent, will be subject to repression. That is virtually certain and leaders and activists need to prepare for it. Opponents seek to raise the costs of social and political struggle and rationally expect that movements will subside when those costs become high enough. The key test for movements will be their ability to persist in pursuing their social and political goals in the face of repression. The challenge is how to reduce the costs of persistence. Doing that requires wisdom and courage. Although casualties are likely, and should be prepared for, there is much that nonviolent activists can do to maximise the likelihood of achieving movement goals and minimising the cost of repression.

In recent years knowledge and experience of how to respond to extreme violence from opponents has grown considerably. This article has ordered that knowledge and experience from diverse sources into a systematic framework that is both theoretically robust and has clear practical applications. The features of this framework include building movement resilience to repression at the strategic, tactical, organisational and the individual levels as well as engaging in advanced preparation and planning. The strategic dimension involves careful analysis of the opponent's power and the ways they depend on ordinary people. This analysis needs to inform a plan that: increases the active participation of ordinary people; draws in new and diverse allies into the movement, particularly those from key social groups who can influence the opponent's behaviour; divides the opponent elite; and promotes moral outrage by activating 'backfire'. At the organisational level it is important that movements that face extreme violence create decentralised networks that are also structured in ways that support communication and coordination between the different nodes of the network. Tactically, there are many things that movements can do including maintaining discipline and developing repertoires of low-risk, high-participation nonviolent actions. At the individual level particular

attention needs to be placed on supporting fearlessness and mutual support in order to assist activists to move people along the pathway to become courageous resisters. These interventions also need to be supported by advanced preparation and planning which necessarily involves training and education, making advance contact with external supporters and a robust communications and information plan. Using West Papua as an example I have argued that applying this framework can even assist movements operating in worse case scenarios: a resisting population in an isolated area, far from local or international media and networks of support, who face an extremely ruthless opponent which views them as less than human.

Of course, there are also limitations of this research. Some movements have adopted many of the interventions discussed in the article. However, there is not a single nonviolent resistance movement that I am aware of that has systematically applied the entire framework to strengthen a particular struggle for positive social change. Neither is it clear how possible, or even likely it is, that movements would adopt the framework. This challenge partly goes to the nature of leadership, decision making, and diversity in social movements. How readily can the various component parts of the framework be generalised and adapted across culture, time and space, let alone integrated into a coherent policy and program of action?

If research into nonviolent resistance was funded as much as military research, a large-scale experiment could be devised to test the framework. Even so, the voluntaristic, diverse and ephemeral nature of social movements, not to mention the ethical considerations, would make such scientific and comparative research a fraught undertaking. However, willing partners may be found for a more limited effort. Indeed each of the five dimensions can readily be translated into a program of education and training. Some of this work has already been done. Brian Martin's backfire model, for instance, has already been translated into a Manual (Martin 2012). CANVAS in Belgrade, Training for Change in the United States, Peace Brigades International and Frontline Defenders of Human Rights have worked on parts of the framework, although no-one, that I am aware of, has looked at how the component parts might be integrated into a systematic, unified and coherent program of action, training and education. With a careful action learning design and a rigorous monitoring and evaluation process

the framework could be tested and refined. Although repression remains a persistent and tragic reality for many social movements there are hopeful signs that could support action learning. The phenomenon of civil resistance is becoming more prominent and more successful over time. Civil resistance as a field of research is growing and maturing. There are also many foundations and donors willing to assist nonviolent conflict transformation. Consequently a logical next step is to return to the field with a program of action research.

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