COMMENTS

'Riots' during the 2010/11 Tunisian Revolution

A Response to Case's Article in JRS Vol.4 Number 1.

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Abstract

Case's (2018) analysis of unarmed violence during the 2011 Egyptian Revolution has furthered the argument for the need to assess unarmed political violence in the context of civilian resistance movements. This response to Case draws on interview data from participants in the 2010/11 Tunisian Revolution, who detailed the use of both nonviolent and violent methods and tactics. With the findings applied against the criteria of mobilisation, resilience and leverage that Case derived from Schock (2013), the Tunisia case fundamentally offers further supporting evidence for Case's conclusions. However, the Tunisian events also highlighted the problems with reducing the analysis of nonviolence to its pragmatic-strategic components in the relation to violent methods. This is particularly significant given the constructive work and the establishment of alternative political and economic structures that were attempted in Tunisia. Such efforts were linked to the 'aspirational nonviolence' that interviewees revealed, in the pursuit of aims under a broad concept of 'dignity'. Therefore, although Case's expanded concept of civilian resistance to include unarmed political violence is a sound analytical tool, and drawing on violent methods may offer a greater variety of means of resistance, there is still considerable scope to study and practice enhanced methods of nonviolent resistance, with due consideration for 'moral' questions over how we organised politically and economically, and the pursuit of nonviolent social revolution.

Introduction

Case's (2018) article in *Journal of Resistance Studies* (JRS) has raised pertinent issues in relation to the literature on civil resistance and nonviolence, concerning how it has dealt with the presence and role of violence within campaigns and actions considered to be nonviolent. Case's use of Egypt as a case study was particularly intriguing, given the striking parallels with the results of my PhD research into the methods of protest during the 2010/11 Tunisian revolution. Case's position is briefly outlined below, followed by a broad introduction to my research method and findings. The elements of nonviolence and violence in the Tunisian case are then applied to Case's assessment of salient dynamics of civil resistance derived from Schock (2013), in terms of mobilisation, resilience and leverage. The theoretical and practical implications of Case's (2018) study in relation to unarmed violence are generally supported by my Tunisia findings. However, I also discuss 'aspirational nonviolence' and constructive work as significant aspects of nonviolence in Tunisia, detailing their implications for resistance.

Case's Position

The fundamental argument Case (2018) outlines is that civilian resistance movements, although widely considered in existing research to be characterised by nonviolence, have 'involved rioting and other acts of unarmed collective political violence' (p.10). Unarmed political violence concerns such acts as, 'destruction, sabotage, arson, and physical altercations with police or political opponents—not in contrast to but *within* the context of the types of movements the scholars call nonviolent [original emphasis]' (p.10). Meanwhile, 'riot' is used by Case to, 'indicate collective, unarmed political action by a group of civilians involving destruction of property and/or harm to people' (p.14). Case acknowledges that terms such as 'riot' are contended (p.13); my aim here is not to elaborate on terminology but concertedly engage with the substance of Case's assessment. However, Case emphasises that studies such as Chenoweth and Stephan's (2011) equate 'violence in civilian-based movements' with, 'a limited version of the violence in armed struggle', overlooking unarmed violence as defined above (Case, 2018,

p.16). Throughout my PhD thesis I referred to protesters' 'violence' without discrimination; although not definitionally useful, this emerged from an equivalent position to Case (pp.20-21), that such violence should be recognised as being precisely that.

Method

My PhD research involved the collection of primary data through in-depth interviews, in accordance with a grounded theory method (GTM)[1]. The interviews were undertaken with individuals involved in the protests during 2010/11, with many having prior experience of resistance to President Ben Ali's regime. The following section provides a brief overview of the concepts pertaining to nonviolent and violent dynamics that emerged, as developed from the interview analysis and critical engagement with relevant literature. Below, interviewees' pseudonymised names are italicised.

Violent and Nonviolent Dynamics in Tunisia

The main concepts concerning this paper are broadly summarised here, all of which are touched upon in the following discussion:

The framing or presentation of the revolutionary movement, which was enabled and occurred not just online but through various channels of communication;

The question of leadership and the nature of 'actocracy';

Military and security force defections.

These concepts were and are highly pertinent to the nature of nonviolence, although concepts developed specifically concerning the nature of nonviolence were:

The lack of 'pragmatic' and 'principled' distinction in nonviolence;

The rationalisation of violent activities, particularly as revenge, in self-

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[1] Given the necessary brevity of this response, I will be happy to enter personal correspondence to provide details of my GTM method and the substantial evidence collected.

defence and in contrast with regime violence;

The cultural or socially-specific context of nonviolence in Tunisia, nonviolence as a cultural object or nonviolence as an aspiration, which for example enabled coalescence around nonviolence as a stark contrast with regime violence;

The sense of mutual sacrifice, the loss of fear and unity;

Grassroots political and societal organisations emerging in the early post-Ben Ali period and the suppression of revolutionary momentum;

'Dignity' as an overarching revolutionary aim;

The lack of exogenous influence.

These concepts clearly have relevance to Case's assessment of violence '*within* the context of the types of movements the scholars call nonviolent [original emphasis]' (p.10). The following will first relate my evidence to Case's analysis. Subsequently, I will discuss some of the prominent aspects of nonviolence in Tunisia based on the above concepts, as some qualifications are warranted to extend the understanding of nonviolence and violence's relationship.

Assessment of Unarmed Violence according to Case's dynamics

Case (2018) himself considered Schock's (2013, pp.281-282) three principal concepts of civil resistance theory, namely mobilisation, resilience and leverage, suggesting that each is, 'enhanced by making unarmed violence legible within movement repertoires' (Case, 2018, p.24). Here I will take each in turn, reflecting on the evidence from Tunisia.

Mobilisation

Case (2018) suggests that riots 'might frighten some people away from participation in nonviolent actions, but they might also politicise people and rouse them to action' (p.25), with responsiveness of activists required in relation to the varied forms of potential participation and changing 'structural and systemic constraints and opportunities' (p.25). Further,

Case suggested that acts of violence may play a crucial role or spark a campaign, while being relevant to collective action frames that 'the campaign influences and is influenced by' (pp.22-23).

Concerning broader dynamics of mobilisation, during the Egyptian revolution Case (2018) points to various acts, such as police stations' destruction, that created room for nonviolent demonstrations and occupations to occur (p.32). Various interviewees commented on how Tunisia's larger demonstrations and protests, particularly in January and building up to the substantial demonstrations from 11th-14th January, were diverse in their participants, for example including very young and elderly individuals (*Eya, Nazir, Dalia, Achraf*), reflecting nonviolent demonstrations' participation advantages. However, Case's qualification regarding Egypt is pertinent in the Tunisian case also, because various participants related their direct clashes and fighting with the security forces, in a manner that helped to liberate spaces such as university campuses and areas of towns and cities where the police then found it difficult to operate (*Ayoub, Nader, Aycha, Dalia, Noman*). Thus, protests and demonstrations could emerge and be perpetuated, as well as sit-ins and strikes sustained. Nonviolence's ability to attract sympathy was questioned by Case (2018, p.28) and will be returned to below, but in the Tunisian context, it was not apparent that commitment to nonviolence was comprehensive, nor necessary. *Dalia* explained that in Sousse, the local population around the university proved a very effective 'incubator'; further qualifications would be Ehsan's questioning of the extent of the broader population's mobilisation—he placed it at perhaps 1%, although this is purely speculative—while another Sousse-based UGET member (*Ayoub*) emphasised the opposition and indifference the larger protests faced as they marched through neighbourhoods.

It was apparent that the regime's brutality while attempting to suppress the demonstrations had a consistent counter-effect in galvanising individuals to join protests, while protester violence in response was rationalised and perceived as limited compared to the regime's violence. Remaining strictly with Case's analysis of mobilisation and violence for now, it indeed seemed apparent that protesters' violence was broadly accepted and did not hinder mobilisation, because the regime's severe violence created a 'nothing to lose' mentality (*Emna, Ridha, Bassem, Nazir,*

Eya). Considerable admiration and solidarity with those demonstrators 'facing the bullets', particularly those in the interior, was expressed (*Mariam, Nazir, Bassem, Nader, Emna, Ridha, Kenza*). However, that protesters were comparatively less violent, were 'unarmed' and indeed drew on nonviolent methods I believe played into an emerging narrative of 'peaceful demonstrators', which is expanded on below.

Resilience

Case (2018) connected a campaign's resilience to a diversity of tactics, suggesting that although a 'tactical cost/benefit analysis' of unarmed violence's potentially detrimental effects on a campaign's resilience is warranted, 'there may be significant *emotional* benefits to riots, both for participants and onlookers, which strategically enhance a movement's overall resilience'; this is also reconcilable with 'rational' action (Case, 2018, p.26).

　'Spontaneity' (to mean leaderless) has been perceived as an advantage of the Tunisian protests, at times linked to the prominence of internet communication technologies and online organisation (Bamyeh, 2012, pp.50-51; Castells, 2012, pp.17-18; Ghonim, 2012, p.293), as well as to nonviolence (Kirkpatrick & Sanger, 2011; Ramadan, 2012; see Kahlaoui, 2013, p.152). My PhD research indicated that heavy qualifications must be made at least to the first two. While this does not strictly concern nonviolence or violence, *Ridha*, a prominent activist, blogger and citizen journalist, referred to the concept of 'actocracy', which seemed to be significant to resilience. Very briefly, this pertains to the diverse, dynamic, fluid and decentralised nature of leadership rather than its absence, something reflected in Sghiri's (2013, p.28) first-hand account; as Ridha suggested: 'It's acts that decide what's going on'. De Filippi's (2015) definition of actocracy is helpful: 'a community of dispersed individuals' with a 'shared view and commitment to achieving a common objective' may be governed by a system of 'extremely informal' norms, 'often based on the principles of *actocracy* (i.e. the first to act is the one to rule), collective agreement and implicit consensus' (p.303). Altering this to, 'the first to act is the one to lead', we may see how organised activity resulted in varied nonviolent and violent actions. This also seems to be linked to the compulsion to act in response to regime violence, which

pervaded the interviews. *Noman* stressed the importance of responding to protester deaths, relating that '[we] don't really have a strategy or tactic but it was just direct clashes [with police.] It was more an emotional movement, more than a rational or tactical movement'. Regardless, *Noman*'s explanation downplays what was achieved through the logic of 'actocracy', while the 'emotive' movement still saw its elements of violence rationalised (*Hamza, Mariam*), with the will to act and counteractions by the regime galvanising others to participate due to their anger.

Here consideration should be given to nonviolent discipline, which has been emphasised as crucial during the 2010/11 WANA events (Boesak, 2011, p.4; Bamyeh, 2012, p.56; Ettang, 2014, p.418; Khatib & Lust, 2014, p.9). Case (2018) pointed to Pinckney's (2016) research to question the conclusion that the breakdown of nonviolent discipline during three of the colour revolutions had, 'a negative impact on the overall campaign', because, 'all three cases in the study were ultimately successful in ousting their respective heads of state' (pp.23-24). If we take a similar measure of success in the Tunisian case as being the departure of President Ben Ali, it is apparent that the absence of nonviolent discipline also did not undermine the Tunisian protests. Interviewees did relate to me instances where they personally attempted to maintain nonviolence during their involvement in events (*Ayoub, Nazir, Dalia*). Yet the violence that did occur was largely rationalised by both users and spectators of it, including when it was unequivocally admitted as being in revenge. As a broader comment to assessments of violence in the WANA region, the rationalisation of violence counters orientalist conceptions of undirected 'rage' (p.xviii). Indeed, the rationalisation of violence more reflected Fanon's (1990) sense of a 'cleansing' or cathartic violence (p.74); the destruction of police stations, RCD party infrastructure, Ben Ali-Trabelsi properties and raiding of government offices was excused based on their symbolic significance and for the understandable anger against the regime, while also having tactical and indeed strategic significance (*Nader, Nazir, Hamza, Ridha, Mariam, Noman*).

Leverage

Case (2018) expressed concern that 'protest organisations, especially in Western democracies, often deploy non-disruptive repertoires which

might have the appearance of contention but which nevertheless fail to exert meaningful pressure on authorities, creating a disruptive deficit [original emphasis]' (p.27). This *disruptive deficit* 'of conventional protest, in tandem with the neoliberal capacity to "manage the marginalised" (Katz 2008) and coopt dissent, produces a vacuum likely to be filled by political violence' (p.27), something Case suggests is compounded when adherence to, 'strictly nonviolent forms of protest' is decreed by, 'professional activists and social movement organisations' (p.27).

Although the implications of the *interplay* of nonviolence and violence are difficult to extricate in terms of distinct effects on mobilisation and resilience, Case's assessment of 'leverage' draws more of a divide between nonviolence and violence; where conventional protest fails, political violence becomes attractive, something that is exacerbated by calls to potentially ineffective nonviolence . It is here that the Tunisian case raises certain issues for Case's analysis. One pertinent point simply concerns the need for tactical and strategic creativity under nonviolence, for example in the means of nonviolent escalation (Johansen & Martin, 2009; Dudouet, 2015; Sørensen & Johansen, 2016), and alongside meaningful pressure we may also speak of meaningful *change*, with regard to which the presence of nonviolent 'constructive work' has not been given consideration. This is a potentially serious form of disruption, a form of intervention in the status quo and alternative to the standard organisation and running of things. I will return to this in greater detail in the Tunisian context, although it suffices to say here that the establishment of the 'Councils for the Protection of the Revolution' during the 2010/11 events emerged as part of what I termed a specifically 'nonviolent aspiration', reflecting Vinthagen's (2015) conception of 'without violence' and a manner of utopian enactment (p.222).

Political jiu-jitsu is given some emphasis by Case (2018), reflecting the focus it has received in the nonviolence literature as a prominent dynamic (Weber, 2003, p.258; Engler, 2013, p.61; Sutton, Butcher & Svensson, 2014, p.559). However, it is notable that Sharp (2005) emphasised that political jiu-jitsu 'sometimes operates', being a form of 'persuasion' that Sharp deemed the weakest form of action, a secondary dynamic to what he advocated as a 'heavy reliance' on 'large scale, carefully focused noncooperation' (p.10; Sharp, 1973, p.658). Although

my interview data showed political jiu-jitsu to be a prominent dynamic in the Tunisian context, alongside its associated 'backfire' dynamics, to draw a distinction from 'moral' jiu-jitsu seems contrived. Although the Tunisian military was perceived as having 'defected' or at least stayed neutral due to measured political rationality (Brooks, 2013; Pachon, 2014), the overlooked wider security force 'defections' (or 'indifference' regarding Ben Ali) and empathy with demonstrators was considered to reflect revulsion at the violence they were being asked to commit against fellow citizens, as well as wider emotional and psychological demoralisation (*Ridha, Nazir, Nader, Ayoub*; also Jebnoun, 2014; Pachon, 2014).

Relating to this, Case's (2018) assessment of the 'backfiring phenomenon' is still pertinent, where he suggested that although protester violence is believed to strengthen repression and diminish public support, this rests on 'the presumption that movement success requires each action to lead to increased public sympathy, the reliance on media to represent protest actions accurately, and the systemic bias that likely plays into mass-perception of protest' (p.28). Drawing on Meckfessel (2016, pp.190-3), Case (2018) suggests that backfire:

> might have more to do with preexisting opposition to the forces of repression, or with the appearance of disproportionate or illegitimate repression, than it does with absolute nonviolence on the part of the protesters […] A violent response from police can diffuse activists, harden their resolve, create disillusionment about the established order among onlookers, and set off 'microbmobilisation' processes that expand opposition to a regime (p.28).

Again, I am unconvinced that this necessarily creates an inevitable space for unarmed action, because as Case undoubtedly acknowledges the context and circumstances must be weighed by activists. However, Case's qualification of 'absolute nonviolence' holds in the Tunisian context and in relation to the severe backfire of regime violence. Nonviolent discipline was not necessary; it was only necessary for the state's violence to be more outrageous than that of protesters' violence, which recalls Gandhi's (1979) position before the 1942 Quit India Movement (p.160). But it is also apparent that the perception or narrative of a peaceful,

unarmed and defensive movement that shaped views during the protests may have provided a useful contrast with regime violence that could also have undermined security force confidence. Effective exposure of regime violence through various communication channels seemed imperative for producing a backfire effect, reflecting Martin's (2012) analysis that backfire processes are neither always opportunistic or passive (also Martin, 2007; Sutton et al., 2014, p.5610). Further, disillusionment among elements of the security forces potentially reflected a longer-term accumulation of empathy and engagement with protesters (see Sharp, 2010, p.63), at least since the early 2000s, in addition to many security force members' shared social and economic plight with ordinary Tunisians. Consideration of such dynamics is how nonviolent resistance can in fact seek and prove to be disruptive.

Assessing some of the specific aspects of the Tunisian protests further in the parlance of 'undermining pillars of support', Case (2018) considers the dilemma of security forces when faced with riots and peaceful protests, which is, 'how much force they are willing to apply in an attempt to end the disruption, or risk spreading it' (p.30). This concerns decisions over engagement occurring at, 'all levels of the chain of command, including both rational and emotional considerations such as a fear of mobilisations escalating, fear of being physically hurt, desire to or fear of physically hurting others, commitment to following orders' (p.30). I was intrigued by his statement that 'emotions and consequences of decision-making are palpably higher during violent protests' (p.30), as it seems apparent that responding to nonviolence and the potential of a backfire effect creates grave emotional implications and practical consequences. One example has just been given, with security forces' decisions to fulfil orders to use lethal force against ordinary Tunisians that were potentially friends and even family (*Ayoub, Nader, Nazir, Ridha*).

Specifically assessing decisions over engagement, the extent of the backfire of regime violence and the rationale behind it should be given some focus. There were clear points during the Tunisian protests when regime violence severely backfired, for example after a massacre in Kasserine on 9th January that played into considerable protest escalation, including in Tunis' poorer areas (*Noman, Ridha*). This led *Ridha* to exclaim, 'Oh the ghetto is out, Ben Ali is fucked!" (see also

Sghiri, 2013). Nevertheless, interviewees gave a sense of consistent, high-intensity regime violence throughout the demonstrations. *Noman* explained that the Regueb demonstrations began on 21st December, 2010 with immediate clashes with the police, and police entering houses to make arrests. Such transgressions, alongside stories of individuals and even a baby being shot in the security of their own home, indicating undue and lethal violence generally, made a significant impression on numerous interviewees. Such violations contributed to the 'nothing to lose' mentality.

From the 10th January Sidi Bouzid, Regueb, Kasserine and Gafsa all appeared to have established a space absent of domestic security force control. How violent clashes contributed to this cannot realistically be dismissed, however, additional mechanisms may have been central, for instance, the general strike from 10th January in the Sidi Bouzid region (Noman). Additionally, the military's deployment from the 9th January should be considered, because it was suggested by Ehsan that the security force's violence diminished at this time—perhaps tempered by the military, which created a space for large-scale demonstrations over the following days. However, I believe the military's deployment seemed to be a further case of the regime being out of touch with events and seeking to *escalate* not limit violence, regardless of the effect; Pachon (2014) revealed that Ben Ali had ordered the military to collaborate with the Ministry of the Interior to 'suppress the uprising' (pp.515-516). It was on 10th January when Chief of Staff General Ammar supposedly refused the order to fire on protesters, although this was a misrepresentation of his reiteration of a clear chain of command for authorisation of lethal force (Pachon, 2014, p.516). The actual role of the military was ambiguous; Nader suggested the military intervened against the police in Gafsa, whereas Noman explained that the police's continued use of live ammunition culminated in a civil strike in Sidi Bouzid and Regueb. This could be considered an appropriate nonviolent escalation that avoided inviting potential suppression from the military.

Finally for this section, Case (2018) proposed that 'protester violence and subsequent repression can have impacts in both demobilising and mobilising directions' (p.28), ultimately summarising that:

> Any tactics, riots and unarmed violence are likely to have both potential benefits and potential costs for movements, depending on the context and on a variety of factors. In order to effectively analyse the impact that these have in specific civil resistance movements, violent actions must be incorporated into the overarching analytical framework (p.31).

This I believe is imperative, and Sørensen's (2017) article in *JRS* has stressed the potentially severe practical implications for activists if cases of resistance that may be learnt from are uncritically stripped down to their nonviolent elements. Although various features of the 2010/11 Tunisian revolution have been noted above as just some of the instances where violence and nonviolence overlapped, the following section notes some prominent aspects of nonviolence that I believe must be considered for future resistance.

Nonviolence in Tunisia

Two prominent aspects will be concentrated on here, which are the significance of a 'narrative' of nonviolence in Tunisia, as well as the nonviolent 'aspiration'. Neither 'narrative' nor 'aspiration' are intended to imply that nonviolence was not something tangible or practiced during the Tunisian revolution, as both rested on some degree of applied nonviolent methods. Concerning the narrative of nonviolence, Tunisia shows that perceptions remained important to the growing discord and divergence between the regime and society; the practical argument that acts of violence can be exploited by the state to justify counter-violence is a powerful one, indeed well acknowledged by interviewees such as *Dalia, Ridha* and others who directly intervened to limit acts of violence (*Nazir, Ayoub*). The regime was excessively violent, and the protesters were widely perceived as nonviolent, at least 'comparatively' so. A commitment to nonviolence, even if not strict discipline, seemed to be beneficial in Tunisia; it is difficult to determine what the implications of greater protester violence would have been in terms of backfire, but nonviolence contributed to the effectiveness of the backfire of regime violence. The need to be able to effectively create and disseminate such a narrative is important to resistance movements, particularly in this apparent 'post-truth' era wherein an opponent's negative framing may be difficult to counter, as with the Tunisian regime's accusations of protestsers being

terrorists and criminals. Yet in Tunisia the regime appeared to largely lose control of the narrative, undermining their capacity to use demonstrators' violence to negatively frame them.

Concerning aspirational nonviolence in Tunisia, this is best reflected in Vinthagen's (2015) sense of nonviolence as being 'without violence' and 'against violence', a form of, 'utopian enactment—a confrontation where violence is pitted against an attractive possibility of something else' (p.222). *Emna*, a young university student at the time, explained her reasons for participating in the demonstrations:

> Mainly the thing which pushed me actually, was seeing, we didn't really used to seeing people who are bleeding. *We're not used to that, we grew up feeling safe, relatively safe in this country* [emphasis added]. We know we are in a dictatorship, but we are not used to seeing blood, we are not used to seeing people shot in the head, their brain just coming out.

This loss of security strenghtened the compulsion to respond in unity and solidarity with other Tunisians facing regime brutality. The regime's violence was akin to a foreign occupier (*Emna, Ridha*; also Sghiri, 2013), an exclusionary force that detached individuals from their sense of belonging or identity in society, creating an unsettling contingency that compounded their will to act as a means of re-securing oneself in society. Various interviewees identified myriad aspects of what they believed to be nonviolence's rootedness and presence in Tunisian culture (*Ehsan, Bassem, Eya, Kenza, Taher, Hamza, Achraf, Ines, Nabil, Dalia*). While this may be no more or less true for Tunisian culture than others, it appeared to have a strong influence as a cultural object and aspiration during the revolution; where nonviolence was aspirational was in its characterising of the reformulation of society, with Tunisians' unity and unified action characterised as predominantly nonviolent (see Chabot & Vinthagen, 2007).

While much of this may seem intangible, the recognition of the self in the other, shared malaise, threats and indignity that manifested variedly for individuals, was acted on. Alongside demonstrations, parallel political structures emerged in the form of the 'Councils for the Protection of the Revolution' (CPRs), grassroots organisations across Tunisia which sought to pursue deeper political, economic and social

change during the events. Although varied perspectives were offered on their role, the cynicism expressed by certain interviewees (*Ayoub, Nader*) only seemed to play into the efforts to undermine the CPRs and co-opt and institutionalise the push for change, undertaken by organised political parties and institutions, as well as the regime remnants. They clearly offered a platform for ordinary individuals, unemployed, youths and those seeking radical change to organise, feeding into efforts such as the Kasbah demonstrations to ensure the Ben Ali regime's remnants were uprooted, strengthening strikes and occupations of workplaces for economic objectives (*Noman, Yosri*), and even organising the provision of municipal services for a time (*Ayoub*). Only a brief survey and evaluation can be offered here, however, such activities in Tunisia were within the realm of 'nonviolent revolution' and 'constructive' work, irrespective of their ad hoc or transient nature, which themselves are issues that need further research and work. At a minimum, the CPRs point to an area where nonviolent activists and resisters should study and work to improve.

Implications for Resistance

The 2010/11 Tunisian events fundamentally support Case's (2018) conclusion that violence such as riots and property destruction should be acknowledged as part of civil resistance movements and, moving forward, further engagement with the effects and implications of that is required (pp.34-35), both theoretically and practically. However, in pointing to some of the prominent aspects of nonviolence in Tunisia, I feel the real 'disruptive' capacity of nonviolence may lie beyond some of the traditionally 'pragmatic' or strategic elements, and with constructive elements that have commonly been overlooked during the 2010/11 WANA events. Thus, by means of conclusion I will to some degree pick up where Case himself concluded.

Case (2018) seems ambivalent over the distinction between principled and pragmatic nonviolence (p.34), however, he expresses approval of 'drawing a distinction between the belief in moral nonviolence and an analysis of the processes that enable unarmed civilian social movements to achieve their political goals', as 'something powerful and necessary' (p.34). By leaving aside the 'moral argument against the use of violent action', this requires a willingness to 'critically asses the efficacy of

various approaches and combinations of available tactics' (p.35) within the specific context, including, 'Adding riots and other violent protest activities into the legible repertoire of civil resistance strategies and tactics' (p.35). However, mindfulness is necessary of the warnings of the 'critical peace' literature in relation to the 'principled-strategic' literature, which concerns very broadly questions of power, emancipation and nonviolent revolutionary change (Jackson, 2015, pp.18,20; Sørensen & Johansen, 2016, p.84; Baaz, Lilja & Vinthagen., 2018, pp.191-192).

I would actually point to Case's brief allusion to the criticisms of those such as Chabot and Sharifi (2013) and Vinthagen (2015) of Sharp's 'attempt to separate Gandhian strategy from Gandhian moralism' as being 'faulty to begin with' (p.34); but not only that, Sharp's belief that 'a movement could not truly have one without the other' (p.34; Sharp, 1979, p.269). My engagement with Sharp's (1979) research in relation to Tunisia indicated to me that Sharp's conflation of principled and pragmatic action requires more engagement, particularly given the impression in some quarters of the influence of his 'pragmatic' position over the 2010/11 WANA events. Indeed, Chabot and Sharifi's (2013) scepticism over the efforts for deep democratic change during the 'Arab Spring' partially rested on this misplaced impression (Chabot & Sharifi, 2013, p.279; Schock, 2013, p.279), although Chabot (2015) later revised his position on Sharp's influence (pp.277,244). This is a significant issue, because I believe the Tunisian-based efforts in this regard such as the CPRs are crucial to consider; furthermore, Sharp's (1980) analysis of the requirement for parallel and alternative structures on an Arendtian basis as a means of pursuing deep democratic change and decentralised political systems (pp.157-159; Arendt, 1969, p.124), inherently and unavoidably concerns moral questions, such as how political systems ought to be arranged and others treated.

While Sharp suggested such structures can emerge out of violent processes, spaces where nonviolent means of organisation and communication can endure, with avoidance of 'power over' (Vinthagen, 2015, p.184) and pursuit of shared dignity (as in the Tunisian context) hold potential for progress. Moreover, Sharp (1980, pp.32-33,58,153) and others (Martin, 1993, pp.125-126) have emphasised the need for investigating effective nonviolent defence of these spaces, as resilient

alternative democratic structures have proven problematic. Mindful of Johansen's (2007) call for nonviolent social revolutions to be pursued, with previous 'pragmatic-strategic' revolutions failing to achieve meaningful change and seeing the entrenchment of neoliberal systems (Johansen, 2007, pp.157-158; Johansen, 2012, p.313), this requires rigorous planning for what happens the day after a revolution 'succeeds'. In the Tunisian and Egyptian context this was the overthrow of the dictator. Yet the narrative of a nonviolent, 'successful' and democratic transition in Tunisia is part of the country's problem, disregarding the severe challenges that remain. Research that is nonviolent by academics concerned with emancipation through nonviolent resistance has to challenge these narratives.

Such considerations do not exclude room for assessing violence and nonviolence's interplay, which is sorely needed. However, acknowledging the conflation of principled-pragmatic nonviolence in practice should also lead to more research drawing on nonviolence's emancipatory legacy and potential for change (Sørensen & Johansen, 2016, p.84), and cognisant of Jackson's (2015) warning that the allure of violent resistance is strengthened without 'rigorous critique of violence as a political instrument' and 'sophisticated understanding of violence in all its forms' (pp.38-39). With ethical arguments for violence's emancipatory potential continuing to be made (Boyle, 2015, p.137), moral arguments for the need for social revolution should not be overlooked while seeking alternatives. Moving forward, Tunisia's 'nonviolent aspiration' and elements of constructive work marks one alternative, however nascent and transient.

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